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MEMBERSHIP: Annual subscription for individual members is
$60AUD. Associate membership for students and
retired members is $35AUD. Institutional
membership is $70AUD. Single issues are $20AUS,
$22AUS (incl. GST) for Australian-based sales.

BACK NUMBERS: No. 77 et seq Obtainable from Managing Editor.

ISSN 0001-2793
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The notion that language is not merely referential but serves a communicative purpose with a definitive goal has led to the development of the study of “language in use” or “discourse.” The “performative function” of language has thus taken central stage under the sociopragmatic approach. Additional notions such as “face” and the concept of “politeness” have shifted the focus to what interactants “do” with discourse instead of what they “mean” by a given utterance.1

Conversation can be said to contain two elements, the informational and the phatic. The latter is part and parcel of the sociolinguistic repertoire of any society whereby some conventional formulaic expressions are used as a gambit to open or direct a conversation or to establish our distance from and express our feelings towards the other. The anthropologist Malinowski (1884–1942)2 coined the phrase “phatic communion” to refer to this social function of language, which arises in order to maintain rapport between people in line with the maxims of politeness. In other words, phatic communication is used to establish social relationships rather than impart factual information. In 1960, Jakobson3 used the term “phatic function” to refer to the channel of communication that is established to maintain communication. Robins4 used the term “relevance and idle chatter” to refer to this aspect of human communication that reflects a courteous approach towards the other interlocutors and reflects one’s ethnic

* This paper was sponsored by Kuwait University Research Grant # AE 02/08
background, kinship and social hierarchy. Coulmas\(^5\) refers to phatic expressions as standard links between what people actually say and what sort of communicative functions their utterances serve to perform. Schneider\(^6\) introduced another term “small talk” and developed grammars, which characterize small talk in particular domains. Laver\(^7\) further analysed small talk by describing the contexts in which it occurs while Cheepen\(^8\) studied topics typically used in such contexts. Holmes\(^9\), however, tackled the topic from a different angle; she concluded that Americans’ responses to compliments are usually perceived as face-threatening acts, because the recipients, especially women, are obliged by social norms to appreciate them and at the same time show modesty.

The analysis of requests by Ervin-Tripp and Wolfson’s study of compliments in American English as well as the contrastive investigation by Blum-Kulka, House and Kasper all point to a burgeoning interest in the field (Sanchez 594). Nevertheless, the majority of these early studies were ethnocentric in approach and remained heavily language-centred. In 1985, Wierzbicka carried out a contrastive analysis of requests in English and Polish in an attempt to detect culturally differentiated ways of speaking. She claims that different pragmatic norms reflect different cultural values. For instance, she associates the interrogative form of requests in English with the Anglo-Saxon tradition of individual freedom that guarantees the right to accept or reject a request.\(^10\) Similarly, Oleksy\(^11\) conducted an ethnographic study of compliment response in American English and South African English. He found out that American English speakers show a higher frequency of compliment response while South Africans prefer acceptance. Along the Whorfian hypothesis, he establishes a link between linguistic structural modes and the sociocultural patterns of the speaking community.

Within the same ethnocentric approach, several Arab researchers investigated the function of phaticity in certain regional dialects of Arabic. Nelson, el-Bakary and Al-Batal\(^12\) compared Egyptian and American compliments while Al-Khasawneh\(^13\) explored the translatability of Jordanian phatic expressions into English. Mughazy,\(^14\) on the other hand, conducted an oral discourse completion test to study the pragmatics of the evil eye formulaic compliments and the recipient’s response strategies in the form of evasion, humour, complaint and confrontation.

The study of phatic communion is inherently part of discourse research, which sets out “to make sense of or to interpret phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them.”\(^15\) Part
of what the analyst has to do is to re-imagine (i.e., interpret) the actual discourse of which the text-as-record is a very impoverished trace. While the semantic component of the text is relatively discernible by textual clues, the interpretation of the expressive-emotional aspect of phatic expressions requires extralinguistic and sociolinguistic references. Otherwise, the pragmatic core of the SL text may be lost and, therefore, ambivalence in the TL text may arise for the recipient reader. The misinterpretation and in effect the mistranslation of phatic expressions may misrepresent the author’s communicative intention, the social context of the situation as well as the disposition or relationships of the participants in a given communicative act.

The Constitution of Phatic Expressions
The acts of greeting, leave-taking, thanking, apologizing and so on constitute universal phenomena. However, the linguistic realization of these acts, the content and rules of their performance may exhibit variations from one language to another depending on the particular values and beliefs of their users. Phatic expressions vary in their forms according to constitution and place of occurrence in a discourse. The conventional form of phatic communion requires the presence of interlocutors (an addressor and an addressee) a place, time and an occasion. The latter can be a simple casual chat or a special occasion such as birthdays, anniversaries, Christmas, graduation and many more. The forms of phatic interaction range from simple greetings and compliments, suggestions and advice, requests and appeals, promises and reminders to indirect warnings and threats. The goals, on the other hand, vary between achieving a sense of familiarity and group integration to realizing the outcome of a given speech act.

Setting plays a detrimental role in the volume and frequency of phatic communion. Kendon discusses the correlation between phatic communion and the participants’ arrangements. He postulates that participants arrange themselves into a particular spatial-orientational pattern and they cooperate to maintain such an arrangement throughout the conversational act. However, it should be pointed out that phatic communication is not constrained by the immediate spatial and temporal environment. Postcards, e-cards, e-mail, voice-mail and text messages provide convenient alternatives to face-to-face conversation.

Parent considers some non-conventional phatic gambits. He cites the case of repetition as a positive politeness strategy. When an addressee repeats an utterance he has already heard, this is
considered an overture of emotional agreement with the utterance and stresses interest. Sometimes, the speaker repeats certain parts of the request or elaborates with reasons for the request even after the addressee gives a positive response. This is done in order to soften the conversation by pulling the addressee to see the reasonableness of the request. Likewise, when the addressee interrupts the speaker’s utterance only to complement it, this shows that the addressee is aware of the speaker’s needs and both are in full agreement. Using ellipsis, on the other hand, indicates that the speaker and addressee share mutual knowledge. For example, a speaker may use a given number (e.g. SP 25) to refer to a watch being repaired on the assumption that it is interpretable within a shared understanding between both interactants. Finally, diminutive forms are sometimes used to minimize the intensity of a face threatening act as they appear to have an element of self-humbling and persuasion. Parent cites the example of offering a carrier bag to a customer in Catalan by using the diminutive una bosseta “a small carrier bag” in order to persuade the addressee that “it’s only a little carrier bag so you can’t say no” (601).

Prior to, or at the beginning of, a conversation, participants often frame the event. That is, they make clear to each other the intended nature of the conversation-to-be. For the most part, the purpose of this small talk is to establish rapport and trust among the interlocutors and provide time for them to evaluate each other. According to Miller, all conversations contain phatic communion since “one needs to feel good about the speaker in order to be able to want to take part in any of what he or she has to say.” Yet, this does not undermine the fact that opening conversations are also purposeful in that they help the participants define their goal, whether to negotiate or be resolute. It should also be made clear that the degree of phatic frequency varies according to topic and setting. Thus, business-oriented interviews and emergency calls have the lowest level of phatic clichés. For example, Gonzales reports that emergency calls consist of disjunctive, fact-seeking sequence whose aim is to elucidate the location and nature of the emergency and dispatch the required remedy. In such settings, time is of the essence and there is no point in wasting the precious seconds in establishing unsolicited solidarity.

Conversational phatic expressions including honorifics and greetings constitute the most common type of spoken discourse that is intended to convey emotions, initiate a talk and sustain it. Rather than imparting information, they function to share feelings, create goodwill (or hostility), or set a pleasant (or offensive) social
mood. In other words, they establish the tenor and attitudinal setting for a possible dialogue. Holmes (5) postulates that this strategy is used by polite people to “avoid obvious face threatening acts” and denote “non-imposing distancing behaviour.” Indeed, without softening tactics like indirectness in the request (e.g. I wonder if you could...) or the use of politeness markers such as “please,” requests are intrinsically face-threatening since they involve the placement of an imposition on the addressee and an intrusion into his/her territory.

Since phatic communion is part and parcel of the cultural etiquette and the communicative framework of any given language, Crystal remarksthat cultures vary greatly in the topics which they permit as phatic communion. For example, the weather is not a universal conversation filler as one may find in traditional conversational routines in English. Likewise, some cultures prefer complete silence to uttering a courteous formulaic phrase. In this regard, Darwish notes that translation interventionism is required to make the translation of [phatic expressions] conform to target language conventions and norms in terms of politeness, social distance and honorifics. He cites the example of the word “wife,” which has several Arabic synonyms each indicating a different level of politeness and formality (زوجة / عفيفة / حرم / قريبة). The choice of any of the Arabic equivalents will determine the degree of deference shown to the addressee. On the other hand, Dickins finds that sometimes it is virtually impossible to mediate conversational routines as they constitute an integral part of cultural exoticism. He cites a sample of repetitive Arabic conversational salutations which can only be functionally rendered as “hello” and “how are you.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arabic ST</th>
<th>Literal translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>السلام عليكم</td>
<td>A: Peace be upon you.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>وعليكم السلام</td>
<td>B: And peace be upon you.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>كيف الحال</td>
<td>A: How are you.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>الحمد لله</td>
<td>B: Praise be to Allah.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>كيف حالك أنت؟</td>
<td>A: Praise be to Allah;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>الحمد لله</td>
<td>How is the family?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>كيف الأهل؟</td>
<td>B: Well, praise be to Allah.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>بخير الحمدلة</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A non-vernacular translator of an SL text may not thoroughly understand the paralinguistic information of SL phatics, misinterpret the pragmatic meaning of a lexical unit and fails to reproduce an equivalent SL lexical function in the TL text. Within the lines of phatic expressions, Beridze identifies exotic foreign honorifics that are not translatable. Many of these turn into borrowings which, in general, are transcribed in translation. For example, effendi is a Turkish honorific suffix of the first name of the addressee which bears national colouring and thus it is transcribed or transliterated with the ensuing sense of foreignism. But should an average English reader be culture-sensitive enough to identify “Turkish” honorifics without a footnote definition? If not, it is unlikely that the TL reader would be able to realize the socio-cultural value of effendi as an authentic source honorific. Even more inadequate it would be to transpose a marker of distance with a marker of solidarity. For example, while the address titles “sir” and “mister” expresses distance, respect and formality in English, their direct lexical equivalent Batono in the Georgian language community stand as markers of intimate phatic communion.

The dichotomy of phatic expressions: cooperative maxims vs. conversational politeness

In 1975, H. Paul Grice published his “Principle of Cooperation,” which was composed of four maxims that were believed to govern any effective human conversation:

1) Quantity: Give the appropriate amount of information.
2) Quality: Be truthful (Quality).
3) Relevance: Give the appropriate type of information, i.e., be relevant.
4) Manner: Be clear. (Grice 18)

Grice’s maxims, however, seem to apply to ideally framed conversational settings where there is an immediate goal or set of purposes, mutually-accepted by the participants (Grice 48). They may not apply in their entirety in the case of phatic expressions on the grounds that Grice was not originally concerned with phatic communion. In the real world, ideal settings are often not present; participants may flout the maxims by monopolizing the floor, interrupting the speaker, being ironic or withdrawing from the whole conversation. Grice’s point of departure was not that people always apply these maxims, but that if one flouts one maxim (e.g. by jumping to an irrelevant point in the course of a conversation),
the speaker may be prompting the listener to look for a meaning (i.e. an implicature) that is relatively different from the meaning expressed at the surface level (Spencer-Oatey 1633).

In a development on the Principle of Cooperation, Leech introduced the maxims of politeness, namely tact, generosity, modesty, agreement and sympathy. His argument was that according to the Economy Principle, politeness aims at minimising antipathy and disagreement while maximising sympathy and agreement between interlocutors. Nevertheless, phatic communion expressions do not always obey Leech’s Principle as they may not signify lexical inferences in all cases of discourse. One may presume that phatic expressions are a case of redundant tautology and, therefore, should be “reduced where possible” as their elimination does not lead to ambiguity of message. In the words of Newmark, such superfluous expressions should be pruned:

Redundancies hang particularly loosely around clichés, phatic phrases (“phaticism”), repeated implied superlatives, prepositional phrases, rhetorical flourishes…Normally, the translator has to use restraint in excising redundant SL features, confining himself to pruning here and there, since if he goes too far he is sometimes likely to find the whole text redundant.

Darwish cites the example of the honorific pronouns such as usted in Spanish and vous in French (سيدكم / حضركم / أنتكم in Arabic), which are used for the third person singular to represent an embedded system of politeness that denotes rank, status and social distance of speaker and addressee. He proposes that the translator must decide whether (SL) cultural redundancies are essential for the message to be communicated effectively in a target language like English that lacks such honorific pronouns. He remarks that the dogmatic adherence to literal translation of cultural and emotive redundancies has created the misconception in the eyes of western readers who have come in contact with Arabic through translation that Arabic is a “flowery” language (Darwish 50–1).

It seems that the views cited above evolve around textual equivalence more than discoursal efficacy for the message to be communicated is not solely verbal. The socio-cultural aspect in phatic rituals often denotes a desire by the interlocutors to establish communication rather than simply impart lexical meaning. The fact that phatic expressions aim at enhancing politeness and saving face by employing positive formulae such as flattery or apology, may
flout Grice's maxims of cooperative principles that include quantity, quality, relevance and manner. In other words, an analysis of conversational discourse would reveal that most phatic clichés are not exactly concordant with the face value of their lexical interpretation. If so, then this would be considered a manipulation of the maxim of truth and relevance. However, Grice's maxims “are essentially ground rules for the interactive management of intentions.” Hence, they can be expanded to include the maxims of politeness such as tact, modesty and intimacy for without phatic expressions such as greetings, flattery and apology, sustaining a dialogue will be almost impossible. Therefore, it can be safely said that phatic expressions have relevance to the sociolinguistic function of communication and the conventional modes of culture. The interlocutors in a given communicative discourse need to determine their sociability level in order to map the trajectory of their dialogue. The cosmetic effect of phatic communion defuses tension and makes a request for information looks as a form of inquiry rather than an imperative imposition.

Consequently, any interpretation of phatic expressions should be viewed within a pragmatically dynamic schema of discourse. Rather than simply a static product within the immediate text, phatic communion is an ongoing interaction in the making. Interactants are not free agents who can alter social norms and etiquette nor do they simply quote conventional phatic clichés without individual engagement. Certainly, they are constrained by established conventions and customs, and restrictions are set on their initiative but there is always room for manoeuvre. In order to render a given phatic expression accurately in terms of relevance and cultural functionality, a translator needs to assess the situation that produces it. For instance, in case of an apology, one needs to understand the intention behind it, and its likely effects. It is only in context that speakers are able to recognize whether, for example, an utterance of “I'm so sorry” is to be taken as an expression of apology, regret, condolence, or sarcastic defiance.

Selection variables
There are certain variables that govern the choice of formulaic openings and closings such as setting, age, sex, rank, social/financial status, education and degree of intimacy. For example, the closing phrase الله إنشاء [God willing] can be interpreted differently according to age, the degree of intimacy or respect among the interlocutors. If the phrase is uttered as a command by a speaker of a higher social status or rank (e.g. a superior in a corporate) or of an
older age, it would carry the force of a speech act and forms a commitment to execute the command promptly; it would be approximately translated as “certainly,” “definitely” or “absolutely.” However, if the same phrase is used in response to a request by someone who is of equal or inferior status, then it would not necessarily constitute a moral obligation and it would better be translated as “ok,” “alright,” “I’ll see what I can do,” “I’ll let you know.”

Generally speaking, the older the speaker the more likely s/he would be inclined to use phatic expressions. Thus nowadays, the complimentary phrase [may Allah have mercy on you] or “bless you” in English, which is uttered after the addressee sneezes and says [thanks/praise to Allah], is rarely used by the pragmatic, internet generation who prefer to ignore the whole act of sneezing as simply a physical reflex to a given stimulus. Likewise, phrases like [may Allah bless you], [May Allah give you strength] are age/status-restricted since they are often uttered by an older speaker (or a senior of higher rank) to a younger one (or a junior of lower rank). In contrast, the phrase [May you be blessed with long life] is used initially or finally upon addressing old people or those of higher status.

In the same way, young people often use the title [sheikh] and [my uncle] to address senior citizens even though the addressee may never have performed the pilgrimage and is in no way related to the speaker. Ironically, speakers of a Lebanese or Syrian dissent use a similar word [father/daddy] to call young children as a way of emulating child talk. Finally, upon concluding a conversation, an old (male or female) speaker may use the expression [May our lives have a blessed ending]. Yet, younger people use the expressions [any service/I’m at your service] or [would you like to order/request anything] to address people of older age or higher status. Unfortunately, such phatic expressions have no direct translational equivalents in English and they are either given a literal rendition or are ignored altogether.

Abu Hatab (27, 31) notes that compliments are more frequent in the discourse of [middle-aged and old] females regardless of the age, sex or social status of the addressee. Indeed, there are sex-specific phatic expressions and compliments that are female-oriented. The compliment [out of this world/astounding/mind boggling] indicates that the speaker is feminine for if it is,
otherwise, uttered by a male it will connote that he is effeminate. Therefore, a translator should exercise caution when rendering equivalent English expressions into Arabic. If it transpires that the speaker is a male the natural choice would be عجيب or رائع. In the same way, the “goodbye” alternatives in Arabic include رائع and مع السلامه whereby the latter is often uttered by females. And when concluding a conversation, a female speaker is likely to say الكلام معك مانبل [It’s nice/ interesting talking to you]. Again, a translator has to determine the sex of the speaker before embarking on any one choice.

In terms of the degree of intimacy, a distant male would use a brief greeting such as السلام عليكم [peace on you] or مرحبا [hello] or a zero greeting, followed by a simple من فضلك/ لو سمحت [please] or ممكن... نافذ [by Allah, can …] before addressing his request to a male peer (Abu Hatab 32). The same distancing level occurs when the speaker is a female and the addressee is a male. Yet, if a male addresses a female and vice versa, s/he would prefix his or her request with more ice-breaking polite expressions such as حذفاً ، لو سمحت [excuse me, would you kindly …]. By modifying the standard formal greetings, one may indicate a special intimacy level as when young males address young females (often with a flirting intent) with the greeting صباح الورد [morning of roses] or صباح الورد [morning of cream O honey] which is almost the equivalent of the English “good morning honey” less the cream. However, a simple formal “good morning” may be combined with other lexical items or uttered with a special intonation to convey negative connotations. Thus for example, a rising tone on the word “morning” or the addition of the word “Beirut” would add sarcastic overtones as in the pod article entitled صباح الخير بيروت !! صباح الخير بيروت !! [Good Morning O Beirut !!] (منتدى الطيران العربي),31 which is intended to criticize the status quo in Lebanon.

Similarly, setting, distance and the number of participants involved would influence the choice a phatic formula. Thus, the opening phrase الله يعطك العافية [may Allah give you health] is addressed to an employee or a labourer before placing a request. However, the same expression can be used in Syria and Jordan to indicate mockery and reprimand when the addressee is blamed for a grave mistake. Another setting-related example is the greeting السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته [may peace, the grace and blessings of Allah be upon you]. Although, a participant in a conference held in an Arab locale may open his presentation by this traditional formal greeting, an interpreter would rather render the greeting as “good
morning” or “good afternoon/ evening” lest the literal translation of the original carries some unintended religious nuance. By the same token, the use of the time-free greeting [by Allah’s grace] is more frequent among males in the Arabian Gulf region and is mainly used in male-to-male conversation. However, in translation, such a greeting would rather be rendered as “hello” or “hi” for the same reason mentioned under السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته.

Topic-related phatics abound in (dialectal) Arabic. Upon receiving a favour or a noble deed, the beneficent would compliment the benefactor by the expression رايتك or بيض الله وجهك [may Allah make your face white] or بارك الله فيك [may Allah reward you with His blessings], which can be translated by a simple “thank you” or “(I) appreciate it.” Further, after delivering a baby, either parent is congratulated in one of the following: الحمد لله على السلم or مبارك ماجاك [congratulations for what you have been given] or جعله الله في خير or بزيبي بعزك الصالحة [may Allah make him a righteous/ pious son]. In English, a single word of “congratulations” will be sufficient. Likewise, upon surviving an accident or after undergoing surgery, visitors will often resort to expressions that involve religious nuances such as خطااك السو [may you be safe from evil], لاائن عليك [don’t worry, it’s alright], ماجور [all for a good reward], أجر وغفارة [may you be rewarded and blessed with good health], إنشاء لله [It’s alright. Allah willing, you’ll be rewarded by purging your sins] and ماتشوف شر [may you be safe from evil]. The latter has been extended to occasions that do not involve accidents or sickness and it has become more of a casual greeting as a filler or floor control device in conversations. For all the above, English uses fewer and shorter equivalents such as “get well soon” and “wishing you good health.” Naturally, the English translation will lose the versatility and the religious nuances relayed by the Arabic originals.

Another topic-related phatic expression is البيت بيكم [the house is yours] “feel at home,” which is used when welcoming visitors to one’s home. It should be noted, however, that in the event of a first visit to a recently purchased house, the visitor should initiate the conversation by the compliment منزل مبارك [may it be a blessed home] which translates into the broad-spectrum complimentary greeting in English “congratulations,” even though the Arabic expression carries religious overtones quoted from a similar verse in the Quran. Within the same context, سفرة دائمة [may yours be an
everlasting table] is uttered by the visitor after having a meal to thank the host for his/her hospitality. The equivalent English expression would be something in line with “thank you, that was a delicious meal.”

Geographical location and gender may combine to determine the type of phatic expression. In concluding a transaction at any commercial facility, a male salesman in the East of the Mediterranean region may thank a male customer by saying مغرضين [may Allah recompense you]. Yet such a phrase would rarely be used when either or both participants are females. Instead, it will be replaced by a simple شكر [thank you] or the borrowed French formula “merci.” The latter is also governed by the factor of education and liberalism since a religiously conservative female of the same region would prefer the Arabic to the French equivalent. An interpreter translating any of these formulae into English would rather avoid the intricacies of these fine variables and render the closing phrase as “thank you.”

Gender has also been found as a governing factor in the use of profanities and curses in phatic expressions. Females tend to use more standard expressions with lesser taboo forms. They are more likely to express positive politeness and to use mitigating strategies in order to skirt or dilute threats to an interlocutor’s face. On the other hand, masculinity is emphasized through the use of taboo (colloquial) words (Abu Hatab 42). Females may also resort to code-mixing between English and Arabic phatic formulae as a signal of high class and prestige (see the section on “lost in translation” below).

Lost in translation: phatic anomalies
What might be appropriate in one language might not be so in another since phatic rituals are informed by cultural conventions and social customs. It follows that transposing SL phatic peculiarities will create a sense of foreignism if no functional matches exist in the recipient language. Likewise, failure to reproduce the effect of such peculiarities into the TL will lead to unredeemable loss in translation. In his study of politeness in Catalan, Parent (597) indicates that loss in translating phatics is inevitable since some requests for information may be void of any preamble greetings such as “hello” or “excuse me,” “please” or even the closing “thanks” after the addressee’s response. He ascribes this to the urgency of the request and the immediacy of the response which may take place in such settings as near an elevator or a crowded passage in a shopping mall. In order to soften or
mitigate the “face-threatening” imposition, the speaker uses a compensatory intonational contour with a “polite” sound pitch. Yet, upon the reproduction of such an exchange in a written script the non-verbal features will be lost and the request may sound abrupt.

In both English and Arabic, speakers start a dialogue by using rhetorical questions such as “haven’t I seen you somewhere before?” which has a direct equivalent in Arabic بتيها لي إني شافتك “أنا مشبه عليك” or “قال هذه المرة [you look like someone I know]. The question/answer ritual about the wellbeing of the addressee also exists in both languages albeit with a higher frequency in Arabic. Likewise, the initial greetings are more elaborate in Arabic with questions ranging from the health of the addressee, the wellbeing and whereabouts of his sons, brothers, family, friends and acquaintances, his job and even the address of his current residence. Similar questions about the health of the addressee or some private family matters are repeated out of context at intervals in the middle of a conversation in order to fill pauses, mark a topical shift or simply as a gambit to keep the communication channel open. Translating such semantically “redundant” phatic interrogatives would sound awkward in English and they will definitely be culturally marked as Arab interactants tend to use the seemingly superfluous phatics to develop solidarity more readily than English speakers. This is probably why Arabic goodbyes tend to end with phrases while one word is enough in English (Abu Hatab 41).

One function of phatic communion is to show social solidarity. Therefore, it is not unusual to find that they are frequently infiltrated by dialectal and foreign words. However, since there is no standard gauge for rendering a given non-standard variation in Arabic by an English dialectal equivalent, a translator will either use a standard TL equivalent or a dialectal (slang) approximate. In both cases, the target rendition will reflect a style shift. Thus for example, a phrase like “shut up” has a different meaning than simply the literal صمت/خفس when uttered by a teenager expressing admiration towards his/her peer as in “shut up! This is a masterpiece” wherein the translation should preserve the complimentary overture as in إلهي، إنه حقيقة، إنه تحفة! رائعه! Likewise, A Kuwaiti youth may admire his male peer’s new car by cursing or calling names to express high solidarity يلعن يومها صمت على كل موديلات السيورت [damn its day, it beat all sport models]; an Egyptian would use a similar phrase يخرج بيتها دي ضربة (فركشت)
The nearest approximate translation in English would be “wow, it beat all sport models!” or “damn, it’s a knockout!” or even “it kicks a….,” A young female, however, may use more filtered expressions and show her admiration by saying “gosh, it’s a swell!” Indeed, colloquial and taboo phrases like [Allah Damn you] and [May Allah take your soul] are sometimes used to show group affinity and peer bondage especially among males who want to assert their masculinity. Such variations require that the translator be well-versed in the regional dialectal variations throughout the Arab countries and be able to relay the connotations rather than the denotations of phatic expressions especially in the presence of taboos and pseudo-curts which carry no acrimonious or bitter feelings at all. Nevertheless, there will always be an unredeemable loss in respect of the paralinguistic associations of locale and variations of regional colloquials that have no equivalents in the target language.

Another loss in translation occurs upon translating code-mixed phatic expressions. The latter are most noticeable in female colloquial speech as a marker of prestige and high class. Young educated females have a tendency to insert foreign (mostly English or French) lexis to initiate or end their phatic expressions, for example:

Bonjour, how is your madam (wife) today?
Can you give me the mobile please?
Ok. See you later, bye.

The effect of using code-mixing to convey a sense of prestige and high class is purged in the English translation as borrowed lexis are restored to their original unmarked status. This is a case of unamendable loss that can only be rectified by annotation.

Cultural Disparity: a case of under-translating
Compared to English, Arabic has a much more versatile inventory of phatic communion expressions. However, this does not entail that the issue of cultural disparity will automatically lead to untranslatability. Rather, it is possible to find functional equivalents even though the length of the target rendition may not match that of the source text. Generally speaking, the majority of phatic expressions in Arabic are cast in phrases rather than single words. Some of these expressions originate in the standard “classical”
version of Arabic while a good number are formulated in the colloquial(s).

Arabic phatic formulae tend to be permeated with religious nuances that constitute untranslatable loopholes when rendered in English where functionally corresponding formulae do not contain such references. Translators, therefore, tend to render ad verbatim or alternatively simplify the ST by using superordinate terms in the absence of equivalent hyponyms in the TL. For example, the simple greeting word “Hello” can be rendered as السلام عليكم [peace be upon you] or the dialectal الله بالخير [with the good of God] while the Lebanese-Syrian equivalent مرحبا [welcome] is used erroneously to be the addressee instead of the addressee (سعد الدين). Likewise, upon requesting and thanking, an Arab may use الله يحكمك [May Allah preserve you] or بارك الله فيك [blessings of Allah upon you] for which English would use the generic “please,” “would you kindly …” or “thank you.” Jones cites the honorific الشيخ “Sheikh” which is used by Christian-oriented Lebanese newspapers to refer to the former Phalangist leader as الشيخ بيار الجميل. A culturally equivalent translation would omit the Arabic honorific and retain “Pierre Gemayel” as there is no association of respect in the Islamic title الشيخ to warrant including any equivalent in the TT.

Similarly, on the occasion of buying a new car, English speakers use a simple compliment such as “congratulations,” while in Arabic and its dialects the equivalent is more elaborate: مبروك، الله يكفيك شرها [congratulations, may Allah spare you its troubles/evil]. A speaker is also expected to pass an anti-envy remark such as مالا شاء الله / تبارك الرحمن [with the blessings of Allah]. Even in simple matters as when the speaker forgets what he is about to say, he may resort to a filler such as اللهم صلى على النبي [Allah’s blessings be on the prophet]. The latter may also be used in an imperative form صلى على النبي as a floor marker to soothe the addressee and request turn taking. Indeed, there are many situations in which an Arab speaker uses an imperative construction while intending to convey a polite request or invitation as in offering a ride or while sharing a meal وركب يا [utter: “in the name of Allah”] and أم يذك [dig in].

Under-translation is also present in other settings like dining and inviting guests to a meal. For instance, if the loan phrase “Bon appetit” is translated into “good appetite” when sitting at a table with an English friend, it would sound semantically correct but socially and culturally wrong. A more natural equivalent would be “enjoy your meal” or “please, help yourself.” In the same way, its
Arabic renditions or the literal [شهبة طيبة] do not sound culturally correct as it is customary to say “الحمد لله” [Praise be to Allah] which have no functional equivalents in English. After a meal, guests are expected to compliment their host in English by phrases like “thank you, that was a delicious meal…” whereas in Arabic the guest says [صفرة دايمة] [May it be an everlasting feast] or [الله يدم النعمة] [May Allah perpetuate His grace]. In funerals, mourners may use phrases like “I’m sorry. Please accept my sincere condolences,” while the equivalents in Arabic carries religious overtones as in [لا حول ولا قوة إلا بالله وليا إلى راجعون] [To God we belong and to Him we return], [عظيم الله عزّكم] [May Allah exalt your reward], [أحسن الله عفواً] [May Allah honour your consolation], [اللهم أعزّك البقاء بحيوتك] [May you be recompensed in the rest of your life] or [سبحان الحي الباقي] [glory to God the Eternal the Immortal].

The case of under-translation extends even further to the phatic rhetoric of written letters. Arabic letters often open with the ceremonial invocation [بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم] [In the name of Allah Most gracious Most merciful] for which English has no equivalent. Likewise, the opening salutation “Dear …” in a formal English letter is (mis)matched by a more sombre equivalent in Arabic “Esquire” while the English complimentary close “with best regards” is rendered as “أืนحاك انتقدك” [please accept our utmost respect], which indicates a higher level of formality. It is also customary in Arabic application letters to insert a concluding phatic statement whereby the addresser expresses his gratitude towards the addressee and invites a favourable consideration of his request or application. Even the signature line is void of the phrases “sincerely yours” or “truly yours” as Arabic signatures are limited to the sender’s title and professional rank. All the above examples point towards the fact that it is fallacious to contemplate a faithful rendition of phatics and that instead of mistranslation we may opt for under-translation as a compromise.

Proxemics, kinesics and phatic gestures
Malinowski’s (296–336) definition of phatic communication is somewhat restricted to the oral verbal level. Yet, audible verbal expression is but one form of communication. To successfully
conduct a conversation, participants must display a willingness to collaborate and reciprocate through other non-verbal means such as maintaining a friendly body posture, showing attention and avoiding any unnecessary interruptions or disruptive remarks. Although only one participant is allowed to speak at a time, the addressee may react by facial expressions, head nods, touching behaviour and physical gestures to respond to many functions such as greeting and leave-taking, affection or aggression, attraction, gratitude and congratulation. For instance, if a participant leans backward, this might be a signal that he or she wishes for the conversation to end. If a co-participant reacts by leaning forward, the conversation must continue in its present phase. In this fashion, co-participants can move together into successive phases of the event which are much more easily identified with the individuals who utter them, independent of verbal suggestions and commitments. Simply being responsive, in any way, to others’ adjustments in spatial-orientational positioning sends a message of engagement, another function of phatic communion.

Another non-verbal expression of phatic communion is eye-contact. Co-participants repeatedly focus their eyes on different parts of the face and, occasionally, their eyes meet. The aiming of the eyes is perhaps the principal way in which the interactants can signify their attention and engagement. Indeed, one of the ways in which a recipient of an utterance may shift topic or redirect the speaker to another point is by looking away from the speaker and towards another member of the gathering (Kendon 332). Nevertheless, it is customary in an Arab society to avoid head-on eye-gaze which may be construed as defiant or rude especially when the conversation occurs between a male and a female. It is courteous to shift the eye intermittently without losing sight of the co-participant.

Although some proxemics are of a universal nature, others vary in their interpretation from one culture to another as they operate within certain social constraints. For instance, the standing distance between a male and a female is closer in a European society than in a conservative Arab setting where heterosexual interactants keep a safe distance. Moreover, North European societies avoid frequent touching while Arabs tend to tolerate it among individuals of the same sex (Crystal 401). Greeting embraces and kisses (on the cheeks or the nose) among males are done more frequently in an Arab society, even if the period of absence is as short as two or three days. Sometimes embraces are performed twice within the same session, both upon greeting and leave-taking. Fine differences
also exist between tribal Bedouins who prefer to kiss one cheek only and urban dwellers who alternate between two cheeks. Nose kissing is performed when the recipient is older in age or higher in status.

Gender differences are also present in performing greeting proxemics in an Arab society. While embraces are common between females they are not allowed between a veiled woman and a man unless they are closely related. Similarly, a man may not shake hands with a veiled female unless she takes the initiative by extending her arm. Any misinterpretation of proxemics can easily lead to embarrassing situations that may affect the progress of a conversational routine.

**Conclusion**
The study has revealed that although Arabic and English share some similarities with regard to the selection variables of phatic expressions, there are differences that are manifest in the structure and frequency of the formulae used. Thus, while Arabic uses more complimentary phrases English relies on single words. Likewise, the frequency of both lexical and non-lexical expressions is higher in Arabic.

The examples cited in this paper indicate that it is fallacious to contemplate a faithful rendition of phatics and that instead of mistranslation we may opt for approximates or even undertranslation as a compromise on the relative scale of correctness.

Our findings attest to the fact that the study of translation can never be entirely scientific or value-free. Like any ethno-cultural study, translating phatic expressions involves the creative reproduction of values within the constraints of pragmatics, semiotics and the socio-cultural background of the interactants.

Future studies may be channelled to develop a taxonomy of phatic strategies and their corresponding expressions in both English and Arabic. Such a taxonomy should involve a contrastive sociolinguistic and pragmatic analysis of phatic discourse with a view to diagnosing the sources of mistranslations and cultural mismatches. Research is needed to see if there is a correlation between the frequency of phatic expressions and the variables of topical choice, register and the interlocutors’ socio-cultural background. For instance, one contested assumption is that phatic clichés thrive in lesser educated and rural communities and that the co-participants’ profession is one of the important variables that determine the level of phatic expressions.
Further investigation is needed to explore the role of honorifics, titles, intonational patterns, proxemics and kinesics in the constitution and interpretation of phatic communion across languages and cultures. Such a study may also examine the influence of acculturation through the globalization of mass media.

NOTES


32. محمد سعد الدين ، "الترجمة ومعوقات التكافؤ"، البيان، العدد 219، يونيو 1984، ص. 80-67


Unlike many of Sir Walter Scott’s other novels, which are invested with a sweeping landscape encompassing various primary locales and, frequently, a wealth of sub-locales within locales such as London, *Woodstock* is confined essentially to that titular locale. Similarly, while, as Gary Kelly suggests, “Scott had a profoundly political and moral attitude to the material objects of life, state or domestic, and to the shape of the physical environment in which people lived,” *Woodstock* is arguably one of the most thematically dense sites in the Waverley canon. It is spatially present, invested with a wealth of immediate and dynamic symbolic values—past, present and future. The shadows of both medieval history (Henry II and Rosamund’s relationship) and more immediate history (the Civil War) stretch across the locale of Woodstock, and Charles II’s restoration is forecast, and indeed premised, on his escape from this locale.

In *Woodstock*, Scott establishes and asserts his position supporting Charles II and his anticipated, and ultimately realized, sovereignty through two techniques. First, he seeks to juxtapose the various representations of compromised and defiled authority operating throughout the novel. Second, having suffused the novel with the language of spiritual defilement and infection, Scott aligns the omniscient narrator’s sympathies with the mischievous “devilry” practiced upon the Independent sequestrators by the Royalists while simultaneously associating Parliamentary and Independent principals with the ultimate defiled authority—the Devil himself.

By deploying each of these mechanisms, he posits an implicit yet consistent argument supporting the Royalist assumption of
(relative) moral rectitude and integrity in the historicity of the period depicted in the novel and hence portrays Charles II’s restoration as a generally positive chapter in English history.

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Woodstock—that carefully constructed building (both physically and narratively) that resonates across history and references the monarchy from Henry II on—is the primary location of thirty-four of the thirty-eight chapters in Woodstock. It simultaneously encapsulates and maps the struggle for political and cultural supremacy by the warring Royalist and Parliamentarian/Independent parties throughout the novel. In addition, it provides Scott with a symbol through which to consider concepts of power, domination and authority.

Kelly considers Woodstock to be “perhaps the best of the later Waverley Novels […] presenting Scott’s mature deliberations on politics, language, and power, subjectivity, authority, and literature, with particular reference to British society in a post-revolutionary, or perhaps a pre-revolutionary age” (Kelly 165). Indeed, I would suggest that it is Scott’s “deliberations on” and resultant representations of the politics, language, power and authority operating specifically in the context of this historical period that engender his covert argument supporting Charles’s restoration at Woodstock’s close. It is, of course, through the political and religious nexus which dominates both the novel Woodstock and the locale Woodstock that Scott explores issues of authority and power.

Scott has been commended for his “even-handed” portraits of the various warring individuals and factions in the novel. Bjorn Tysdahl, for example, suggests that “Woodstock gives us characters that mirror each other across the political gulf.” Similarly, D. J. Trela emphasises that “[b]ad as these characters [the Commissioners] are, it is important to recall Scott’s careful balancing act in Woodstock, for the Cavaliers do not themselves come off all that well.” I want to suggest, however, that the apparently balanced representation achieved through the mirroring of characters across the socio-political-religious divides premised in the historicity of the Interregnum is, in fact, deliberately—and skilfully—distorted. It is useful to consider three instances of this distortion of characterization: Charles II and Cromwell; Sir Henry Lee and the Commissioners; and Joceline Joliffe and Trusty Tomkins.
I want to consider these characters in the context of what I term “compromised authority” and “defiled authority.” I define compromised authority as occurring when legitimate authority is undermined by its own shortcomings; when positional authority is not recognized; or when authority exists ostensibly “out of context.” My definition of defiled authority, by comparison, is when legitimate authority is engaged in unlawful activity; when positional authority is abused to the point of corruption; or when illegitimate authority is accorded legitimate status. I contend, therefore, that Scott portrays Charles II, Sir Henry Lee and Joceline Joliffe as emblems merely of compromised authority: Cromwell, the Commissioners and Trusty Tomkins are shown to be manifestations of defiled authority. I want now to demonstrate how Scott positions within the confines of Woodstock each of these six agents of authority as either compromised or defiled, as a means of embedding implicit approval of Charles and the Royalists in the context of a more invidious alternative.

It can be seen that Scott establishes the compromised nature of Charles’s authority in three ways. First, Scott demonstrates how, in Charles, legitimate authority is undermined by its own shortcomings by forcing an adjacency between the portrait of the ideal monarch painted by Alice and the “hard-favoured” reality of this Stuart monarch’s character. Second, Charles’s status as legitimate monarch is unrecognized. At Woodstock, initially he is physically unrecognizable, disguised as he is, though his identity and sovereignty are ultimately acknowledged: in the wider environs he continues to be politically unrecognised until the novel’s close. Finally, it becomes apparent that Charles’s authority even when recognized—as occurs when he declares his true identity to Markham Everard and Sir Henry—exists out of context. His authority is confined to the locale of Woodstock and to his loyal Royalist subjects. Charles is not in the necessary position of legitimate and recognized authority to effect the lasting restoration of a locale, and thus affirm his public capacity to instigate moral justice and order, as does the monarch in, say, The Fortunes of Nigel and Peveril of the Peak. In Woodstock and at Woodstock, Charles can only facilitate a purely private instance of restoring order by exercising restraint over his private desires, foregoing his ignoble pursuit of Alice, and bringing about the reconciliation between Henry Lee and Markham Everard necessary for the marriage of Alice and Everard.

Scott represents Cromwell’s authority in somewhat different terms. As Trela argues, Scott’s depiction of Cromwell is surprisingly
balanced, especially when viewed in the context of other Tory assessments (195–220). Indeed, it is interesting to note the similarities in Scott’s techniques of crafting Charles and Cromwell’s portraits. Scott draws their characters in equivalent depth, focusing on their respective strengths, weaknesses and histories. He even depicts their unprepossessing visages in similar terms—“the features of the Wanderer (Charles) were harsh as ever” (Woodstock 261) while Cromwell is “strong and coarsely made, with harsh and severe features” (Woodstock 85).

However, whilst crafting this adroit portrait of Cromwell’s positive and negative characteristics, Scott also establishes his authority as being not merely compromised—as Charles’s authority is shown to be—but defiled. Cromwell’s authority, although arguably legitimate (and thus shown to exist and operate beyond the confines of Woodstock by Wildrake’s journey to Windsor), is represented as being irretrievably debased by his “unlawful” act of regicide. That Scott’s Cromwell is well aware of this regicide being a heinous act is demonstrated in two instances. The first occurs when he, in Wildrake’s presence, unwittingly displays the Van Dyke painting of Charles I:

Cromwell, assuming a firm sternness of eye and manner, as one who compels himself to look on what some strong internal feeling renders painful and disgustful to him, proceeded, in brief and interrupted expressions, but yet with a firm voice, to comment on the portrait of the late King. [. . . ].

“It was a stern necessity – it was an awful deed! [. . . ] let him show to others the reproaches of that cold, calm face, that proud yet complaining eye: Those who have acted on higher respects have no cause to start at painted shadows. Not wealth nor power brought me from my obscurity. The oppressed consciences, the injured liberties of England, were the banner that I followed.”

He raised his voice high, as if pleading in his own defence before some tribunal (Woodstock 99).

The second instance takes place as Cromwell seeks to flush the supposed Charles II out from hiding in Woodstock:

“[C]anst thou think it a light thing to me, that, the blood of this lad’s father lying in some measure upon my head, I should now put in peril that of the son? … I am called Parricide, Blood-thirsty Usurper, already.” (Woodstock 402)
Throughout the novel Scott also establishes that Cromwell’s personal hunger for kingship, rather than a disinterested assumption of leadership, further defiles the nature of his authority—both through Markham Everard’s commentary and Cromwell’s own speech. As Wilt points out,

In Oliver Cromwell Scott shows a man maddened by the kingship he murdered, well ahead of his time, on January 30, 1642, haunted not only by the picture of the dead Charles I but, more terribly, by the desire which he must not desire— for kingship.” (170)

Thus, Charles’s compromised authority is shown to be superior to Cromwell’s—the unrecognized king is ultimately more fit to rule than the aspiring king. Charles, despite his varied flaws, is shown to be capable of, and indeed achieves, a “salvation of the heart through recognition of the reality of goodness.”

Cromwell, by comparison, is, as Kelly avers, “the dark sublime of power, at once awesome, frightening, and unknowable” (169).

Scott also addresses two other aspects of defiled authority: the abuse of positional authority to the point of corruption and the imbuing of illegitimate authority with legitimate status. However, he associates these examples of defiled authority with Independent, rather than Parliamentarian, characters—specifically, the Commissioners and Trusty Tomkins. Although Scott was at pains to construct an ostensible balance between the two supreme authority figures of the novel—Charles II and Cromwell—he does not seek to achieve this in his juxtaposition of the two denizens of Woodstock—Sir Henry Lee and the sequestrators, the Commissioners. Sir Henry is fondly drawn—a gallant yet irascible Cavalier of the old school, idealistic in his loyalty and devoted to his King, his Bible and his Shakespeare. The Commissioners are not so kindly used:

Harrison was one of the most cruel and pitiless men in Cromwell’s army; always urging some misapplied text to authorize the continued execution of the fugitives, and sometimes even putting to death those who had surrendered themselves prisoners. (Woodstock 122)

Bletson is a coward and an atheist who is “quite prepared to submit to Cromwell, or any one else who might be possessed of the actual authority” (Woodstock 125). Desborough is Cromwell’s brother-in-
law, whose “body seemed rather to resemble the disputatious representatives of a generative congress, than the well-orderd union of the orders of the state, in a firm and well-compacted monarchy.” (Woodstock 122)

It is interesting to note that Sir Henry Lee and the Commissioners both contravene martial law in their attempts to secure Woodstock as their prerogative. The Commissioners’ authority is shown to be defiled as a result of their malfeasance in sequestrating Woodstock and evicting its tenants, in defiance of the precepts of military law. This defilement is further verified by their subsequent abuse and corruption of their (equivocal) positional authority as they seek to profit from their unwarranted tenancy of the Lodge. Scott implicitly contrasts this debased authority with Sir Henry Lee’s authority as “Keeper” of the King’s property, which is founded on his disinterested commitment to the King’s cause, and compromised only by his illegal exile. By comparison, Sir Henry’s violation of martial law is no example of defiled authority—rather it is one of the more effective comedic events in the novel. Sir Henry, together with the deaf, old Dame Goody and the terrified Phoebe Mayflower, seeks to defend Woodstock from Cromwell’s troop of soldiers—to no avail.

“Death to all who resist—life to those who surrender!” exclaimed Cromwell, stamping with his foot. “Who commands this garrison?”

“Sir Henry Lee of Ditchley,” answered the old knight, stepping forward; “who, having no other garrison than two weak women, is compelled to submit to what he would willingly have resisted.”

“Disarm the inveterate and malignant rebel,” cried Oliver. “Art thou not ashamed, sir, to detain me before the door of a house which you had no force to defend? Wearest thou so white a beard, and knowest thou not, that to refuse surrendering an indefensible post, by the martial law, deserves hanging?”

“My beard and I,” said Sir Henry, “have settled that matter between us, and agree right cordially. It is better to run the risk of being hanged, like honest men, than to give up our trust like cowards and traitors.” (Woodstock 407)

While Sir Henry is indubitably contravening martial law by his defiance of Cromwell’s military authority, again his disinterested loyalty and valour in seeking to defend Woodstock contrasts with the defiled authority of the Commissioners and their ambition to
profit from their unlawful appropriation of the locale. If Charles’s sovereignty is a superior alternative to Cromwell’s Lord Protectorate, Sir Henry’s stature as an ambassador for the Royalists is far higher than that of the Commissioners as representatives of the Independents.

There is one further coupling of characters across the political and religious divide of the novel that further demonstrates Scott’s contrasting of compromised and defiled authority. The characters of Trusty Tomkins and Joceline Joliffe are paralleled comprehensively to demonstrate their inherent differences. The two are boyhood friends, of the same “lower order” in life, and in love with the same woman; they are, however, political and religious opponents. Again, Scott seeks to posit the compromised authority of the Royalist cause against the defiled authority of the Independents. In this instance, defiled authority is the result of illegitimate authority being accorded legitimate status. The Independent Trusty Tomkins is “an outright hypocrite playing both sides of the political fence as an informer … a spy who has worked for both rebels and royalists [and] an amoralist without political allegiance.” Nonetheless, he inveigles himself into Woodstock as a trusted and hence legitimated member of the Royalist cause:

Indeed, this man Tomkins seemed by some secret means to have gained the confidence in part, if not in whole, of almost every one connected with these intrigues. All closeted him, all conversed with him in private; those who had the means propitiated him with gifts, those who had not were liberal of promises. When he chanced to appear at Woodstock, which always seemed as it were by accident—if he passed through the hall, the knight was sure to ask him to take the foils, and was equally certain to be, after less or more resistance, victorious in the encounter; so, in consideration of so many triumphs, the good Sir Henry almost forgave him the sins of rebellion and puritanism. (Woodstock 344)

Joceline Joliffe is, however, cautious, keeping under careful watch this “discreet seneschal” (Woodstock 347). Ultimately, Trusty Tomkins’s attempted rape of Phoebe—yet another example of the abuse of a position of trust and consequent authority—results in Joceline Joliffe’s inadvertent killing of Tomkins. While this act of violence compromises Joceline Joliffe’s own authority as Sir Henry’s servant and trusted recipient of Louis Kerneguy’s true identity, his gallant and instinctive motive of protecting Phoebe
Mayflower contrasts favourably with Tomkins’s defiled intentions and hypocrisy.

Thus, it can be seen that Scott, by his juxtaposition of compromised and defiled authority at various social levels, seeks to promote the Royalist cause and, therefore, Charles II as a preferable alternative to that of Cromwell and his cronies. Throughout the novel, Scott draws carefully constructed alternatives to Charles and his potential to function as a legitimate, acknowledged and reinstated sovereign. Each of these alternatives is shown as operating, not as a compromised authority, but as a defiled one. Notions of defilement in *Woodstock* are not, however, confined to Scott’s assessment of the various authorities. They are embedded in the “territorialization of space” that dominates the novel as the opposing factions campaign to control the historic built environment of Woodstock. Just as Scott sought to establish an apparent balance between Charles II and Cromwell, he enmeshes the concepts of defilement in the language used by both warring parties. Each appropriates this language in his attempts to establish his own moral purity and superiority and represent the “other,” opposing culture as (spiritually and morally) polluted.

David Sibley argues that stable built environments enable the inclusion of dominant cultures and the exclusion (and control) of subordinate ones:

> [S]ocio-spatial exclusion [i]s a part of the more general question of social control … [which] is the attempted regulation of the behaviour of individuals and groups by other individuals and groups in dominant positions.

Woodstock is not, however, a stable built environment in the historicity of the Interregnum. As such, it functions as a confined space within which the struggle to determine and establish the dominant culture takes place. Hence, the efforts of both the Independents and the Royalists to effect a “socio-spatial exclusion” of their enemies from the confined space of Woodstock is an attempt to control those broader social boundaries determined by political and religious alignment. The eviction of the Royalist Lees by Tomkins on behalf of the Commissioners is therefore a means of imprinting the Independent dominance over Woodstock by establishing and reinforcing spatial boundaries. It is also the Independents’ “attempt to distance themselves […] from those who are deviant, different and dangerous […] because of their desire to maintain purity and cleanliness” in both political and
religious terms (Hubbard et al 259). The Royalists’ attempts to reassert their dominance over Woodstock are premised on the same aspiration.

Thus, if, as Sibley argues, “[t]here is a history of imagined geographies which cast … others who are seen to pose a threat … as polluting bodies or folk devils,” it can be seen that both factions engage vigorously and enthusiastically in this practice (49). In the opening chapter, Tomkins, in his self-appointed role as preacher, demands of his Royalist listeners who “wallow in the mire of monarchy”: “are ye not now plotting, or ready to plot, for the restoring of the young Man, the unclean son of the murdered tyrant?” (Woodstock 13).

Shortly after, with typical Shakespearean referencing, Sir Henry accuses his daughter of “let[ting] that rebel youth creep into thy heart I wot not; perhaps it is a punishment on me, who thought the loyalty of my house was like undefiled ermine. Yet here is a damned spot, and on the fairest gem of all” (Woodstock 23).

Sir Henry and Trusty Tomkins then energetically trade insults:

“Thou art but a canting varlet,” replied the knight; “and yet thou art right in some sense—for it is superfluous to curse men who already are damned as black as the smoke of hell itself.” (Woodstock 25).

Upon the knight’s departure from the scene, Tomkins then turns his attention to Joceline Joliffe: “[A]t the town of Worcester,” said the soldier, “where you were crushed like vermin and palmer worms, as you are” (Woodstock 35). Soon after, Sir Henry passes judgment on his nephew, Markham Everard: “Thou hast spoken truth in that, Mark, wert thou the blackest Puritan whom hell ever vomited, to distract an unhappy country” (Woodstock 52).

Later, Holdenough insists that “our native country is about to become the very sink and cess-pool of all schisms, heresies, blasphemies, and confusions, as the army of Hannibal was said to be the refuse of all nations” (Woodstock 108). Holdenough also considers Woodstock to be a source of Royalist pollution and
contagion: “a house of witchcraft and abomination, this polluted
den of ancient tyranny and prostitution should be totally consumed
by fire, lest Satan […] should find a garrison […] from which he
might sally forth to infest the whole neighborhood” (Woodstock
202).

Some time after, Sir Henry is disgruntled to find blasphemous
republicans can write well:

“John Milton!” exclaimed Sir Henry in astonishment—“What!
John Milton, the blasphemous and bloody-minded author of
the Defensio Populi Anglicani—the advocate of the infernal High
Court of Fiends; the creature and parasite of that grand
impostor, that loathsome hypocrite, that detestable monster,
that prodigy of the universe, that disgrace of mankind, that
landscape of iniquity, that sink of sin, and that compendium of
baseness, Oliver Cromwell!” (Woodstock 300)

Thus it can be seen that the language of pollution and defilement is
harnessed for use by Royalists, Presbyterians and Independents
alike—and the more fulsome the insult, the more dogmatic the
speaker. The only significant characters at Woodstock who do not
make use of this means of disparaging others and establishing their
own superior moral credentials are Alice and Markham Everard.
These two are the most virtuous individuals in the novel, and it is
their marriage which is effected by Charles’s intervention and which
“exemplif[ies] the good qualities of moderation and reconciliation
that alone deserve perpetuation. Thus out of the crucible of the
Civil Wars comes this marriage of Royalist and Puritan, this
melding of the best elements of both characters” (Trela 218).

Having established the general descent into the use of language
of defilement, and the superior moral qualities of those who do not
engage in such badinage, Scott positions his own Royalist
sympathies throughout the novel in two ways. The first is through
the “devilry” in which the Royalists engage to rid Woodstock of the
Commissioners; the second is via the frequent association of the
defiled authority figures of the novel—Cromwell, the
Commissioners and Tomkins—with the ultimate spiritual pollutant:
the Devil himself.19

In the opening chapter of the novel, Scott establishes his
Royalist sympathies through the strong authorial voice, which
resonates with a sense of loss and bereavement at the perceived
wanton sullying of the legitimate order and decorum. Both Sroka
and Trela draw attention to the notion of desecration of traditional
values reverberating throughout this chapter—"Woodstock begins, therefore, with an act of desecration, a church occupied by brute military force, presented as a kind of demonic possession" (Sroka 193). Trela makes the point that "the story opened with a description of the Woodstock parish church, which has seen its effigies smashed, its stained-glass windows shattered, wood carvings broken up, and its sacred aisles used as a stable" (Trela 215–6). This chapter portrays the oppression of Royalist values by the crude display of military power, and thus, being "emblematic of the social, religious, and political divisions of the Civil War and its aftermath … initiates a major theme of the novel, the relationship between language and authority" (Kelly 170–1).

Scott’s Royalist sympathies, already foregrounded in the opening chapter, are further revealed in his careful crafting of "the devil’s work" at Woodstock during the Commissioners’ tenancy. Sibley suggests that when "a threat to core values [occurs], social and spatial boundaries […] can become charged and energised. The oppressed, however, have their own strategies which challenge the domination of space by the majority, if only briefly and in prescribed locales. Ultimately, carnivalesque events confirm their subordination" (46). Similarly, Christopher Worth contends that

Woodstock is Scott’s most carnivalesque novel. At its core is the disruption of authority by the tricks played upon the Commissioners sent to dispark the Royal Palace … Representations of authority and its undermining are at issue throughout Woodstock … In a world inverted by a temporarily triumphant revolution, carnival signifies the resistance of the old masters (rather than the resistance of the populace) to the doxa of the new order; Scott finds himself ambivalently approving licence and liberating disorder."

Scott does not pass judgement on the Royalist’s antics at the "possessed" Woodstock locale; rather his commentary is directed towards the effects of this devilry on the Independent and Parliamentary recipients. The cowardice displayed by the Independent Commissioners is scorned—"here are Bletson and the brute Desborough terrified out of their lives, and Harrison raving mad, because the devil will not be civil enough to rise to fight him in single duello" (Woodstock 140); the relative bravery of the Roundhead priest, Nehemiah Holdenough, acknowledged; and the superior qualities of that "wise, moderate, and resolute person, Colonel Everard" reaffirmed (Woodstock 177).
Sroka suggests that the conflict in *Woodstock* is a “conflict between tradition and rebellion … depicted as a dramatized contest between good and evil, between the sacred and the demonic” (193). My argument is, however, that the conflict is between compromised and defiled authorities, and that, as a means of emphasizing the moral turpitude of those defiled authority figures mentioned, Scott juxtaposes the pseudo-devilry of the Royalists with the specific references by a range of characters—both Royalist and Presbyterian—to Cromwell, the Commissioner and Tomkins in the context of the devil himself. It is interesting to note how Scott deflects the one exception to this linking of the defiled authority figures with the devil. When Albert Lee takes issue with Wildrake’s entrenched debauchery, Dr Rochecliffe argues that this is more the effect of societal disorder occasioned by the Roundhead perversion of hierarchial mores, lays explicit blame for Wildrake’s failings at the door of “the lower orders” and suggests that Charles is similarly affected:

“You mistake him, dear Albert,” replied Rochecliffe—“Roger Wildrake […] is a gentleman, was bred at the Inns of Court, and spent his estate in the King’s service.”

“Or rather in the devil’s service,” said Albert. “It is such fellows as he, who, […] with their deep oaths, their hot loyalty, and their drunken valour, make decent men abominate the very name of cavalier.”

“Alas!” said the Doctor, “it is but too true; but what can you expect? When the higher and more qualified classes are broken down and mingled undistinguishably with the lower orders, they are apt to lose the most valuable marks of their quality in the general confusion of morals and manners—just as a handful of silver medals will become defaced and discoloured if jumbled about among the vulgar copper coin. Even the prime medal of all, which we royalists would so willingly wear next our very hearts, has not, perhaps, entirely escaped some deterioration.” (*Woodstock* 258)

Again, Scott notes the compromised authority of Charles and his “defaced and discoloured” character, yet differentiates it from the more debased forms of authority existing in the novel. By comparison, Scott links Cromwell—as defiled authority—explicitly with the devil. Kelly suggests that “all the characters in the novel are manipulated directly or indirectly by [Cromwell]; he is the *diabolus ex machina*, a real counterpart to the imagined and faked devil-work conducted at Woodstock to frighten off the
Parliamentary commissioners and allow Charles to seek temporary refuge there” (Kelly 169). Cromwell himself is conscious of the widely held belief that he is in league with the devil: “Peace, busy fiend, and urge me not!” said Cromwell. “Think’st thou, like other fools, that I have made a pact with the devil for success, and am bound to do my work within an appointed hour, lest the spell should lose its force?” (Woodstock 402). Wildrake is one of those “fools” — “Noll hath certainly sold himself to the devil,” he advises Markham Everard early in the novel, later adding: “I have seen the devil . . . and have, as thou say’st, got a warrant from him” (Woodstock 62 and 103). The references to the Commissioners in the context of the devil are equally overt: “I say,” said the Presbyterian [Holdenough], “there are worse folk may rise than cavaliers; and I will prove what I say. The devil is worse than the worst cavalier that ever drank a health, or swore an oath—and the devil has arisen at Woodstock Lodge!” (Woodstock 109). He continues:

“I see not that I may with prudence trust myself with the tossing and goring ox Desborough, or the bloody and devouring bear Harrison, or the cold and poisonous snake Bletson—all of whom are now at the Lodge, doing license and taking spoil as they think meet; and, as all men say, the devil hath come to make a fourth with them.” (Woodstock 110)

Wilderake, as is his wont, holds a similar view: “they thought I was their kinsman, the devil, come among them uncalled” (Woodstock 65).

The Presbyterian preacher, Nehemiah Holdenough, not surprisingly, decries the Independent Tomkins as “thou man of Satan,” “a man of buff and Belial” (Woodstock 9 and 11) and a “lying missionary, into whom Satan had put a spirit of delusion; and preached, besides, a solemn sermon on the subject of the false prophet, out of whose mouth came frogs [and who is therefore] a pestilent heretic” (Woodstock 348). While this can be seen as excessive religious zeal and professional pride on Holdenough’s part, Tomkins is ultimately proved to be all this and more, as Joceline Joliffe remarks: “when he was wild Philip Hazeldine, and then he was bad enough; but since he daubed over his vices with hypocrisy, he seems to have proved worse devil than ever” (Woodstock 355).

Central therefore to Scott’s position throughout Woodstock of supporting Charles II and his anticipated, and ultimately realized,
sovereignty is the cumulative process of demoting the alternative authorities operating in the Woodstock locale. In that confined space, Scott seeks to implicitly denounce Cromwell, his associates and his henchman as representatives of a defiled authority, against which Charles's compromised authority is favourably situated. Charles's potential to function as a legitimate, acknowledged and reinstated sovereign is further demonstrated by his being the only authority figure to achieve a positive restoration of order (albeit only a private instance) when he effects the marriage of Alice and Everard. By comparison, Cromwell's equivalent restoration of order at Woodstock is merely the rescinding of his arbitrary and illegal order to put the Royalists—including Bevis, the faithful hound—to death. Although at no time throughout Woodstock does Scott visit unequivocal approval upon Charles's character, ultimately he posits a strong and consistent argument that in the world of the Interregnum, where so much defiled authority is recognized and rewarded, the compromised authority of Charles II, that being legitimate authority undermined by its own shortcomings, is a superior authority—even when unrecognized but especially when restored.

NOTES

1 I am grateful to Professor A. D. Cousins for reading and commenting in detail on an earlier draft of the present essay.
3 As Gaston Bachelard suggests: “Past, present and future give the house different dynamisms, which often interfere, at times opposing, at others, stimulating one another,” The Poetics of Space (Beacon Press: Mass, 1994), 6. Kelly contends that “Scott’s novels, in the way they treat the past, are about the immediate present and future of Scotland, of Britain, and the Christian West—largely as imagined by Edmund Burke in his French Revolution tracts.” He continues: “[T]he narrator in the Waverley Novels … frequently compares the past in the novel with the present of the novel and its readers. This device suggests a continuity between historical hindsight and contemporary overview” (Kelly 144).
4 Fiona Robertson concurs, suggesting that “[w]ithin Woodstock itself, characters both exemplify and explicitly debate the relationship between language and political opinion. They also consider the part played in revolution—and, by implication—by works of literature … In other words, the novel participates in the literary-political process it analyses,” Legitimate Histories: Scott, Gothic, and the Authorities of Fiction (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 272.
The significance of the closing scenes of Woodstock has occasioned some critical dispute. Judith Wilt considers “Charles’s reward ... [to be] the splendid tableau-scene of the Restoration. There the Lees, and even the triumphantly domestic Markham Everard, sit like a sculpture group in a wayside bank to welcome the king to his own again,” Secret Leaves: The Novels of Walter Scott (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 176. Robertson, however, argues that Woodstock is the classic fiction of restoration, closing as it does with an idealized but worryingly static tableau of restored legitimacy. In other words, the novel participates in the literary-political process it analyses” (272).


This premise of compromised authority does not only occur in Woodstock. It is a recurring issue for Scott and therefore a central feature of the Waverley novels. Scott’s various representations of this concept of compromised authority occur primarily—though not exclusively—through the paradigms of law(lessness), (il)legitimacy and (il)legality in each of the Waverley novels from his first, Waverley, (1814) to his last, Castle Dangerous (1831). However, it is important to note that I use the categories of “compromised authority” and “defiled authority” in the context of the novel’s dynamic, and do not seek to position them in relation either to Civil War, or to post-Napoleonic, political discourses as such.

Sir Walter Scott, Woodstock (London and Toronto, J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd, 1931), 267. Further reference to the novel in this chapter is from this edition and will be cited by page number in the discussion.

In The Fortunes of Nigel, by promoting the marriage of Nigel Olifaunt and Margaret Ramsey, James achieves the partial restoration of the House of Glenvarloch and thus is seen to function in his public role as monarch. In Peveril of the Peak, Charles’s intervention in the abuse of justice surrounding Julian Peveril facilitates the reconstruction of Martindale-Moultrassie, another symbol of the king’s effecting the restoration of order in a public capacity. In both instances, the monarch achieves a restoration of justice and order through the reinstatement of the rightful owner and the recreation of a locale that functions as an emblem of moral order.

Wilt interprets the public and private significance of Charles’s renouncing his amorous pursuit of Alice somewhat differently. Charles’s “refusal to disencumber himself from “womankind” ... would be fatal to his public authority, not dishonorable to his private
affection or dignity; yet again as with Everard himself the avoidance of this public pitfall is camouflaged as an act of private generosity” (175). Kelly sees the duel between Everard and Charles as “yet a further example of Charles’s failure to govern his private character according to the requirements of his public position and responsibilities” (167-8).

12 See Woodstock, 85–7 for Scott’s portraiture of Oliver Cromwell and 272–75 for his drawing of Charles II’s character.

13 Wilt also focuses on Cromwell’s “forbidden desire to leap into the empty saddle, the high space just vacated by the legitimate king” (171).

14 Francis R. Hart, Scott’s Novels—The Plotting of Historic Survival (Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 1966), 101

15 This is no new activity for General Harrison whom both the omniscient narrator and Sir Henry denounce for his transgressing martial law by putting to death prisoners who had surrendered.


17 Phil Hubbard, Rob Kitchin, Rob and Gill Valentine, Key Thinkers on Space and Place (London: Sage, 2004), 262. I make use of a number of Sibley-esque concepts regarding the domination and control of space and place, the desire to maintain spatial exclusion of the “other” and the ambition to establish oneself as clean and the “other” as polluted. See David Sibley, Geographies of Exclusion: Society and Difference in the West (London and New York: Routledge, 1995).

18 Sibley, Geographies of Exclusion, 81.

19 Sroka makes the same point: “The authorities of the Interregnum—the commissioners, their dragoons, and Oliver Cromwell himself—are all repeatedly referred to as “devils” (193).

20 Kelly also makes the point that “there are two separate planes of historical experience and knowledge in the Waverley Novels—that of the protagonist, floundering in darkness and ignorance, and that of the omniscient narrator, explaining what no single character in the novel, nor all the characters collectively, could possibly know” (144) and that “[o]f all the characters in the novel, Everard is the one whose language is most like that of the narrator, though his language is naturally more individual and personal than the detached and general language of the narrator” (170).

In the fifth of his “Western Elegies,” written towards the end of his career, the pre-eminent Australian poet A. D. Hope notes the importance for him as a person and as a writer of his exposure to languages and cultures other than English. For the speaker of more than one language, he writes, aware that neither thought nor feeling is properly translatable,

his soul grows still and attentive,
Aware, beyond any speech, of a metaphysics of meaning
Which teaches that not mere words but the heart is what
must be translated.1

Hope was an avid learner of languages throughout his life, from Latin to Arabic and Japanese, and, as Kevin Hart has noted, “had access to a far wider range of poetries and poetics than any other Australian poet.”2 His poetry and criticism, accordingly, engage closely with an enormous wealth of material from the European tradition and beyond, focussing particularly on ancient Greece and Rome, on the modern “tongues of Italy, France and Iberia,” and the “tongues of the Goths and the Germans, the Norse and the Anglo-Saxons,” in which Hope specialised when at Oxford. Hope describes Russian as the “Last of the tongues of men into which my soul found translation” (Hope, Orpheus, 13), and from the mid-1960s onwards it is true to say that Russian literature occupied as important a place in his thinking and writing as any of the numerous other non-English cultural traditions on which he drew. Several of Hope’s late projects centred on this interest in Russian
literature. The most ambitious of these was his attempt to compile a volume of critical essays on Russian themes. Although this project was never completed, it is clear that in his examination of the Russian authors he chose to discuss, Hope was striving to create a statement about the nature of literature and the role of the poet in society which was also of direct relevance to his own practice as a writer. This article draws on the papers, correspondence and notebooks in Hope’s archive at the National Library of Australia, as well as on Hope’s published writing on Russian themes, to explore the full range of Hope’s engagement with Russian literature and to demonstrate its centrality to his thinking in his last three decades as a poet.

I

Hope had met Russians while he was studying at Oxford (1928–31): most notably the Russian language was prominent at Lacock Abbey, the country house in Wiltshire where Hope spent much of his free time when in England. Among Lacock’s other regular guests was a certain Mrs Perrin, an exiled Russian aristocrat “who filled the house with Russian and an air of excitement which she carries with her everywhere.” Hope’s hostess at Lacock, Maud Talbot, was well versed in European languages and literatures, including Russian, and she and Mrs Perrin were “continually skirmishing in the Russian tongue.” In his letters from Oxford, Hope also notes more varied intellectual encounters with Russian culture: the viewing of the film Rasputin, the Holy Devil, and a reading of Chekhov’s play The Cherry Orchard as part of the activities of a play-reading society with which he was involved. Perhaps inspired by these English experiences, on his return to Australia in 1931 Hope began to teach himself Russian, using a grammar together with the readers written by Lev Tolstoi in the 1870s for the peasant schools on his estate at Iasnaia Poliana. Hope took Russian lessons in Sydney and appears to have developed quite strong links with members of the Russian community there (Hope, Chance Encounters 76–7). Certainly he was still corresponding with his first teacher, Ursula Schwallbach, and other Russian-speaking acquaintances from this period, into the 1980s.

Since a large part of Hope’s papers was destroyed by a fire at the Australian National University in 1953 it is hard to trace his involvement with Russian themes during the two decades following his return to Australia. Occasional Russian allusions in the available documents, such as signing a letter to his future wife in 1939 as “Aleksei Persikovich Gop” (‘Gop’ being a form of the name ‘Hope’
as it would be transcribed into Russian script), suggest that a certain Russian sensibility had pervaded his everyday consciousness,7 and indeed in later writings Hope not infrequently inserts Russian words or phrases into comments which themselves have no bearing on Russian themes. For example, a 1957 notebook entry on the relationship between drinking and sex is headed (in Cyrillic letters) “Naoborot!” [On the Contrary].8 A 1970 entry in which Hope reflects on the costs of fame and consoles himself with the thought that he has scattered interviews around the world like animal droppings is entitled “Coprologia or Populiarnost’” [popularity].9

The question can reasonably be asked: how good was Hope’s Russian? Probably, he gained a respectable speaking knowledge in the 1930s, though by 1992 in Chance Encounters he notes that through lack of practice, as with his numerous other languages, he is no longer able to sustain even the simplest conversation (Hope, Chance Encounters, 79). Yet for the most part it was a reading knowledge of foreign languages that Hope held to be important to his vocation as a poet. In The New Cratylus he describes the method he applied to acquiring new languages: to learn the rudiments of grammar, then to immerse himself in poetry until he arrived at the “flash point” needed for “the essential feel” of the language.10 This method is perhaps calculated, as Hope admitted, to encourage a “feeling of language abstracted from its everyday, practical association,” but he does seem to have learned to read Russian with considerable facility, and continued to do so until late in life. This is suggested by the often extensive Russian quotations copied into his notebooks with annotations in English, the notes he took from Russian sources, the copies of articles in Russian stored with his other papers, and the letters in Russian from correspondents such as Nina Christesen. And although Hope not infrequently found it necessary to gloss Russian texts with English translations for words he did not know, and is occasionally guilty of misreading—his acknowledged creative misreading of the title of Anna Akhmatova’s cycle “Tainy remesla” [Secrets of the Craft] as “Tainye remesla” [Secret Crafts] is a case in point11—Hope’s Russian was most certainly more than adequate to its essential task: absorbing the rhythms and themes of a foreign literature into his own poetic sensibility. That he had fully internalised these rhythms is suggested by a dream he recounts in a notebook entry for 1973. Here he is writing an ode, in Russian, on the death of Pushkin. Two lines (of uncertain metre) remained imperfectly in his memory on waking: “Budet Pushkin, budet slava ego / Do sroka ... ykh vekov” [Pushkin will live, his fame will live / Till the end of ... ages].12
Hope’s most explicit and active engagement with Russian literature began in the late 1960s, following his retirement from the Australian National University, and his release from his administrative and teaching duties there. Hope had known Nina Christesen, the founder of Russian studies in Australia and lecturer at Melbourne University, since at least 1946, and in 1967 he became a founding member of the advisory board of the new journal *Melbourne Slavonic Studies*, which Christesen edited. Hope was to publish several critical articles on Russian topics in this journal over the next few years. He gave regular guest lectures on Tolstoi and Dostoievsky to students in the Melbourne English Department, and also addressed Christesen’s students on Russian poetry (Armstrong 92). His papers contain drafts and notes for several of these lectures, which covered such topics as the work of Akhmatova, Mandelstam, Pasternak, Mayakovsky and Voznesensky; the flourishing of poetry at the turn of the twentieth century in Russia and the subsequent disillusionment of writers with the Bolshevik revolution; and the literature of resistance in subsequent years. Hope’s early reading in Russian literature appears not to have gone beyond the usual nineteenth-century classics. In a notebook entry of 1971, for example, he recalls learning by heart several of Ivan Krylov’s fables when he was studying Russian in the 1930s. The earliest references to Russian literature in Hope’s papers are to Pushkin and Tolstoi, whose names recur regularly in different contexts over several decades. Other names that appear include Dostoevsky, Tiutchev, Baratynsky and Chekhov. Hope’s unrealised project for a book of critical essays on the poetic achievement of women writers, *The Distaff and the Lyre*, led him also to the peasant poet Irina Andreevna Fedosova (1831–99) and to Karolina Pavlova (1807–93), as well as to the much better known Anna Akhmatova and Marina Tsvetaeva.

On the evidence of the notebooks and other papers, from the early 1960s onwards Hope also began to take an interest in twentieth-century writers, apparently taking as his starting-point Boris Pasternak’s *Doktor Zhivago*, first published in Russian in 1957, and in English translation the following year. Although, generally speaking, politics is almost entirely absent as an overt theme in Hope’s writing, he made an exception in considering the role of the poet in the Soviet Union. As the Russian version of *Doktor Zhivago* was published in Italy in defiance of the Soviet censorship, Pasternak came under severe attack and was expelled from the Union of Soviet Writers at the instigation of its then General
Secretary Aleksei Surkov. Hope would naturally have followed the developments surrounding his enforced refusal of the Nobel Prize for literature in 1958 with considerable interest, and in 1972 recalls with some disdain the “hypocritical” remarks made on the subject by Surkov, whom Hope met at the home of Manning Clark in 1962. From Pasternak, Hope’s interests seem to have spread outwards to include Mayakovsky and other Futurists, to whom he may have been introduced through his reading of Pasternak’s autobiographical Okhrannaia gramota [Safe Conduct], and later to younger dissident or semi-dissident writers of the 1960s, notably Abram Tertz (Andrei Siniavsky), Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Andrei Voznesenskii. The first two of these were notable victims of Soviet policy towards the arts in the 1960s, while the third, whose career and writing Hope followed particularly closely, was an “official” writer who, while subject to criticism, nevertheless succeeded in achieving a high degree of independence within the Soviet literary establishment. It may have been as writers broadly seen as anti-establishment, and thus associated with the dissident movement, that Hope first encountered Anna Akhmatova and later Osip Mandelstam, to both of whom he devoted a good deal of attention during the 1970s, investigating the broad cultural context of the 1910s in which they first developed as poets (the Russian Silver Age) as well as their later fates and poetic output.

II

During the 1970s, Hope was also involved in several projects focussing on translations of Russian poetry. As well as working on his own translations from Mandelstam and particularly Akhmatova, he was associated closely with similar endeavours by his friends the poets David Campbell and Rosemary Dobson. In 1970, Hope records a meeting with American poets in New York at which they read their own versions of works by Voznesensky, in many cases prepared from literal translations made by other people. This seems to have been Hope’s first encounter with the translation method in which a poet who does not know the source language works in collaboration with a speaker of the language who is not necessarily a poet. Hope notes that in his opinion the results of this sort of collaboration had been mediocre: “Without a fairly good knowledge of the original in its own language, the poet working through a middleman seems to me like a blind man trying to translate the Last Judgement of Michelangelo into music from the description of an unmusical painter.”
A few years later, however, Hope had clearly modified his view somewhat, and in his foreword to the versions of Akhmatova and Mandelstam published by Campbell and Dobson as *Moscow Trefoil* in 1975, acknowledges that the combination of poet and native speaker can produce a genuinely creative solution after all. Hope has nothing but praise for the “literal” versions provided by Natalie Staples for this exercise, suggesting that their merit resides both in their literalness and their incompleteness: “Natalie Staples has, as it were, re-dissolved the original back into a stage at which its ‘character’ or ‘tone’ is already there, but its elements are still in a fluid and manageable state for another poet to work on it and continue and direct the process of crystallisation.”20 The role of Campbell and Dobson, Hope notes, was not so much to act as “subordinate introducers” of the foreign poets, as to create independent poems treating similar themes “in something the same way that Pope’s Epistle to Augustus is based on Horace’s Epistle to Augustus,” “not so much to sink the translator’s identity and spirit in that of the poem and the poet translated as to present the one interpenetrating the other in a new entelechy representing both, but also, in a sense, transcending both” (Hope, “Foreword” vii).

As *Moscow Trefoil* includes Natalie Staples’ literal renditions alongside the versions by Campbell and Dobson for each of the poems selected, the interrelations among the three are also a source of productive aesthetic resonance. The experiment in poetic recreation was continued by Dobson and Campbell, in collaboration this time with Olga Hassanoff and Robert Dessaix, in the selection of translations of Russian poems published as *Seven Russian Poets* in 1979.21

On several occasions Hope expounded his view of the translator’s task as interpreter working with the medium of an autonomous language to allow the original to speak in a new context to a new audience. This idea is most notably expressed in a paper on Akhmatova given at a seminar on translation from Russian at the Australian National University in 1977 and in related publications.22 His view is also very clearly reflected in his own practice as a translator, in which translation as such and imitation are closely intertwined. Hope’s principal achievement in this area was the poetic cycle “Homage to Anna Akhmatova,” where original poetry and translation are strikingly combined to produce one of Hope’s most powerful statements on the nature of artistic creativity, in which he both links Akhmatova and her role as a poet for her generation with the classical mythology of rebirth and
implies that his own poetry is a continuation of Akhmatova as well as of the classical tradition itself.25

III

It was also during the 1970s and 1980s that Hope first planned to produce a volume of critical essays on Russian themes. He evidently at one stage intended to include his Russian articles in his collection of essays The Pack of Autolycus, which was in the event published without them in 1978.24 Hope’s Russian project, however, clearly outgrew the scope of the more general collection, and there exist among his papers several outlines for a volume specifically on Russian literature. That Hope was slightly diffident about this project in view of his lack of a formal academic background in the area is suggested by his correspondence with Nina Christesen and the Akhmatova specialist Amanda Haight. Both approved the plan, Haight commenting that it was “a very good idea and not at all pretentious.”25 Hope worked on his Russian volume for over a decade and was still hoping to complete it in the late 1980s, noting on one outline that it was “planned to come out in 1988 if I can find a publisher.”26

What seems to be the earliest version of the proposed book (ca. 1977?) took the first part of its title from one of Hope’s articles on Mandelstam: “The Swallow and the Bee and Other Essays on Russian Literature.” It comprised the following chapters:

- Pushkin’s Don Juan
- Dostoyevsky and Nietzsche
- Akhmatova’s Theory of Poetry
- Pasternak’s Idea of History
- The Swallow and the Bee
- Voznesensky’s Lament for Two Unborn Poems.27

All the essays, apart from the one on “Pasternak’s Idea of History,” had already been published, at least in preliminary form.

Other, and apparently later, outlines among Hope’s papers show that the conception of the volume was gradually expanding in his mind. One file entitled “Sadko and Other Essays on Russian Writers” contains a table of contents beginning with an essay on the folk poem Sadko:

- Sadko
- Pushkin’s Don Juan
In Defence of Nataliya Goncharova
Dostoyevsky and Nietzsche
Secrets of the Craft
The Swallow and the Bee
Voznesensky’s “Lament for Two Unborn Poems”
Pasternak and History
The Free and the Unfree (Man in 20C Novel revised)

Of these, “Sadko,” “In Defence of Nataliya Goncharova” and “Pasternak and History” are marked as unwritten in Hope’s notes.28
A third, untitled, table of contents is more extensive again:

Preface
Sadko and Tsar Saltan
Pushkin’s
- Don Juan
- Tsar Nikita
- The Captain’s Daughter
- A Case for the Defence
Dostoyevsky and Nietzsche
Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina
Alexander Blok
Akhmatova and the Muse
Mandelstam
- The Blind Swallow
- The Swallow and the Bee
Pasternak
- Causality in Dr Zhivago
- Last Poems
Tsvetaeva
Voznesensky
- Essay on [general essay]
- Lament for 2 Unborn Poems
Solzhenitsyn
Safe Conduct29

Other ideas for essays noted in Hope’s papers suggest he was also thinking of a piece on Mikhail Zoshchenko’s expulsion from the Union of Writers in 1946, an article on Krylov and La Fontaine, a piece on Nabokov, and two further articles on Tolstoi: one on the philosophical background of War and Peace, the other on “The Kreuzer Sonata.” The (apparently unwritten) preface to the proposed volume was to include an acknowledgement of what Hope modestly describes at this stage as his “small acquaintance with Russian,” an account of how he came to learn the language and to know members of the Russian community in Australia, and recognition of his particular debt to Nina Christesen.30
IV

It cannot of course be known with any certainty what the final form of Hope’s book of essays on Russian literature would have been, and not all of the ideas recorded in his papers and notebooks appear to have matured into systematic form. It is, however, possible to gain a general idea of the proposed book’s main themes.

First of all, Hope clearly intended to locate Russian literature firmly within the European tradition, and thus within the cultural context in which he himself operated as a writer. This concern is perhaps most strongly apparent in Hope’s writing on Mandelstam, where one of his starting-points is the latter’s theory that Russia is the natural heir of ancient Greek culture, of which it comprises an organic continuation and extension. In this context, Hope discusses Mandelstam’s use of classical motifs in his poetry of the 1920s at some length, showing how in writing about ancient Greece, Mandelstam is also writing about contemporary Russia. It is also a major theme in Hope’s published articles on Akhmatova, in which an important focus is her treatment of the figure of the Muse. It is worth noting in this context that in the essay “Poems in the Making,” included in The New Cratylus, a discussion of Akhmatova’s cycle “Secrets of the Craft” is placed at the centre of a much broader examination of poetic inspiration taking in Plato, Nietzsche, Wordsworth, Yeats and Rimbaud as well as Akhmatova herself. Elsewhere Hope uses Russian examples to illustrate quite general literary points, as, for example, in his notes for an essay on Sadko, which exercise he sees as “Nothing erudite—just the pleasure and reflection on the pleasure of discovering this marvellous tale in all its freshness and colour.”

Hope affirms the importance of Russian literature on many other occasions, even when it is not a central focus of his argument. His published article on Nietzsche and Dostoevskii, for example, highlights parallels in the thinking of the two writers and offers a partial Nietzschean reading of Dostoevskii’s novels. In discussing the poetry of Voznesensky—where Hope’s concern is chiefly with its political context—he makes comparisons with Lorca, Cervantes and Dante. In his article on Pushkin’s “little tragedy” Kamennyi gost’ [The Stone Guest], Hope is at pains to show the Russian work in the light of its models in Tirso de Molina, Molière, Mozart and elsewhere. In an unpublished article on Pushkin’s novel Kapitanskaia dochka [The Captain’s Daughter], Hope contrasts the Russian work with contemporary writing in France and England in its “conscious use of fiction to reveal to Russian readers the nature of their own country,” and indeed draws
a parallel in this respect with the American, Canadian and
Australian novel.  
Secondly, as in *The New Cratylus*, Hope is interested in the origins
of poetry and the nature of creative inspiration. Again, this is a
central concern of his writing on Mandelstam and Akhmatova. As I
have noted elsewhere, Hope identified strongly with the poetics of
the Russian Acmeist movement, of which Akhmatova and
Mandelstam were the most prominent representatives, and in his
Mandelstam essays pays a great deal of attention to isolating the
compositional principles of his poetry, specifically the interweaving
of multiple layers of intertextual, autobiographical and private
references which go to make up any individual poem (Wells). In
writing about Akhmatova, Hope also focuses on the sensitivity to
language required of an effective poet and on the Acmeist
“semantic” tradition of words as “something living, internal to the
poet’s own mind and heart concerned more especially with the
poet’s sense of being chosen, or supplicated, to be the voice of
objects, persons or events of the world around” (Hope, “Anna
Akhmatova’s *Secrets of the Craft*” 73). Hope is concerned too with
the unconscious process which brings these forces together in the
mind of the poet, and in a trope reminiscent of his own poem “On
the Night Shift” (Hope, *Orpheus* 17–21), reads Akhmatova’s cycle
“Secrets of the Craft” as an enumeration of the different figures he
sees as essential to his conception of poetry as team-work: the poet-
craftsman, the reader, the Muse. Hope’s notebooks contain
numerous comments on the process of the composition of verse as
experienced by Mandelstam, Akhmatova and Pasternak,
highlighting the mystery as well as the craftsmanship involved.
Hope’s reflections on the nature of the poetic word also led him
to contrast Pasternak’s early and late poetic styles. He finds in the
earlier (Futurist-inspired) works “often an effect of rather decadent
‘whining,’ a quaintness in the vision instead of a revelation,”
whereas the verse of Pasternak’s late period, including the poems of
*Doktor Zhivago*, Hope describes in terms of Acmeist clarity.  
Hope’s concern with the language of poetry together with his
practical experience of translation informed several essays and
reviews in which he considered the rendering of Russian verse into
English. In writing about Akhmatova, for example, he relates the
translation process to an “original process of composition in which
the translator does not try to manipulate his material consciously,
but to let the world and the language of the original poem take over
and speak through him” (Hope, “Anna Akhmatova: The Secrets of
the Craft” 8). In the light of this relatively liberal view of translation
it is not surprising that elsewhere Hope takes issue with Vladimir Nabokov’s principle that translation should be a “literal” rendition of the original.

The biographical impetus behind a work of art is also taken up in Hope’s essay on Pushkin’s Kamenny gost’, where the distinctiveness of the work is tentatively ascribed to an identification in Pushkin’s mind between himself and the character of Don Juan. Hope’s interest in Pushkin’s amorous biography is perhaps not surprising given his own celebrated affection for the opposite sex. The same preoccupation forms the basis of the poem “Love and Poetry,” centred on the figure of Calypso Polychroni, who was supposedly not only Pushkin’s mistress, but before him Byron’s. Polychroni not only metonymically represents the continuation of the literary tradition from the older poet to the younger, but because of her Greek ancestry also suggests a further cultural link back to the times of Homer (Hope, Orpheus 29). Hope also spent some energy on investigating the life of Pushkin’s wife, Natalia Nikolaevna Goncharova, and her relationship with her admirer Georges d’Anthès, who was Pushkin’s opponent in his last, fatal duel. A draft essay, “Natalia Nikolaevna: a Case for the Defence,” seeks to vindicate Goncharova from the charge that she was unfaithful to Pushkin, and portrays her as a poorly educated young woman, out of her depth in a world of heightened emotion and court intrigue. Hope’s interest in this theme is reflected in his 1967 poem “Having left Pushkin in the snow,” which highlights the irony of d’Anthès’ later career as president of the Paris Gaslight Co.: he describes the French capital as “la ville lumière, / Lit by the man who quenched the morning star.”

The third major theme in Hope’s writing on Russian literature relates to the ethical imperative for a writer to speak out in defence of freedom of expression. This aspect of the writer’s role in society is largely absent from Hope’s published articles on Akhmatova and Mandelstam, although the connection between preserving the cultural tradition and maintaining moral values in the face of political oppression is made in his adaptations and translations of their poetry. In the poem “Letter to Amanda,” for example, Akhmatova is compared to the classical sibyl in her ability to record and interpret the fate of the Russian people. Hope’s notebooks and drafts demonstrate a more explicit awareness of the persecution of numerous writers in the Soviet Union, including also Pasternak, Zoshchenko and Solzhenitsyn, but his most direct statements on this topic appear in two published articles.
In one of these, “Safe Conduct,” so named from an early autobiographical sketch by Pasternak, Hope outlines the careers of four major Russian poets of the first generation to come to maturity in the Soviet Union: Akhmatova, Mandelstam, Pasternak and Tsvetaeva. Hope looks at each of these in turn against the background of arbitrary persecution that characterised the time in which they lived. He suggests that in each case their actions could have been expected to bring a greater penalty than they actually did. Pasternak’s openly independent stance, for example, did not produce major consequences for Pasternak himself even though friends such as Olga Ivinskaià were given prison sentences because of their connection to him. The sentence of exile given to Mandelstam in 1931 for his “Stalin Ode” was much less than could have been expected. By way of possible explanation Hope speculates, with some plausibility, that the poets were being protected at the highest levels by Stalin himself, and, referring to Alexander the Great’s protection of the poet Pindar, implies that great poets are always surrounded in some way by a protective aura.

Hope’s published essay on Voznesensky looks closely at the actual mechanisms of literary dissent within a single poem (Hope, “Voznesensky’s ‘Lament’” 38–57). Voznesensky’s “Plach po dvum nerozhdennym poemam” [Lament for Two Unborn Poems] was published in 1965 as a response to Khrushchev’s Kremlin speech attacking the arts in March 1963. It is, in Hope’s words, “a counter-attack on those who would subject the artist to the demands of party programmes and Socialist-Realist prescriptions” (Hope, “Voznesensky’s ‘Lament’” 39). Hope reviews the Soviet commentary on Voznesensky’s poem and concludes that it misses the point by attributing the poet’s failure to write the two poems to laziness, when in fact it is really due to cowardice: “the poet has failed in a higher duty than that due to the Union of Writers or the Russian state” (Hope, “Voznesensky’s ‘Lament’” 46). This article engages in quite detailed textual analysis, pointing out Voznesensky’s covert allusions to his contemporaries and to the current political situation, as well as examining Voznesenskií’s humour and the linguistic mechanisms he uses in order to link together apparently disparate images. Unwillingness to compromise in the face of official criticism is also in part the subject of an unpublished general essay on Voznesensky, which again touches on his status as a follower of Pasternak, and on the importance of performance to Voznesensky’s work.

Hope was clearly attuned to the non-aesthetic, broadly political or historical component of many other Russian works, even though
often he did not bring his ideas into final written form. In his unfinished essay on Pushkin’s “Kapitanskaia dochka,” for example, he notes Pushkin’s implied criticism of Catherine the Great’s handling of the Pugachev Rebellion of the 1770s and highlights the narrative strategies Pushkin employs to protect himself from possible charges of disloyalty to the tsarist regime. Hope also showed an interest in Pasternak’s treatment of history in Doktor Zhivago. Hope was overall somewhat ambivalent towards the novel, writing: “I find myself rather confused about Dr Zhivago. I don’t think it a great novel or even a very good novel, but I found that I was both excited and moved by reading it.” Hope appears to have been particularly struck by Pasternak’s use of coincidence in the novel, although no detailed comments on this theme are extant. The relationship between historical cause and effect may well also have been the topic of Hope’s proposed essay on Tolstoi’s War and Peace.

V

So far as it can be reconstructed, Hope’s projected book of essays both affirms the importance for him of Russian literature, and recapitulates and extends motifs well known to readers of his verse and other critical writing: the centrality and persistence of the European tradition; the emphasis on poetic craftsmanship with due acknowledgement of the multiple sources of inspiration; the view of the poet as ‘chosen’ and as the guardian of cultural heritage. The Russian and Soviet context for this last point gives it a sharper edge, by extending the poet’s role from a purely cultural to a moral, social and political plane which is rarely addressed in Hope’s own poetry, but is nevertheless present in, for example, the cycle “Homage to Akhmatova.” Quite apart from the intrinsic value of Hope’s insights into the particular Russian authors which he examines, the proposed book, therefore, constitutes a significant metapoetic statement.

Why then did Hope not succeed in bringing his Russian project to completion? No doubt many factors were involved, not least the difficulty of finding a publisher in a period of contraction of scholarly book publishing. From the mid-1980s, glasnost and perestroika in the Soviet Union turned much of the public attention that might have been directed to Russian literary concerns towards more immediately pressing questions of world politics, and the book may have been less attractive to publishers for this reason. Moreover, if Hope’s writing on Russian literature failed to attract a publisher for a general audience, it was not really suited to an
academic readership either, being essentially the work of a poet rather than a scholar. Although when he started publishing on Russian themes in the 1960s Hope's ideas were certainly fresh and original, Russian literary studies enjoyed a massive explosion of interest in the 1960s and 1970s, with which, given his other duties and the large number of literary projects with which he was involved, Hope would have found it difficult to keep up. Certainly, his work was not situated within the mainstream of Anglophone Russian literary scholarship.

Some of Hope's ideas proved to have been already anticipated by other researchers. For example, his notion that Pushkin's Don Juan was based on elements of the author's biography was foreshadowed in an article published by Anna Akhmatova in 1947 (although Hope could only have become familiar with it on its republication in volume two of Akhmatova's complete works in 1968, the year after the appearance of his own article). Furthermore, Hope incorporated a good deal of his Russian material devoted to inspiration and to poetic creativity into the essays of *The New Cratylus*; on a poetic level this material is also reflected strongly both in “Homage to Akhmatova” and in Hope's tribute to Mandelstam, “In Memoriam: Osip Mandelstam, December 1938” (Wells). As perhaps the most original part of his writing on Russian literature was thus already in the public domain, there was less reason to publish the Russian essays as a whole, and less incentive to complete those that remained unfinished.

Nevertheless, Hope's project had a high level of internal coherence and it is clear that the resonances between the Russian essays and Hope's other writing are considerable. A study of them, however incomplete, confirms Hope as a writer at the centre of the European modernist tradition, an “Orphic” poet striving to preserve and to proselytise the value of the poetic word, and to include the Russian cultural world incontrovertibly in the foreground of his literary vision. Hope's available writing on Russian literature is incisive and compelling; it is only to be regretted that he did not bring the project to a conclusion.

NOTES

This paper draws extensively on Hope's papers at the National Library of Australia. I am grateful to Professor Geoffrey Hope for granting me permission to consult restricted parts of his father's archive and to the staff of the Manuscripts Reading Room of the NLA for their assistance.


Hope to Florence Hope, 25 April [1930?], NLA MS 5836/14/138.

Hope to Florence Hope, 14 January 1929, NLA MS 5836/14/138.

See also A. D. Hope, *Chance Encounters* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1992), 76.

Directed by Martin Berge in 1928.

Hope to Florence Hope, 10 March [1930?], 3 March [1930?], NLA MS 5836/14/139.

Hope to Penelope Robinson, undated, but later annotated “early 1939” in Hope’s hand, NLA MS 5836/636.

Notebook V, l. 9, NLA MS 5836/99.


Notebook XV, ll. 35-6, NLA MS 5836/104.


Notebook XIII, ll. 1–2, NLA MS 5836/103.


Notebook XIII, ll. 89-90, NLA MS 5836/10/103.

Notebook XI, ll. 58–9, NLA MS 5836/10/102.


Seven Russian Poets: Imitations by Rosemary Dobson and David Campbell (Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 1979). On the notion of “adequateness” in verse translation and the nature of poetic meaning informing these imitations, see also Robert Dessaix, “The Adequate


26 “Volume of Russian Essays,” NLA MS 5836/74/613.

27 NLA MS 5836/29/256.

28 “Sadko and Other Essays on Russian Writers,” NLA MS 5836/29/256.

29 “Volume of Russian Essays,” NLA MS 5836/74/613.

30 “Volume of Russian Essays”; “Nabokov,” NLA MS 5863/29/263.


33 “Sadko,” NLA MS 5863/29/263.


37 “Pushkin: The Captain’s Daughter,” NLA MS 5863/76/635.

38 “Notes on Pasternak’s Imagery,” NLA MS 5863/29/264; Notebook XI, ll. 21-3, NLS MS 5863/10/102 (“Giving things their names”).


“General Essay on Voznesensky,” NLA MS 5863/74/617.

“Pushkin: The Captain’s Daughter,” NLA MS 5863/76/635.

“Lecture on Dr Zhivago,” NLA MS 5863/264.

See “Lecture on Dr Zhivago”; Notebook VII, NLA MS 5863/100, l. 26; Notebook XII, l. 43v., NLA MS 5863/103; Notebook XIX, ll. 134–6, NLA MS 5863/106.


TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED COGNITIVE MODEL OF LITERATURE: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO TANG CHUANQI FICTION

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This study explores from a perspective of cognitive poetics the factors that contribute to the formation and transformation of literary tradition. For this purpose, I will first propose a general cognitive model in terms of schemata, prototypes and procedures. The data for this study will be mostly classical Chinese chuanqi [transmission of the marvellous] stories from the Tang dynasty (618–907), and reference will also be made to literary genres and works from other cultures as well as those from China but produced at different periods of time so as to shed light on inter-cultural and inter-generic interactions and influences of literature.

Language and literature
Language as the vehicle of literature is the material foundation of all literary conceptions and activities. It would be impossible for us to imagine any literary conceptions or literary activities without being expressed through the medium of language. In this sense, the nature of language inevitably determines the nature of literature. Just as the influential Soviet Russian writer Maxim Gorky (1868–1936) states, “the first and foremost element in literature is language.”¹ He maintains that literary techniques lie principally in the study of language because language is the primary material for all works, particularly literary works.

“But what is language [langue]?”² To this question, Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913) the founding father of modern linguistics replies:
It is not to be confused with human speech [language], of which it is only a definite part, though certainly an essential one. It is both a social product of the faculty of speech and a collection of necessary conventions that have been adopted by a social body to permit individuals to exercise that faculty (Saussure 9).

Saussure regards language as “a system of signs in which the only essential is the union of meanings and sound images, and in which both parts of the sign are psychological” (15), and he believes that as a system of signs, “language exists in the form of a sum of impressions deposited in the brain of each member of a community …” (19), and “language exists in each individual, yet is common to all” (19). This belief leads him to the conclusion that language and speech are interdependent, with language being both the instrument and the product of speech.

Most worthy of our attention here are the three properties ascribed by Saussure as possessed by language in contrast to speech: Language [la langue] is social, conventional, and psychological, whereas speech is individual, contextual and biological, or more exactly, neurological. Although Saussure argues that language may and should be studied separately from speech, he admits that it is the speaking that causes language to evolve because “impressions gathered from listening to others modify our linguistic habits” (19).

Noam Chomsky, the American linguist who brought about the twentieth-century “cognitive turn” of modern linguistics, believes that language is a set of internalized systems of conventions or rules, which is part of the faculty of human brains and involves mental activities, and that linguistics is a branch of cognitive psychology. He denies the existence of supra-language beyond idiosyncratic activities, because language as a referential system of concepts and conventions is abstracted from individual speech or idiolects and cannot exist independently from them.

Language, thus, can be considered from at least two points of views. One of these is associated with the terminological distinction that Saussure drew in French, at the beginning of the twentieth century, between la langue and parole, and the other commonly found in English scholarship between “language” and “speech,” or in Chomskyan terms, between “competence” and “performance.” It is not difficult for us to see the common ground between Saussure and Chomsky in their views of language as a system of conventions in contrast to speech or parole as instances of this abstract system. The distinction between langue and parole subsumed
a number of logically independent distinctions between what is potential and what is actual, on the one hand, and between what is social and what is individual, on the other hand. What Saussure calls a “langue” is any particular language that is the common possession of all the members of a given language community. *La langue* is a social phenomenon, or institution, which of itself is purely abstract, in that it has no physical existence, but which is actualized on particular occasions in the speech act of individual members of the language community. Saussure gave special emphasis to the social or institutional character of *langue*. Therefore, he thought of linguistics as being closer to sociology and social psychology than it is to cognitive psychology, which, however, is characteristic of Chomskyean theory of linguistics devoted to identifying “linguistic competence,” not with *langue*, but with the typical speaker’s knowledge of *langue*.

The Saussurean binary opposition of *la langue* to *parole* and the Chomskyean distinction between “competence” and “performance,” or between “language” and “speech” in plain English terms, also holds true of the relations between literature and individual literary activities, with the former existing in and evolving through the latter. Literature may thus be understood as the totality of all literary texts that can be made in a literary community, just as language is regarded by Leonard Bloomfield (1887–1949) as “the totality of utterances that can be made in a speech community” (Chomsky 16). Even the text, which serves as a (written or audio) record of individual literary activities in the community, is not a self-contained entity. Rather, it is a system of signs because the encoding and decoding of the message in the text is a bi-directional cognitive-based psychological process involving both the writer and his reader. In order to understand literature, literary tradition and transformation, we must examine individual literary activities that are recorded in the literary texts.

**Cognition and literature**

The Chomskyean cognitive turn in linguistics has made its influence felt not only in psychology but also in all language-related disciplines. A good example of this is the emergence of cognitive linguistics in the 1970s and that of cognitive poetics in the 1990s. Cognitive linguistics asserts that all individual speech acts concern human cognitive and mental activities. From human mental activities, cognitive psychologists have successfully worked out a cognitive structure, or a mental framework that “maintains and organizes a body of information relating to a particular topic,” and
“when a need arises, as in a college test, the individual is thought to engage in a memory search in which the second cognitive structure is retrieved and applied to the present requirement.” Essential to this mental framework are such cognitive factors as schemas, prototypes and procedures, etc., and its construction, operation and expansion is greatly determined by the interactions of these cognitive factors, which are themselves interdependent upon each other.

Language is a product of social conventions, and so is literature, which exists in and evolves through the literary activities of the individual members in a given literary community. Like individual speech acts, individual literary activities involve mental activities and come about as a result of interactions of cognitive factors. An investigation into the mechanisms of these cognitive factors operating and interacting in the cognitive structure will therefore help us to get a better understanding of the literature and the literary tradition.

Schemata

Variously known as “scripts,” “frames,” “scenarios” and “demons,” “schema” is a cognitive psychological term first employed by the British psychologist Frederic C. Bartlett (1886–1969) in his study of the human capacity for memorizing and retelling stories to refer to the mental mechanism of human cognitive structure through which information is stored, processed and comprehended. Bartlett discovered in his experiments that human knowledge is manifested as a series of schematic patterns or models, through which we digest, generalize and integrate our experience before transforming it into knowledge and storing it up eventually in our mind. His theory of schema is then borrowed into discourse analysis to account for the cognitive procedures through which literary texts and literary genres are generated and interpreted. Their pioneering efforts contributed to the birth of cognitive poetics or cognitive stylistics. The term “cognitive poetics” suggests that literary genres, styles, narrative units, imagined plots, and types of fictional figures exist in our schematized framework of knowledge, and that the schematized knowledge is activated automatically when one is engaged in a literary activity, that is, reading or writing a piece of literary work. Schematized knowledge is an open system subject to changes, expansions, revisions, renewals, reconstructions and deletions so as to accommodate itself to changed circumstances.
Procedures
Among various cognitive factors, the most essential to literary activities are those of prototypes and procedures. “Procedure” may be understood as a pre-installed programme in our cognitive structure, which will be instantly activated on the spur of the moment to guide us through the course of thinking and acting. Take the procedure for sending emails for example. Once one learns how to send an electronic mail using the computer, one can be said to have grasped one or more procedural schemas, and when one opens the computer, these procedural schemas will be automatically put into action to guide one through all the steps necessary to send out an email message.

Prototypes
Closely associated with the factor of procedure is that of prototype, which was developed by the American cognitive psychologist Eleanor Rosch in her seminal article “Natural Categories.” Rosch believes that human categorization is graded and structured with respect to prototypes rather than criteria in nature. In this theory, the term “prototype” is used to refer to the salient features or constants of a category or an entity. She rejects as unfounded the Aristotelian necessary and sufficient conditions for categorization, which provide a foundation for the set or group theory in the traditional denotation/connotation-oriented semantics. According to the set theory, the meaning of a word is determined by certain semantic properties. Accordingly, the word “boy” may be defined as [+human], [+male], and [-Adult], and the word “bird” as [+feathers], [+beak], and [+ability to fly]. Thus, the semantic properties are considered to be necessary and sufficient conditions for defining and determining the meaning of a word.

In contrast, the theory of prototype regards the words “boy” and “bird” as composed of a series of elements of unequal categorical levels. So far as birds are concerned, seagulls are more prototypical of birds than penguins, and four-legged tigers are more prototypical of tigers than three-legged ones. In terms of natural kinds, as the American philosopher of language Hilary Putnam rightly points out, three-legged tigers belong to the same species as four-legged tigers by nature, and if there is any difference between them, the difference is only that the former is an abnormal member of the species.

The conception of prototype is a hierarchical one. At the top level, there is a general prototype or metaprototype, which usually goes beyond time and space, and is thus of universal appeal and
cross-cultural value. Each prototype at a lower or more concrete level is composed of a set of sub-prototypes, which may appear and function as a prototype in their own right. For example, prototypical of chuanqi stories of the Tang dynasty are flamboyant tone, sensuous language, elaborate narrative, rich description and imagination, ornate style, and fundamental interest in human character and human nature. A considerable number of chuanqi stories deal with love and romance between men and women. Essential to a prototypical chuanqi story of love are a handsome young scholar and a beautiful courtesan or a prostitute in addition to a series of events which cause them to meet, to know, to admire, to love and to set them apart. The tone of the language in this type of stories sounds more subtle, sensitive and sentimental than that in chuanqi stories of a different type known as hanozi 豪俠 [chivalry and adventure] that appeared towards the end of the Tang dynasty. Tang stories of love are at the same prototypical level as Tang stories of chivalry and adventure, and they are both sub-prototypes of the more general prototype of the chuanqi genre, which is itself a sub-prototype of classical Chinese fiction known as wenyan xiaoshuo 文言小説.

Formation and transformation of literary tradition
All literary schematization will go through certain procedures and involve a certain range of prototypes. Some of these procedures and prototypes are peculiar to literature, but not all, as some of them are taken from our daily life. What interests me here is the literary prototype, and the procedures through which literary prototypes are transformed into fleshed literary works. Literary prototypes and procedures are hardly confined to a particular literary-cultural tradition. Rather, they are of universal appeal and may transcend time and space. In all the literary traditions, there exist some prototypes that recur throughout time and constitute the mainstream of literature. That is why literary genres such as epics, tragedies, comedies, lyrics, prose, and fictional narratives (short stories, novellas, and novels) are found in almost all literary traditions, albeit varying from one to one in terms of quality and quantity.

Universal prototypes versus socio-cultural specific applications
Owing to the different socio-cultural conditions under which universal prototypes of literature are applied, literary traditions
from different cultures and different periods of time distinguish themselves from each other in theme and form. A good example of this is the rise in medieval China during the Tang dynasty of chuanqi stories, by means of which candidates for the civil service examination could display their literary talents for “historical, poetic and argumentative compositions” \( [\text{shicai shibi yilun} \text{ 史才詩筆議論}] \), as contrasted with the appearance in medieval Europe of a narrative genre known as romance, in which the three different themes (love, adventure and loyalty) are organized into one and the same narrative structure,\(^{16}\) as represented, for example, by The Nibelungenlied, The Lay of Igor's Host, or Tristan and Isolde.

It is not uncommon for a love story in the Tang chuanqi tradition to come to a tragic ending with a young woman of a lower social status “first seduced and then abandoned” \( [\text{shi luan zhi zhong qi zhi} \text{ 始亂之終棄之}] \) by a young scholar, as shown in Yuan Zhen's 元稹 (779–831) \( \text{Yingying zhuan} \text{ 鶯鶯傳} \) [The Story of Yingyin].\(^{17}\) Quite often we can also find in a romance of the European tradition a tragic ending with a hero dying a heroic death for his love, as exemplified in Tristan and Isolde.

Love stories in all literary traditions involve the prototype generally manifested as a young man and young woman falling in love, getting married and then living a happy life before being separated from each other against their will by certain social, natural or supernatural forces. In the Indian literary tradition, the fate of young men and young women in love is more often than not revealed either as determined by a certain mysterious supernatural power, as shown in the Sanskrit epics, the \( \text{Rāmāyana} \) [Romance of Rāma] and the \( \text{Mahābhārata} \) [The Great Tale of the Bharata Dynasty], and also in the Sanskrit drama \( \text{Abhijñānashākuntala} \) [The Recognition of Sakuntalā], or as controlled by some socio-cultural factors such as the caste system or religious influence, which feature largely in modern Indian fictional works like Munshi Premchand’s (1880–1936) \( \text{Sevasadan} \) [House of Service], and Rabindranath Tagore’s (1861–1941) \( \text{Srir Patra} \) [A Letter from the Wife].

In contrast, women in love in the Tang chuanqi tradition tend to fall victim to social customs and state stipulations, which forbid scholar-officials marrying women from a lower social class, as seen in the \( \text{Story of Yingying} \) and Jiang Fang’s 蔣防 (fl. 830) \( \text{Huo Xiaoyu zhuan} \text{ 霍小玉傳} \) [Story of Prince Huo’s Daughter]. Compared with
the influence from the secular power of state and social conventions, religious influence seem to be too trivial to be worth mentioning in Chinese chuanqi stories. The distinctive features as delineated in the Tang chuanqi love stories with regard to the causes for the tragic endings should be understood as a natural result of the application of the prototype of love stories to the culturally-specific Chinese society, which is also the case with love stories in the Indian literary tradition.

Prototypes/procedures versus personal experience
As stated above, prototypes in their broadest sense are universal in nature and are therefore not restricted to a particular culture or a particular geographical area, but the conditions for their application may vary from one culture to culture, from one place to place, and from time to time due to different socio-historical conditions, creating different literary traditions. That which goes hand in hand with the application of prototypes is the procedure through which a general prototype of literature is turned into a specific literary work. Prototypical of such a procedure is the author adapting his personal experience for his fictional work. For example, the Tang poet Yuan Zhen draws on his earlier experience of love affairs with a young woman in his attempt to transplant the universal prototype of love into his fictional character Scholar Zhang in the Story of Yingying. The application of prototypes also involves procedures of the author drawing on historical records or anecdotes, fictional characters in other literary works, what has happened to these historical and fictional figures, and what the author has heard or seen. A case in point is the Tang chuanqi story—the Changhen ge zhuan 長恨歌傳 [Story about the Song of Everlasting Sorrow], which was written by Chen Hong 陳鴻 (fl. 805) as inspired by the great Tang poet Bai Juyi’s 白居易 (772–846) narrative poem—the Changhen ge 長恨歌 [The Song of Everlasting Sorrow], which itself was adapted by the author from historical records, anecdotes and hearsays about the romance between Emperor Xuanzong 玄宗 (r. 712-756) of the Tang dynasty and his favorite concubine Yang Yuhuan 楊玉環 (719-756), who is better known as Yang Guifei 楊貴妃 [Secondary-consort Yang] in Chinese history.
Bound elements affixed to story stems

What I have discussed above is actually the procedure through which characters are individualised and events contextualized before mapping them onto the thematic structure of a story so as to transform an abstract narrative prototype into a fully fleshed piece of literary work. Involved in the procedures are also some “variety” elements, namely, minor characters and side stories such as Yingying’s maidservant by the name of Hongniang, and the episode of mutiny embedded in the Story of Yingying. These elements are not essential to the subject matter in the construction of a narrative piece of literature, and like bound morphemes in morphology, they are not able to stand by themselves independently from the story stem based on the main character(s) and storyline but are capable of being affixed to the stem so as to add shades of variety and colour to the narration without changing its storyline and subject matter.

Because of their frequent appearance in a given literary tradition, however, they may form a convention of their own, and eventually acquire a prototypical status. No one would deny that chuanqi stories could be without such minor characters or episodes, and equally undeniable is that their thematic and narrative structure allows room for the minor character to move about and even to develop into a fully fledged character. Take, for example, the minor character Hongniang in the Story of Yingying. In this chuanqi story, Hongniang appears only three times, functioning as no more than a foil to the heroine Yingying, and her role is seriously limited to that of a messenger going between Yingying and Scholar Zhang. However, in the zhugongdiao 諸宮調 [all keys and modes] version of this story under the title of Xixiang ji 西廂記 [Story of the Western Wing] by Master Scholar Dong 董解元 of the Jin 金 dynasty (1115–1234), the role of Hongniang as the maidservant is no longer dispensable to the development of the plot, and this fictional figure is developed further into one of the three major characters in the zaju 雜劇 [variety play] version of The Western Wing by the great Yuan 元 (1271–1368) playwright Wang Shifu 王實甫 (1260–1336), thereby becoming a prototype of maidservants in traditional Chinese fiction of love from Ming 明 (1368–1644) and Qing 清 (1616–1911) times.
Such is also the case with the comic interlude *kyōgen* 猶言 [wild speech] in the traditional Japanese musical drama known as *nōgaku* 能楽 or *nō* 能. Originally, *kyōgen* serves only as an interlude to relax and ease the nerves of the audience who have been distressed at the tragic scenes revealed in a *nō* play, but by and by, *kyōgen* develops into a genre of drama staged independently from the *nō*.20

**Schematization and the transformation of literary tradition**

All literary schematization will go through certain procedures and involve certain ranges of prototypes. The transformation of literary traditions involves the transmission and reception of literary works and literary conceptions across time and space. When the receiver is brought into contact with a literary work from a different culture, the receiver’s schematized knowledge of prototypes will be automatically activated to process, interpret, and digest the information contained in the literary work. The degree to which the information is integrated and internalized depends on the existing model of schemas in the cognitive structure, into which the information is to be assimilated. With the assimilation of the new information contained in the literary work from a different culture, the receiver’s schematized knowledge is expanded, renewed and reconstructed so as to absorb and accommodate new literary forms and concepts, hence trans-cultural influence of literature.

As far as the *chuangqi* story of the Tang dynasty is concerned, influence from ancient India is not only manifested in the revolutionary changing on the part of Tang *chuangqi* story writers of their conceptions of *xiaoshuo* 小說 [small talk] from the mere recording of fantasies and hearsays to the fabricating of stories rich in imagination,21 but also well illustrated in other respects of the art of fiction such as the thematic structure, plot arrangement, characterization, style and subject matter in *chuangqi* stories.

Before the Tang, there was not much deliberate fiction writing in China. To the Tang *chuangqi* writers, however, telling a story was no longer merely a matter of setting down facts, actual or supposed, concerning real or imagined things and people, as observed by the Ming literary critic and bibliophile Hu Yinglin 胡應麟 (fl. 1590):22

In general, unusual tales were prevalent during the Six Dynasties. But they were mostly erroneously transmitted records; their words were not necessarily set down as wholly
illusion. It was only with the Tang that people consciously favoured the strange, and borrowed “small talk” as a pretext for the thrust of their writing.23

A key driving force behind the turn of Chinese xiaoshuo writing from factual recording to fictional creating, as noted by the American sinologist Victor H. Mair, is the idea of huan 幻 [illusion, transformation, magic], which is a Chinese equivalent for the Sanskrit māyā, a core concept in ancient Indian philosophy and religion (Mair 11-14). By the end of Six Dynasties 六朝 (220–618), the idea of māyā had taken roots in Chinese mind and permeated into every aspect of Chinese spiritual life with Buddhism beginning to be accepted as a domestic religion after having been successfully integrated with Chinese culture. The profound and long-lasting influence of Indian māyā culture on Chinese language and literature is well indicated by the many Chinese derivative expressions such as huanhua 幻化 [magic transformation], huanxiang 幻想 [imagination], xubuan 幻覺 [illusion], huanmie 幻滅 [disillusion], huanxiang 幻象, huanjin 幻景 [fancy], mohuan 魔幻 [magic], xuanhuan 玄幻 [fantasy], qibuan 奇幻 [marvel], etc., and by various artistic expressions of the idea of huan in traditional Chinese fiction as represented by Tang chuanqi stories. Parallel to the procedure through which the concept of māyā prototypical of Indian culture and literature was sinicised is that through which it was schematized. From the sinicisation and schematization was born a new concept of xiaoshuo as a product of imagination transmitting the magic, fantastic and marvelous for which Tang chuanqi is named, and by which Chinese literary tradition of xiaoshuo is transformed.

Conclusion
As shown above, there exist some recurrent prototypes in a literary tradition that make their presence and influence felt throughout time, constituting its overall theme and form of literature. However, this does not mean that prototypes are culture-specific, and are peculiar to a literary tradition. Rather, they may transcend time and space and in their broadest sense, are of universal, cross-cultural appeal and application. Literary traditions vary from one culture to another much as a result of different socio-cultural conditions of their application, so do the literary taste, theme and form from one
generation to another in one and the same literary tradition. The degree to which literary traditions differ from each other is inversely proportional to the categorical level of prototypes in terms of which literary traditions are conceived and perceived. At the metaprototypical level, there is something that is universally shared by all literary traditions and that we comfortably recognize as literature or literariness, but if we look at a literary tradition from a more specific perspective of prototypes, we will find that there are some unique literary conceptions and features which are not so often found in other traditions. These conceptions and features are reinforced through the literary practice of one generation after another in the literary tradition, and turned into procedural knowledge, guiding them in the course of reading and writing literary works before being eventually schematized into their cognitive structure. Literary tradition originates in the schematization and proceduralization of literary prototypes, and so does its transformation.

It must be pointed out, however, that the formation and transformation of literary tradition is an extremely complicated phenomenon involving various (social, cultural, historical, linguistic, aesthetical, psychological, and among them of course cognitive) factors. No single literary theory has been comprehensive enough to cover all the aspects of literature. The cognitive model proposed for this study comes along only as one of the various approaches to this phenomenon.

And likewise, cognitive factors contributing to the formation and transformation of literary tradition are not likely to be confined to the three ones—schemata, prototypes and procedures, although they play a key role in this process. There are some other areas in cognitive sciences such as “taxonomies” and “domains” remaining to be explored with respect to their role in literary production and reception. In light of this, our cognitive model, if not the first one of this type, is by no means the last one, and is thus subject to further revision and expansion.

NOTES


Zhao Yanwei 趙彥衛 (fl. 1195). *Yunlu mangchao 雲麓漫鈔* [Random Writings at Yunlu] (Taipei: Xinwenfeng chuban gufen youxian gongsi, 1984), Juan 8, 222.

For a brief yet inspiring comparison and contrast of traditional Chinese literature with their Western counterpart in terms of theme and content, see Nakano Miyoko 中野美代子. *Chūgoku jin no shikō yōshiki: shōsetsu no sekai kara 中国人の思考様式：小説の世界から* [The Chinese Pattern of Thinking as Revealed in the Fictional World] (Tōkyō: Kōdansha, Shōwa 49 [1974]), 50–52.


For an insightful investigation of the social, cultural, legal and psychological reasons for the tragic endings of the Tang *zhuang* stories, see Lao Yin- ping 劉燕萍, *Gudian xiaoshuo lungao 古典小說論稿* [Studies in Classical Chinese Fiction] (Taibei: Shijie shuju, 1963), 106. See also Liu Kairong 劉開榮, *Tangdai xiaoshuo yanjiu 唐代小說研究* [Studies of Tang Fiction] (Hong Kong: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1964), 114.


In the wake of the poststructuralist deconstruction of idealist humanism, any attempt to give an account of the human being has come to be regarded with suspicion as the imposition of a false universal. As Satya Mohanty notes, in our current antihumanist climate, “instances of positive elaboration of the human have been noticeably absent.” A typical poststructuralist stance towards the human cited by Mohanty is that of Louis Althusser who, “fleeing from idealism,” “ends up being skeptical about all claims about human nature” (90). Through a reading of Primo Levi’s compelling account of human existence in a Nazi concentration camp, *Survival in Auschwitz*, this essay seeks to reexamine the legitimacy of the concept of the human being. The concept of the human being is placed under unprecedented stress in the death camp and, in Levi’s text, we find it subject to contradictory pressures: it is both re-affirmed as an immanent concept as well as relinquished as an unusable concept that has broken down irredeemably. In the positive mode, the reader is confronted with the immanence of an essentialist conception of the human being and, further, with the human being as a site of universal identification and moral obligation. Against the current valorisation of difference and otherness, the concept of the human being is retained by Levi as a site for sameness across individuals. As we shall see, what is interesting is that Levi’s preservation of the human as a term of commonality is not an idealist construction but a claim to universality that is, as it were, authorized by concrete experience. Alongside Levi’s continued invocation of an immanent though non-idealist concept of the human being is a contrary sense
of its breakdown which can be read in parallel to the demise of the human subject in poststructuralist thought. Essentialist and poststructuralist conceptions of the human being co-exist in Levi’s text to suggest the view that some positive elaboration of the human being can be sustained amidst the breakdown of that very concept.

In my reading of Levi, I have found Martha Nussbaum’s essay, “Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism,” a useful companion piece. Nussbaum shares with Levi the belief in an essentialist view of the human being without resorting to a false idealism. She argues that an essentialist view in fact need not be idealist and such an essentialist account of the human being can and should be maintained. Intriguingly, what Nussbaum tries to do in the genre of rational evaluative inquiry finds a concrete (though dark) parallel in Levi’s narrative of human survival in Auschwitz.

**Levi’s Will to Humanism**

In Levi’s *Survival in Auschwitz* we encounter the inevitability of humanism. At a time when it has become the norm to assert (often irreconcilable) differences between persons rather than underscore their commonality, Levi’s text can be read as an important intervention. His moralistic testimony of life in Auschwitz stridently confronts the reader with the question: How can one deny the notion of commonality between human beings? In older fashioned terms, how can one deny the concept of a common humanity? To read Levi’s testimony is to come face to face with the inevitability of humanism as is perhaps most immediately suggested by the original Italian title of his narrative *Se questo è un uomo* (*If This Is a Man*).

As Nicholas Patruno observes, “By giving his work the title *If This is a Man*, the author raises a rhetorical question of conscience whose impact is so powerful that any reply would be superfluous.”

The title comes from the text’s epigraphic poem in which the reader is charged with the responsibility of thinking deeply about the violations committed to our concept of humanity in the pages that follow:

You who live safe  
In your warm houses,  
You who find, returning in the evening,  
Hot food and friendly faces:  
Consider if this is a man  
Who works in the mud  
Who does not know peace
Who fights for a scrap of bread
Who dies because of a yes or a no.
Consider if this is a woman,
Without hair and without name
With no more strength to remember,
Her eyes empty and her womb cold
Like a frog in winter.
Meditate that this came about:
I commend these words to you,
Carve them in your hearts
At home, in the street,
Going to bed, rising;
Repeat them to your children,
Or may your house fall apart,
May illness impede you,
May your children turn their faces from you.6

From its opening, Levi's text takes an active stance in charging the reader (“I commend these words to you”) with the concept of humanity as a common term which requires his recognition and identification. The demand is for the reader's human empathy; though he may be reading Levi's book in sheltered and comfortable circumstances, the command is for him to recognize the common humanity shared between himself and the prisoners of the camp.

In his “Preface,” Levi makes clear his view that the Lager (or death camp) is founded on the dogma of the stranger-as-enemy:

Many people—many nations—can find themselves holding, more or less wittingly, that “every stranger is an enemy.” For the most part this conviction lies deep down like some latent infection; it betrays itself only in random, disconnected acts, and does not lie at the base of a system of reason. But when this does come about, when the unspoken dogma becomes the major premise in a syllogism, then, at the end of the chain, there is the Lager. Here is the product of a conception of the world carried rigorously to its logical conclusion; so long as the conception subsists, the conclusion remains to threaten us. (9)

In Levi's view, the Lager is founded on an epistemology of the other human being as strange, unfamiliar or different in relation to oneself. Against this dangerous mode of perception, Levis insists instead on the need to perceive sameness and commonality between human beings. In the poetic epigraph which follows this “Preface,” we have identified Levi's corrective will to humanism. In
charging the reader to consider if the “stranger” is indeed a “man” or a “woman,” Levi’s text seeks to replace the perception of “stranger” with that of a common humanity.

Although neither Levi nor Martha Nussbaum use the term “humanism,” what both seek to do in their respective texts is to assert the case for a common humanity as conceived in essentialist terms (each with his or her own conception of essentialism). One probable reason why both have shunned the familiar term is because of its classical associations with education, knowledge, human potential and flourishing. For varying reasons which will become clear, such an idealist conception of humanism is afforded to neither thinker. In their respective circumstances, what Levi and Nussbaum can strive for is a minimal, stripped-bare conception of a common humanity. In Nussbaum’s case, for example, the idea of common humanity is conceived in exclusively non-metaphysical, empirical terms. She uses the distinctly concrete term “human functioning” instead of the more abstract “humanism.” I shall nevertheless continue to use the term “humanism” as applicable to both Levi and Nussbaum with the consideration that both are enacting a re-conception of the term and that both, in the final analysis, would consider themselves humanists in this new, more austere sense.

**Essentialist Views of the Human Being**

Humanism is conceived by Levi in essentialist terms. Further, because of its essentialist nature, humanism can be charged to the reader as an immanent category. Before going further into a discussion of essentialism in Levi’s text, I would like to turn first to Nussbaum’s lucid discussion of essentialism in her essay.

As an attempt to make a case for an essentialist view of the human being, Nussbaum’s essay can be read alongside the essentialist humanist appeal in Levi’s text. For Nussbaum, essentialism is “the view that human life has certain defining features” (205) and the essentialist view of the human being seeks to define “what the most central features of our common humanity are, without which no individual can be counted as human” (215). She makes the important distinction between metaphysical-realist essentialism and internalist essentialism. In the former, the central (or essential) features of our common humanity are conceived as independent, transhistorical forms. “On such a view, the way the human being essentially is will be a part of the independent furniture of the universe, something the gods can see and study independently of any experience of human life and human history.”
(206). The problem with an essentialism that is abstract, transhistorical and metaphysical is that while perceptible by the gods, it is unavailable to human beings. Attempts to formulate it have led instead—as antiessentialist critics rightly charge—to situations of power abuses. Efforts to define these metaphysical forms have “[taken] the form of enshrining the understanding of a dominant group at the expense of minority understanding” (208). On this front, Nussbaum agrees with antiessentialist critics that any form of essentialism should shun abstractions:

I grant that some criticisms of some forms of essentialism have been fruitful and important: they have established the ethical debate on a more defensible metaphysical foundation and have redirected our gaze from unexamined abstract assumptions to the world and its history. (205)

Nussbaum’s important contribution, however, is to continue to argue the case for an essentialist view of the human being even after the collapse of faith in essential forms as a metaphysical reality. She points to the alternative of the “internalist essentialist” approach which she explains below:

But one might accept these conclusions [pertaining to the untenability or unavailability of metaphysical-realist essentialism] and still be an essentialist. One might, that is, believe that the deepest examination of human history and human cognition from within still reveals a more or less determinate account of the human being, one that divides its essential from its accidental properties. Such an account would say: take away X, Y, and Z (a suntan, let us say, or a knowledge of Chinese, or an income of $40,000 a year) and we will still have what we count as a human being on our hands. On the other hand, take away properties A, B, and C (the ability to think about the future, say, or the ability to respond to the claims of others, or the ability to choose and act) and we no longer have a human life at all. Separating these two groups of properties requires evaluative inquiry: for which we must ask, which things are so important that we will not count a life as human life without them? Such an evaluative inquiry into what is deepest and most indispensable in our lives need not presuppose an external metaphysical foundation, clearly: it can be a way of looking at ourselves, asking what we really think about ourselves and what holds our history together. Later on, I shall propose one version of such a historically grounded
empirical essentialism—which, since it takes its stand within human experience, I shall now call “internalist” essentialism.

(207–8)

While continuing to argue in favor of an essentialist view, Nussbaum presents an essentialist position that is distinctly non-idealist and non-metaphysical but rather based in an individual’s capacity for empirical observation and rational analysis:

When we get rid of the hope of a transcendent metaphysical grounding for our evaluative judgments—about the human being as about anything else—we are not left with the abyss. We have everything that we always had all along: the exchange of reasons and arguments by human beings within history …

(212–3)

Based not in metaphysical truth but in “our poor human conversations” (213), Nussbaum’s re-conception of the essentialist view has an air of modesty about it. The essential features of our common humanity are viewed not as transcendent forms but simply as empirically verifiable properties that are common to human beings. Human beings are the same not because of an abstract, metaphysical essence but because of observable shared empirical attributes. Nussbaum’s essay will further develop this list of essential features, but we turn now to Levi’s text for another view of essentialism.

In Levi’s narrative, we often encounter what appears to be an idealist humanism based on an abstract essentialism. The following statement about the human condition is a typical example:

Sooner or later in life everyone discovers that perfect happiness is unrealizable, but there are few who pause to consider the antithesis: that perfect unhappiness is equally unattainable. The obstacles preventing the realization of both these extreme states are of the same nature: they derive from our human condition which is opposed to everything infinite.

(17)

While we may agree with Levi’s general statement, the point to note is that he is identifying an essential property of man in an abstract, ungrounded manner. His “common humanity” in this example is based on an abstract, unexamined essentialism, i.e. what Nussbaum (as well as antiessentialist critics) would view as an “abstract
[assumption]” with a “poor metaphysical foundation.” The quoted passage resonates with, say, the eighteenth-century idealist humanism of Samuel Johnson. Yet, what is unique about Levi’s text is that this unexamined essentialism becomes subject to the revision of Levi’s experience in the Lager which provides the basis for his articulation of a more concrete, grounded essentialism.

Levi’s humanism is not based on the universal pronouncements of a fictitious Marlow or Nick Carraway, but on the testimony of one who, from his point of view, has journeyed to the essence of human experience. The appeal is to both the uniqueness and extremity of experience in the Lager as a basis for an essentialist position. Levi consistently provides the view of the Lager as a privileged site for an essentialist position. While his testimony commences as a first-person narrative of personal details (“I was captured by the Fascist Militia on 13 December 1943. I was twenty-four, with little wisdom, no experience …”), it switches quickly in the third paragraph to a language of human essentials: “At that time I had not yet been taught the doctrine I was later to learn so hurriedly in the Lager: that man is bound to pursue his own ends by all possible means, while he who errs but once pays dearly” (9). The Lager is the place where the perspective of the callow Levi undergoes a rapid shift from a recounting of personal experience to a crystallization of universal observations. Being in the Lager enables Levi to come quickly face to face with the essential properties of human beings. Levi’s claim is that the goal which Nussbaum sets out to achieve through the rational procedure of her “evaluative inquiry” is being reached through the unique, privileged position of the Lager:

We would … like to consider that the Lager was pre-eminently a gigantic biological and social experiment … Thousands of individuals, differing in age, condition, origin, language, culture and customs, are enclosed within barbed wire: there they live a regular, controlled life which is identical for all and inadequate to all needs, and which is more rigorous than any experimenter could have set up to establish what is essential and what adventitious to the conduct of the human animal in the struggle for life. (87)

The moral philosopher’s attempt to derive “a more or less determinate account of the human being, one that divides its essential from its accidental properties” finds its dark parallel in the processes of the Lager as an unequaled social experiment. The
Lager can be seen as Nussbaum’s undreamed of laboratory for the revelation of essential human features; “fundamental values … can be deduced from this particular world which we are describing” (87).

In separate ways, Levi and Nussbaum argue passionately for an essentialist view of the human being: the latter through the sufficiency of “the exchange of reasons and arguments by human beings within history” and the former on the basis of an experience which is deemed unique and unsurpassed. While converging on the non-abstract nature of essentialism, there are distinctions to be made in Levi and Nussbaum’s conceptions of essentialism. While human essence for Nussbaum is empirical and historical, for Levi it is based in experience. Experience is usually deemed to be subjective, varying from one person to another, and hardly a basis for commonality among human beings. In our current era, this view has at times even been formalized into the critical positions of relativism and subjectivism. Yet, Levi’s claim is that the unique and unequaled extremity of the Lager’s conditions enables the prisoner to undergo a level of experience that cannot but be common to every human being. As he remarks movingly at one point:

Just as our hunger is not that feeling of missing a meal, so our way of being cold has need of a new word. We say “hunger,” we say “tiredness,” “fear,” “pain,” we say “winter” and they are different things. They are free words, created and used by free men who lived in comfort and suffering in their homes. If the Lagers had lasted longer a new, harsh language would have been born; and only this language could express what it means to toil the whole day in the wind, with the temperature below freezing, wearing only a shirt, underpants, cloth jacket and trousers, and in one’s body nothing but weakness, hunger and knowledge of the end drawing near. (123)

The prisoner can lay claim to a level of experience so intense and extreme that the experience is no longer simply subjective but deemed an encounter with a form of fundamental truth. His existence in the Lager has enabled him to experience the true meaning of human hunger, tiredness, fear and pain which is unknown to the ordinary person. The claim is to his experience in the Lager as a form of truth and essence of the human being which is not available in ordinary experience and suffering (and where the “essential” and “adventitious” are still indistinct). Levi acknowledges the inability of ordinary language to convey this essence and implicitly wishes that the sense of words could so be
deepened that they reached the essence of their meanings. His unrealistic desire, in other words, is for a wholly essentialist language, i.e. words that are at once the essence of their meanings. Though such a language is unavailable, we know that Levi wants us to read his text in a “deep” way to recognize not merely an individual subjective experience but a level of experience that is essential to all human experience.

Eking Out a Minimal Existence
What I have referred to as the unrivaled extremity of experience in the Lager can now be elaborated in terms of the severe minimal state of the prisoner in the Lager. In the prisoner's unequaled minimal existence, we find the basis for a structure of essentialism—for how indeed individual experience is encountered as a form of essential experience.

To eke out one's existence in the Lager is to exist almost—but not wholly—as a nothing. It is to be relentlessly compelled to live at the level of the barest minimum. At the prisoner's first entry into the Lager, everything that can be taken from him is taken from him: “One entered the Lager naked: indeed, more than naked, deprived not only of clothing and shoes (which were confiscated) but of one's head of hair and all other hair.” Levi's account of survival in the Lager is a narrative of human beings forcibly reduced to a minimum of existence. The prisoner is so close to a state of zero that his world constricts into a micro-environment in which the littlest of details begins to loom large. Survival may hinge on having a piece of string for the loose button on one's jacket or licking the last trace of soup from one's bowl. Levi, for instance, concludes the account of his initiation into the Lager by stressing how he had adapted to a life of small but crucial details: “I have already learnt not to let myself be robbed, and in fact if I find a spoon lying around, a piece of string, a button which I can acquire without danger of punishment, I pocket them and consider them mine by full right” (37). Levi, the initiate, learns that survival in Auschwitz depends not on heroic acts but on the prisoner's ability to become scrupulously attuned to and in control of a petty world of scraps and odds and ends. He learns in another lesson that death is likely to have its first foothold in minor detail like a prisoner's shoes:

And do not think that shoes form a factor of secondary importance in the life of the Lager. Death begins with the shoes; for most of us, they show themselves to be instruments
of torture, which after a few hours of marching cause painful sores which become fatally infected. Whoever has them is forced to walk as if he was dragging a convict’s chain …; he arrives last everywhere, and everywhere he receives blows. He cannot escape if they run after him; his feet swell and the more they swell, the more the friction with the wood and the cloth of the shoes become insupportable. Then only the hospital is left: but to enter the hospital with a diagnosis of “dicke Füße” (swollen feet) is extremely dangerous, because it is well known to all, and especially to the SS, that here there is no cure for that complaint. (34–5)

Levi’s analysis, though extensive, is based on the simple detail of shoes. Death is not a function of a large, abstract fate but of not being attuned to a small, particular detail. In yet another instance, Levi comments on how a debilitating sensation of impotence and destitution was produced during the first days by the lack of a spoon: this is a detail that may appear marginal to those who since childhood are used to the abundance of cutlery at the disposal of even the poorest of kitchens, but it was not marginal. (The Drowned and the Saved 114)

Levi shows a self-awareness that his attention is focused on what, to the reader, seem like a minor detail. He nevertheless exposes this deprivation as a brutal strategy of the Nazis to demoralize the new prisoner:

[When the camp at Auschwitz was liberated, in the warehouse we found thousands of brand new transparent plastic spoons, besides tens of thousands of spoons made of aluminum, steel, or even silver that came from the luggage of deportees as they arrived. So it was not a matter of thrift but a precise intent to humiliate. (The Drowned and the Saved 114)

Levi’s Holocaust narratives revolve around small details, reflecting the reality that such details—a spoon, a button, a drop of soup—make up the totality of a prisoner’s experience in the Lager. The Lager is deliberately organized so that the prisoner lives at a minimal state that is only marginally above a state of zero. His world begins to constrict and revolve around a minimal number of possessions—so few that he can bundle them up in his jacket to sleep on.
The Minimal State as a Basis for Essentialism

The prisoner’s minimal state fosters a basis for essentialist attitudes. The psychological dynamic of living in such minimal conditions is that every marginal item above zero—though trivial from a normal perspective—gains a maximal import. Stripped of all his possessions after entering the camp, Levi begins to discern significance in little things: “[W]hat value, what meaning is enclosed even in the smallest of our daily habits, in the hundred possessions which even the poorest beggar owns: a handkerchief, an old letter, the photo of a cherished person” (27). In the dreary emptiness of Lager life, a small ration of bread becomes an “everything” to the prisoner:

A day begins like every day, so long as not to allow us reasonably to conceive its end, so much cold, so much hunger, so much exhaustion separate us from it: so that it is better to concentrate one’s attention and desires on the block of grey bread, which is small but which will certainly be ours in an hour, and which for five minutes, until we have devoured it, will form everything that the law of the place will allow us to possess. (63)

Within the minimal state, a shifting double vision is constantly experienced: what the prisoner knows to be small and trivial from an ordinary perspective is experienced by him as large and significant. The structure of essentialism is constituted by this psychological dynamic: it is formed when the shift in vision transcends a change in relative quantity—less to more—to project a dimension of the absolute. This transcendence is evidenced in the five precious minutes when Levi perceives the small block of bread—not as a large block—but as “everything” he possesses. Though the minimal state of life in the Lager is ultimately a relative, asymptotic condition, it provides a powerful psychological dynamic that crystallizes the focus of “one’s attentions and desires” into absolute, essential forms. When available, the focus could be on a minimal possession as an absolute. More often than not, however, “one’s attentions and desires”—given their state of severe deprivation—lack their object so that, faced only with themselves, they become their own objects and are themselves projected as absolutes. The result is that the prisoner’s “attentions and desires”—his hunger, fear, fatigue and other aspects of inner experience—are continually encountered in the Lager in absolute
terms. In his stripped-bare, close-to-zero state, the prisoner continually encounters experience in its absolute dimension. The severe minimal condition projects or crystallizes experience into an absolute dimension.

*Survival in Auschwitz* is an essentialist text that justifies its essentialism on the basis of Levi’s experience of a minimal existence in the Lager. Its essentialism, in turn, is the foundation upon which Levi builds his will to humanism. The “Preface” makes clear that the main purpose of his narrative is to reveal fundamental truths about the human condition:

> As an account of atrocities … this book of mine adds nothing to what is already known to readers throughout the world on the disturbing question of death camps. It has not been written to formulate new accusations; it should be able, rather, to furnish a quiet study of certain aspects of the human mind. (9)

Because Levi has been “to the bottom” and encountered, in this minimal state, the essentials of human experience, his humanist outlook and rhetoric cannot be seen to be abstract or ungrounded. Rather, Levi’s “essentialized” humanism presents itself as an inevitable category on at least two levels. Firstly, humanism is presented with conviction as a non-subjective experiential truth. In other words, contrary to the antiessentialist position, there exist shared, essential aspects of human experience—like hunger, fear, pain—to which Levi’s unique experience will testify. Additionally, humanism is presented as an inevitable category in ethical terms. Put simply, to deny the humanism of Levi’s text—to view it say as an ungrounded ideological construct—is to deny the intrinsic humanity of the prisoner. It is to inflict further injustice on a human being whose frail but immanent humanness—in terms of his hunger, fear, pain—is made so clear by his minimal state. The reader cannot but face the question of humanism in Levi’s text as an ethical question, if not as an ethical imperative. Levi’s text seeks to confront the reader with a humanism that is inevitable in both experiential and ethical terms. It certainly does not see its humanism as a rhetorical construct but as an immanent category for which it would make no apologies and would instead feel strongly justified in asserting. At the same time, this humanism is characterized by a modest minimalism in the sense that it is not based on an idealist conception but on the barest experiential essentials of human beings at the end of their tether.
The Human Being as Moral Appeal

In the prisoner's minimal state, a modest but essentialist concept of the human being is crystallized which the reader of Levi's text must recognize and identify with. In its essentialism, the concept of the human being appeals to an inevitable sameness between the prisoner and the reader. The reader cannot but confront shared aspects of being human between himself and the prisoner. While Levi and Nussbaum vary in their conception of this shared human essence, both would agree on the point of the inevitability of mutual recognition inherent in the concept of humanness. More importantly, both would impute to this inevitable process of mutual identification an inevitable ethical dimension. As two persons identify each other as human, there is simultaneously an imputed sense of obligation and responsibility for each other as human beings. In its essentialism, the concept of the human being exerts not only an inevitable call for identification, but also an inevitable obligation to become ethically involved. The imperative is to identify and to be ethically obligated.

In arguing for an essentialist view of the human being, both Levi and Nussbaum desire ultimately for it to become the basis for an imperative ethics. Nussbaum refers to “the great power of the conception of the human” as a basis for ethical obligation:

Any moral conception may be withheld, out of ambition or hatred or shame. But the conception of the human being seems so much more difficult to withhold than other conceptions that have been put forward as the basis for ethical obligation. (226–7)

Nussbaum elaborates on the psychology of how “[the acknowledgment of another] person as a member of the very same kind [generates] a sense of affiliation and responsibility” (226). If mutual identification as human beings generates mutual obligation, then “denying humanness” is a way of severing the sense of ethical responsibility. Nussbaum cites Holocaust historian Raul Hilberg’s study of the death camps to demonstrate the moral power exerted by the idea of “humanness”:

[When]ever circumstances arose that made it impossible for the Nazi functionaries, whose actions depended on the denial of humanness to Jews, to sustain this denial in a particular case, what ensued was an emotional “breakthrough,” in which
action was indeed, at least temporarily, transformed. What were these occasions? Times, above all, when it became impossible to avoid the fact that one was interacting with a Jewish prisoner in a human manner: occasions of personal conversation or emotional connection that eluded the protective mechanisms of denial. (226)

Both Nussbaum and Levi acknowledge the power of the concept of the human being in exerting a basis for moral obligation which, as Nussbaum notes, is difficult to withhold. By essentializing the concept, the moral appeal of the human is rendered more powerfully as an imperative ethics. While formerly my neighbour’s humanness has a moral appeal upon me, now his inevitable humanness has an imperative moral appeal upon me.

Levi’s will to humanism, which is the chief impulse of Levi’s text, is generated from a recognition of the moral appeal of humanness. For Levi, the violation, degradation and injustice of the Lager are a consequence of a falling away from this shared humanness. His essentialist position is meant as an effort at restoration—specifically an attempt to enshrine an inviolable humanism and, by implication, an inviolable ethics.

Significantly, Levi attributes his own survival to his ability to maintain a relationship of shared humanity with a simple Italian civilian worker, Lorenzo. Levi describes this relationship with his “savior,” Lorenzo, with the typical shifting double focus of his minimal situation:

The story of my relationship with Lorenzo is both long and short, plain and enigmatic …

In concrete terms it amounts to little: an Italian civilian worker brought me a piece of bread and the remainder of his ration every day for six months; he gave me a vest of his, full of patches; he wrote a postcard on my behalf to Italy and brought me the reply. For all this he neither asked nor accepted any reward, because he was good and simple and did not think that one did good for a reward.

All this should not sound little. (119)

For Levi in his minimal state, what in concrete terms seems little becomes a means of supreme importance in terms of clinging on to a concept of the human being:

However little sense there may be in trying to specify why I, rather than thousands of others, managed to survive the test, I
believe that it was really due to Lorenzo that I am alive today; and not so much for his material aid, as for his having constantly reminded me by his presence, by his natural and plain manner of being good, that there still existed a just world outside our own, something and someone still pure and whole, not savage, extraneous to hatred and terror; something difficult to define, a remote possibility of good, but for which it was worth surviving.

The personages in these pages are not men. Their humanity is buried, or they themselves have buried it, under an offence received or inflicted on someone else. The evil and insane SS men, the Kapos, the politicals, the criminals, the prominents, great and small, down to the indifferent slave Häfllinge, all the grades of the mad hierarchy in a uniform internal desolation.

Lorenzo was a man; his humanity was pure and uncontaminated, he was outside this world of negation. Thanks to Lorenzo, I managed not to forget that I myself was a man. (121–2)

Preserving the concept of “man” and “humanity” is of paramount importance to Levi. As we have seen, the concept is one developed through shared identification; because Lorenzo is human, so too does Levi identify himself as human. In Levi’s impassioned description of Lorenzo’s “pure and whole” humanity, we see again the central importance that the idea of humanness has in motivating and inspiring his text. Lorenzo’s humanity is further linked to a notion of his intrinsic goodness, i.e. independent of external motivations, furthering the idea of the human being as a natural locus for an ethical vision. In this instance of a will to humanism in Levi’s text, we see a clear desire for the human being to become the basis for moral vision and appeal.

The Crisis of Humanism
Levi’s will to humanism asserts a totalizing claim on his text by installing as central to the text an essentialist concept of the human being. It is as if it were directing the reader that it can be read in only one way, i.e. in terms of an immanent humanism as the grounds for an ethical imperative to be reckoned with. The epigraph tells us that this moral will takes an active rhetorical stance towards the reader: “I commend these words to you/Carve them in your hearts.” Yet, I would now like to add that while Levi’s will to humanism seeks a totalizing claim on the text, it does not fulfill this claim. The moral will to humanism in Levi’s text exists in tension
with a darker sense of the crisis of humanism. Humanism, while willed as immanent in the text, is also already in crisis.

The inevitable fact is that, in the Lager, Levi is faced with more images of violated humanity—of human beings degraded into nonhuman-beings—than of humanity in a “pure and whole” form. While his text responds by striving to assert an essentialist conception of the human being as the basis for an ethical imperative, it has a more despairing subtext that occasionally yields to these distorted images of the human being. In his study of Holocaust writing entitled *A Double Dying*, Alvin Rosenfeld quotes Elie Wiesel’s statement that “at Auschwitz, not only man died but also the idea of man.” The title of Rosenfeld’s book is intended to register the less explicit though important idea of the death of “the idea of man” caused by the death camps. Rosenfeld asks about the implications for this other moral “death”: “In the light of the unprecedented distortions of humanity that were carried out under the impact of Nazism,” one could ask “How does what happens to human form, the form of man, seriously affect artistic form?” (7).

Levi responds by a will towards a concept of the human being as immanent—hence developing an essentialist form for his text—even as he at times succumbs to an acceptance of the breakdown of this concept. The result is a text that is conspicuously willed as humanist even as embedded subtextually within it is an incipient transition to a “posthumanist” conception of the human being.

Levi’s text is replete with images of distorted human beings. One memorable instance is its depiction of the masses of prisoner who daily march, like unthinking automatons, to the interminable, monotonous rhythms of the Nazi band:

> When the music plays we know that our comrades, out in the fog, are marching like automatons; their souls are dead and the music drives them, like the wind drives dead leaves, and takes the place of their wills. There is no longer any will: every beat of the drum becomes a step, a reflected contraction of exhausted muscles. The Germans have succeeded in this. They are ten thousand and they are a single grey machine; they are exactly determined; they do not think and they do not desire, they walk. (51)

This passage comes closest yet to a depiction of human beings living as zeros. These prisoners neither think nor desire. The only sign that they do exist above a state of zero is the mechanical contraction of their muscles. They have been so wretchedly
reduced that these repeated muscular movements are the only trace of human life in them. The “idea of man” has clearly died here. The death of this idea means that while Levi may will an essentialist conception of the human being, he is almost uniformly faced with circumstances which dislocate, violate or even eliminate the concept of the human being. The result is that the will to humanism exists continually with a sense of its crisis. Levi’s final chapter memorably contains images of grotesquely distorted men wandering in the abandoned camp:

The camp was silent. Other starving spectres like ourselves wandered around searching, unshaven, with hollow eyes, greyish skeleton bones in rags. (161)

The work of the bombs had been completed by the work of man: ragged, decrepit, skeleton-like patients at all able to move dragged themselves everywhere on the frozen soil, like an invasion of worms. (158)

These men have been so degraded that they are unrecognizable as human beings. Levi is faced with such extreme violations to the human being that there is frequently not a usable conception of the human being in the Lager. To advance the essentialist position, Levi has to conceive of the human being as a basis for sameness and commonality. Hence, the goal of identification and obligation between the reader and his victims. Yet, often, human beings in Levi’s text are so degraded, estranged and unrecognizable that they are wholly unusable as a term of commonality. We find instead, in these depictions, a fracturing and division of the concept of the human being. The result is that the concept of the human being in Levi’s text is often an unstable, self-divided term itself, which in its own lack of self-identity, cannot serve as a point of universal identification but instead destabilizes the essentialist formation of Levi’s text.

While Wiesel’s statement on the double deaths of “man” and “the idea of man” is intended in an orthodox humanist sense, it inevitably echoes the latter-day and by now familiar poststructuralist positing of “the end of man.” We may recall, for instance, Foucault’s stridently antihumanistic conclusion of *The Order of Things* which predicts the end of man in terms of how the “idea of man” is but an eighteenth-century discursive construction which will crumble in the linguistic self-consciousness of our era:
Ought we not rather to give up thinking of man, or, to be more strict, to think of this disappearance of man—and the ground of possibility of all the sciences of man—as closely as possible in correlation with our concern with language? Ought we not to admit that, since language is here once more, man will return to that serene non-existence in which he was formerly maintained by the imperious unity of Discourse.

(386)

As the archaeology of our thought easily shows, man is an invention of recent date. And one perhaps nearing its end.

If those arrangements were to disappear as they appeared, if some event of which we can at the moment do no more than sense the possibility—without knowing either what its form will be or what it promises—were to cause them to crumble, as the ground of Classical thought did, at the end of the eighteen century, then one can certainly wager that man would be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea.

(387)

Levi does not share Foucault’s poststructuralist view of language and, together with Wiesel, clearly has a different understanding of what is meant by the end of man. For Levi and Wiesel, the end of “man” is still a literal event and the end of “the idea of man” still posited in orthodox humanist terms. Keeping these distinctions in mind, the Holocaust nevertheless provides an uncanny prefigurement of the later poststructuralist position insofar as by itself the Lager exerts such a tremendous dislocating stress on the concept of the human beings so that the latter becomes a site of difference rather than commonality. In this way, the Lager independently exerts its own force for an end to a humanist conception of the human being to encourage instead the incipience of a poststructuralist conception.

The Case of Steinlauf

One of Levi’s core meditations on the concept of the human being occurs during his exchange with an elderly inmate, Steinlauf. In this episode, we witness in his narrative a lack of self-reconciliation in its attitude towards its concept of the human being. Levi attempts to recall Steinlauf’s frank, impassioned articulation of a view of the human being in the elevated terms of a steadfast idealist humanism:

It grieves me now that I have forgotten his plain, outspoken words, the words of ex-sergeant Steinlauf of the Austro-Hungarian army, Iron Cross of the ’14–’18 war. It grieves me
because it means that I have to translate his uncertain Italian and his quiet manner of speaking of a good soldier into my language of an incredulous man. But this was the sense, not forgotten either then or later: that precisely because the Lager was a great machine to reduce us to beasts, we must not become beasts; that even in this place one can survive … and to survive we must force ourselves to save at least the skeleton, the scaffolding, the form of civilization. We are slaves, deprived of every right, exposed to every insult, condemned to certain death, but we still possess one power, the power to refuse our consent. So we must certainly wash our faces without soap in dirty water and dry ourselves on our jackets. We must polish our shoes, not because the regulation states it, but for dignity and propriety. We must walk erect, without dragging our feet, not in homage to Prussian discipline but to remain alive, not to begin to die. (41)

The key tension in this scene stems from the subjection of Steinlauf’s idealist humanism to the intense dehumanizing pressures of the Lager. However, what results from this forced re-examination of Steinlauf’s idealism is not a crystallization of the concept of the human being in certain more concrete, essential properties but a sense of the narrative’s perplexity and self-division in its conception of the human being. Levi, who is Steinlauf’s fellow prisoner in the Lager, comments with ambivalence on Steinlauf’s attempt to retain a fighting humanist spirit within an environment which vehemently destroys the very “idea of man.” He initially conveys agreement with Steinlauf’s view of disciplined washing as a means of keeping alive a vital concept of the upright man:

In this place it is practically pointless to wash every day in the turbid water of the filthy washbasins for purposes of cleanliness and health; but it is most important as a symptom of remaining vitality, and necessary as an instrument of moral survival. (40)

It is irrelevant that the act of washing in filthy water is pointless from the perspective of health and cleanliness. Its whole importance rests in its being a sign of civilized man. To use Steinlauf’s image, it is “the skeleton, the scaffolding” of civilized man that is being held upright. Levi’s position nevertheless shifts at the end of the chapter when he notes that he is unable to accept Steinlauf’s position:
No, the wisdom and virtue of Steinlauf, certainly good for him, is not enough for me. In the face of this complicated world my ideas of damnation are confused; is it really necessary to elaborate a system and put it into practice? Or would it not be better to acknowledge one's lack of a system?

(41)

Levi, the “incredulous man,” articulates a final position which rejects Steinlauf's elevated concept of the human being as a guiding ideal. His confusion about “ideas of damnation” acknowledges instead the irrationality of Lager reality in which it remains impenetrable to him why a certain prisoner may be damned or saved. Even as Steinlauf’s orthodox humanist wisdom is rejected, it is not replaced with an essentialist view of the human being, but a profound despair and cynicism which relinquishes belief in the efficacy of a systematic account of human functioning in the Lager.

Even as Steinlauf struggles within the matrix of idealist humanism to preserve an elevated image of the human being, the image itself becomes strained and dislocated under the dehumanizing pressures of the Lager. Steinlauf uses the images of the skeleton and scaffolding to suggest the upholding of humanist ideals, yet these very images are more typically associated with death than life, with the mere physical structure rather than genuine vitality of the human being. Furthermore, these images refer contradictorily to structures that are internal and external to the human being, suggesting an unresolved tension in Steinlauf’s conception of the unity of the human being. Even as Steinlauf speaks stalwartly about maintaining the concept of the human being, he articulates an image of the human being that is strained and divided. Embedded in Steinlauf’s orthodox humanist language is potentially a “skeletal” parody of the human being, a lifeless automaton who will repeat his dismal washing action mechanically. Levi teases out this negative, even ridiculous underside to Steinlauf’s humanist wisdom: “The more I think about it, the more washing one's face in our condition seems a stupid feat, even frivolous: a mechanical habit, or worse, a dismal repetition of an extinct rite” (40).

Subject to the pressures of the Lager, the “idea of man” held by Steinlauf’s idealist humanism becomes strained, self-divided and unstable. Here we are hardly at the starting point for an essentialist view of the human being, but rather a fracturing and destabilization of the concept of man. Levi’s narrative voice acknowledges this instability and itself replicates this sense of instability in its divided
meditation on Steinlauf’s account of “man.” Levi terminates the episode with an acknowledged loss of faith in a coherent system to rescue the rapidly dissolving “idea of man.”

**Emerging Posthumanist Conception of the Human Being**

Instead of the human being as a basis of commonality as in the essentialist view, the “idea of man” may itself undergo an internal split in the Lager. The symptomatic division in Steinlauf’s image of man finds its embodiment in the persons who successfully reach “salvation” in the chapter “The Drowned and the Saved.” Levi introduces these characters as a manifestation of human diversity rather than commonality:

> Many were the ways devised and put into effect by us in order not to die: as many as there are different human characters …

> We will try to show in how many ways it was possible to reach salvation with the stories of Schepschel, Alfred L., Elias and Henri. (92)

It is as if the breakdown in the concept of the human being is at once accompanied by a vacuum to be filled by a conception of the diversity of human beings—by their different, diverging stories rather than an account of their common, essential properties. The orientation is now towards human difference rather than sameness and the shift stems from Levi’s cynical and resigned confession that, though he may reject Steinlauf’s orthodox humanism, he faces in the dehumanization of the Lager the perplexing “lack of a system” in (re-)conceiving the human being.

The case of Alfred L. can be read as a parody of Steinlauf. Alfred L., like Steinlauf, possesses a “disciplined and methodical energy” which is channeled into a regiment of washing:

> L. had a “line”: with his hands and face always perfectly clean, he had the rare self-denial to wash his shirt every fortnight, without waiting for the bi-monthly change (we would like to point out here that to wash a shirt meant finding soap, time and space in the overcrowded washroom; adapting oneself to carefully keep watch on the wet shirt without losing attention for a moment, and to put it on, naturally still wet, in the silence-hour when the lights are turned out); he owned a pair of wooden shoes to go to the shower, and even his striped suit was singularly adapted to his appearance, clean and new. (94)
Steinlauf washes persistently in accordance to his faith in how such an act can uphold a concept of the human being. By contrast, Alfred L.’s disciplined washing results in the *perversion* of the concept of the human. L. maintains an appearance of cleanliness to prove that he is superior to his fellow prisoners and hence a potential “prominent” in the Lager:

> When the Chemical Kommando was formed ... L. knew that his hour had struck: he needed no more than his spruce suit and his emaciated and shaved face in the midst of the flock of his sordid and slovenly colleagues to at once convince both Kapo and *Arbeitsdienst* that he was one of the genuinely saved, a potential prominent; so that ... he was without hesitation appointed “specialist,” nominated head of the Kommando ... He was subsequently appointed to examine all the new intake to the Chemical Kommando, to judge their professional ability; which he always did with extreme severity, especially when faced with those in whom he smelled possible future rivals. (95)

Steinlauf’s belief that by persistently maintaining the exterior form of a human being one preserves the “man” is parodied by Alfred L. who doggedly “[acquires] in practice the whole appearance of a prominent considerably before becoming one” (94). The result in L.’s case is a striving towards a simulacrum of the human being in which is implied a division in the concept of the human being. The “idea of man” is preserved only in the form of a façade as Alfred L. himself leads the “cold life of the determined and joyless dominator” (95). The “idea of man” splits into a parodic simulacrum of itself, one that aspires towards the appearance of “man” but lacks its spirit within.

In the case of Henri, the outer façade is even more uncanny because here we find a *perfected* simulacrum of the human being:

> To speak with Henri is useful and pleasant: one sometimes also feels him warm and near; communication, even affection seems possible. One seems to glimpse, behind his uncommon personality, a human soul, sorrowful and aware of itself. But the next moment his sad smile freezes into a cold grimace which seems studied at the mirror ... and here he is again, intent on his hunt and his struggle; hard and distant, enclosed in armour, the enemy of all, inhumanly cunning and incomprehensible like the Serpent in Genesis.
Henri appears to be so warmly human as to lead one to perceive his “human soul” within. Yet, what seems to be an embodiment of a genuine human nature is frighteningly revealed to be a façade put on to conceal an inner being that is “inhumanly … incomprehensible.” Henri in fact embodies a concept of the human being that is unreadable. He manipulates his neighbor by tempting him to read himself as a true human being while his actual nature is enclosed in an impenetrable zone: “Henri has cut off every tie of affection: he has closed himself up as if in armour” (90). Henri’s example represents the greatest split in the concept of the human being—an exterior of soulful humanity which is wholly unreadable within. His unreadability marks an extreme point of radical disidentification, estrangement and differentiation within the community of human beings. In Henri, we see the beginnings of a conception of the human as radically marked off, i.e. the human being in terms of radical otherness, which cannot be co-opted by a will towards an essentialist conception of the human.

In the above examples, Levi depicts a conception of the human as diverse, heterogeneous, unstable, self-divided, simulated, self-parodying and unreadable. These features suggest a conception of the human being that is closer to a poststructuralist rather than an essentialist view. The poststructuralist condition, Satya Mohanty notes in a useful summary, is characterized by “[t]he emphasis on discontinuity, the celebration of difference and heterogeneity, and the assertion of plurality as opposed to reductive unities” (120). Despite Levi’s will towards an essentialist conception of the human being in his text, we see alongside an emerging poststructuralist conception. Even as the Lager is a privileged site for essentialist conceptions, its inexorable attempts to extinguish the “idea of man” render it a similarly privileged site for incipient posthumanist conceptions (such as poststructuralist or postmodernist ones). Indeed, despite his will to humanism, Levi would concede that it is “postmodern” man who is most adept at surviving the Lager’s dehumanization to become its remains and legacy. Alfred L. and Henri are his illustrations of “how many ways it was possible [not to drown] but to reach salvation.”

The story of Schepschel suggests how “postmodern” man may be more effective at surviving the Lager. Like Henri and Alfred L.,
the “idea of man” has died in Schepschel: “[F]or a long time now he has grown accustomed to thinking of himself only as a sack which needs periodic refilling” (93). Unlike Steinlauf, Schepschel does not for his survival in the Lager rely on a guiding ideal of the human being. Instead his person is a nondescript self characterized by a series of negative descriptions which do not define him at the core:

Schepschel is not very robust, nor very courageous, nor very wicked; he is not even particularly astute, nor has he ever found a method which allows him a little respite, but he is reduced to small and occasional expedients, “kombinacje” as they are called here.

Every now and again he steals a broom in Buna and sells it to the Blockältester; when he manages to set aside a little bread-capital, he hires the tools of the cobbler in the Block, his compatriot, and works on his own account for a few hours; he knows how to make braces with interlaced electric wires. Sigi told me that he has seen him during the midday interval singing and dancing in front of the hut of the Slovak workers, who sometimes reward him with the remainders of their soup.

(93)

Schepschel is “saved” because he is able to improvise skillfully to exploit heterogeneous situations. Survival for him comprises multiple small, expedient acts: stealing brooms, making braces, cobbling, and impromptu performances for scraps. In the “complicated world” of the Lager, Steinlauf’s vain striving to uphold a central ideal of the human being gives way to Schepschel’s versatile capitalization of heterogeneous situation in varied personal roles. The latter is characterized by expediency, improvisation, a (non-)self in multiple roles and an unsystematic approach towards survival. Schepschel can be seen to prefigure the postmodern idea of the antinessentialist, multiple self who eschews essential traits of being. In the case of Schepschel, we witness the extreme limit of the Lager’s pressure to fracture the concept of the human being into plural, improvised conceptions of the human being.

NOTES

Primo Levi's Will to Humanism

2 Althusser is, of course, just one of the many antihumanist thinkers in the second half of the twentieth-century. In Shakespeare's Humanism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), Robin Headlam Wells observes that, besides Althusser, Roland Barthes, Walter Benjamin, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault and Claude Lévi-Strauss have all “either announced or called for the death of ‘man’” (182), i.e. essentialist humanism. So influential is this antihumanist theory that, as Wells observes of the Renaissance period, even Shakespeare and other Renaissance writers are no longer seen to believe in an essential human nature but instead as having “anticipated twentieth-century anti-essentialism by some 400 years” (178). Different theorists would deconstruct essentialist humanism following different emphases. As early as in 1957, Barthes views “man” as a “bourgeois mythology” (qtd. in Diana Fuss, Essentially Speaking: Feminism, Nature & Difference [New York: Routledge, 1989], xii). Foucault presents essentialist humanism as a discursive construct in his famous pronouncement that “man is an invention of recent date” (The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences [New York: Vintage, 1973], 387). Derrida deconstructs essentialist humanism by pitting difference, or différence, against a unitary human nature. More recently, Giorgio Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive (New York: Zone Books, 2002) continues this antihumanist stance when he argues how Auschwitz problematizes the idea of man: it “marked the moving threshold in which man passed into non-man” and is a site that “makes it forever impossible to distinguish between man and non-man” (47). In the twenty-first century, humanism has come under further attack as “a discourse of specieism” that has “violent effects … on nonhuman animals” (see Cary Wolfe, Animal Rites: American Culture, the Discourse of Species, and Posthumanist Theory [Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2002], 6). While the poststructuralist antipathy towards essentialism is considerable, some critics argue that there is a place for the self-aware, strategic deployment of essentialism. For instance, Diana Fuss proposes that “essentialism can be deployed effectively in the service of both idealist and materialist, progressive and reactionary, mythologizing and resistive discourses” (xii).


The first English translation of the text was given this title. It was only in later translations that the title Survived in Auschwitz was used. The latter is now more widely used.


Nussbaum discusses how postmodern skepticism has encouraged “a retreat into an extreme relativism” or even led to a “collapse into subjectivism” (see 209–12).


As a chemist, Levi has a view of language that valorizes its service towards clear, objective and truthful communication. Eschewing poststructuralist skepticism, Levi sees language to be still able to achieve the above ideals. He would in fact reject any skeptical view of language and interpersonal communication: “According to a theory fashionable during the 1970s, which to me seems frivolous and irritating, ‘incommunicability’ supposedly was an inevitable ingredient, a life sentence inherent to the human condition, particularly the life style of industrial society: we are monads, incapable of reciprocal messages, or capable only of truncated messages, false at their departure, misunderstood on their arrival. Discourse is fictitious, pure noise, a painted veil that conceals existential silence; we are alone, even (or especially) if we live in pairs. It seems to me that this lament originates in and points to mental laziness; certainly it encourages it, in a dangerous vicious circle. Except for cases of pathological incapacity, one can and must communicate, and thereby contribute in a useful and easy way to the peace of others and oneself, because silence, the absence of signals, is itself a signal, but an ambiguous one, and ambiguity generates anxiety and suspicion. To say that it is impossible to communicate is false; one always can. To refuse to communicate is a failing; we are biologically and socially predisposed to communication, and in particular to its highly evolved and noble form, which is language” (see *The Drowned and the Saved* 88–9).

In using “postmodern” man, I have switched to another posthumanist term given the inappropriateness of the phrase “poststructuralist” man. Since poststructuralism conceives of “man” as a discursive entity, the phrase “poststructuralist” man would technically-speaking refer only to a discursive entity which is a concept too extreme for Levi’s text. A posthumanist conception of man is emerging in the Lager and the phrase “postmodern man” is intended to suggest its affinity with some characteristic features of both the poststructuralist and postmodern aesthetic.
Future markers indicate “the situation described by the verb at a time subsequent to the moment of speech.” According to Bybee (156), future inflections are found in 44% of the languages of the sample that she studied. She goes on to claim that “the presence of a present / past inflection in a language implies the presence of a future inflection, while the converse implication does not hold.” (157). Thus, languages like Navaho “have a future inflection but no present/past inflection” (157). English has future markers whose “primary function appeared to express mood, but could also be used to express future time” (157).

This paper uses an approach to grammaticalization that focuses on the development of grammatical elements from lexical items. It explores the sources of the simple future forms in Jordanian Arabic (JA), which is a form of Arabic spoken in Jordan, and in Standard Arabic as well. This paper also sheds light on the processes and mechanisms that are involved in the occurrence of the future elements in Jordanian Arabic and in Standard Arabic (SA). In addition, the analysis of the data taken from Arabic brings forward evidence that goes in the opposite direction of the claim that grammaticalization is unidirectional in nature.

The paper is composed of the following sections: Section 1 presents the framework of grammaticalization. Section 2 explores the pathways of development for the future morphemes in some languages (e.g. English). Section 3 deals with the future grammatical elements in Standard Arabic (SA). Grammaticalization and its processes in Jordanian Arabic (JA) are discussed in section 4, which sheds light on the source of future forms, the processes and the
mechanisms of change that trigger their development. Finally, conclusions are drawn in section 5.

1. The Grammaticalization Framework
This section displays the following points: First it introduces the definition of grammaticalization. Second, it discusses the processes of grammaticalization (e.g. desemanticization, phonological processes and morphosyntactic processes). And finally it presents the mechanisms of change (e.g. habituation and inference) in general.

There are two processes through which new grammatical forms come into play: the first form is through analogy whereby new paradigms come into being through formal resemblance to already established paradigms. The second way in which new grammatical forms come into being is through grammaticalization. According to Harris, “Meillet’s sense of grammaticalization includes the process by which a word becomes a clitic, or a cliticized affix”. Heine and Reh define grammaticalization “as an evolution whereby linguistic units lose in semantic complexity, pragmatic significance, syntactic freedom, and phonetic substance respectively.” Grammaticalization can also be more simply characterized as “the processes whereby items become more grammatical through time.” Hopper and Traugott (1993:50) and Trask regard grammaticalization as a subset of changes involved in reanalysis. However, Heine and Reh discriminate between grammaticalization and re-analysis: the former involves the evolution of lexical or grammatical morphemes whereas the latter is concerned with the evolution of syntactic or pragmatic structures. Furthermore, researchers suggest that grammaticalization is essentially uni-directional in nature (see Heine and Reh; Croft; Hopper and Traugott 1993; Bybee, Perkins and Pagliuca). More recently, researchers have come to realize that “Grammaticalization of lexical items takes place within particular constructions and, further, that grammaticalization is the creation of new constructions” (Bybee, Perkins and Pagliuca 59–83).

As has been previously pointed out, this study adopts an approach to grammaticalization whereby a lexical item becomes a grammatical element in the context of a particular construction. Grammaticalization involves the following processes (Bybee, Perkins and Pagliuca; and Trask): De-semanticization, Phonological processes and Decategorization:

In the desemanticization process, the semantic content of the lexical item undergoing grammaticalization is reduced, i.e., it is bleached of its lexical meaning (see Bybee, Perkins and Pagliuca;
and Trask). According to Bybee, Perkins and Pagliuca, “specific, concrete meanings entering into this process become generalized and more abstract, and as a result, become appropriate in a growing range of contexts” (59–83). Accordingly, generalization or bleaching of the meaning of a lexical item is caused by frequency.

On the other hand, “phonological processes” indicates that the words or phrases undergoing grammaticalization are also subject to phonological processes such as erosion, assimilation or even loss (Trask). Bybee and Pagliuca state that “as the meaning generalizes and the range of uses widens, the frequency increases and this leads automatically to phonological reduction and perhaps fusion”. All these processes lead to a critical reduction in the phonological form of the grammaticalizing words such that the produced forms “require less muscular effort” (Bybee, Perkins and Pagliuca 59–83).

Thirdly, in the decategorization process, after having its meaning generalized or bleached and its phonological form reduced, the word or phrase undergoing grammaticalization also undergoes a morphosyntactic process, i.e, decategorization. Decategorization “is applied to the set of processes by which a noun or verb loses its morphosyntactic properties in the process of becoming a grammatical element” (Trask; Bybee, Perkins and Pagliuca 187–206). Sometimes both the grammatical morpheme and the lexical element from which it arose coexist in the language but in some cases the lexical item disappears from the language (Trask; Bybee, Perkins and Pagliuca).

So far, two mechanisms of change are presented in this section: habituation and pragmatic inference. First, habituation is considered as an important mechanism of change in grammaticalization (Bybee, Perkins and Pagliuca). The force of a word or phrase that is repeated over and over is diminished. In other words, the more frequently a word or phrase is used, the more likely that it will undergo grammaticalization. Thus, habituation can cause a word or phrase to be bleached and, as a result, receive inferential meaning. Repetition can also trigger phonological reduction.

The second mechanism is conventionalization of implicature (pragmatic inference). In this type of change, if a particular pattern of inferences is realized in a grammatical construction, the hearer then comes to associate these inferences with the meaning of the construction. According to Bybee, Perkins and Pagliuca, “a grammar that often occurs in an environment in which a certain inference may be made can come to be associated with that inference to such an extent that the inference becomes part of the explicit meaning of the grammar” (25). Hence, in English the
intention meaning leads to the development of the future meaning: since the intentions are often realized in a period subsequent to the moment of speech, the hearer understands the future meaning in such constructions.

2. The “Movement” Pathway of the Grammaticalization of the future markers: an example from English

In this section, we will discuss the movement pathway of development for the future markers in English. The fact that the future is marked in the same way in most world languages and that it develops the same shades of meanings suggest that there is a limited number of sources out of which the future can develop. According to Bybee, Perkins and Pagliuca, future in the languages of the world most often develops from “constructions expressing obligation or necessity, desire, and movement or intention” (159). Trask (144) also discusses the verbs that develop into grammatical markers of futurity in the languages of the world: verbs meaning “go,” “come,” “want,” and “must.” In this section, reference is made to the discussion of the movement path of development that has been identified for the rise of future morphemes in the languages of the world. Bybee, Perkins and Pagliuca report that “the most frequent sources are movement verb constructions, with ten futures having their sources in constructions with ‘come’ and similar verbs and ten in constructions with ‘go’ (159).” Thus, in English the change of (be going to / be gonna) to future occurs only in purposive directional constructions. The change is made possible by the fact that there is an inference of futurity from purposiveness: If I am traveling in order to study, the act of study will be in the future (Trask 143).

3. Grammaticalization in Standard Arabic (SA)

In Standard Arabic, futurity is expressed by the prefix sa- or the particle sawfa meaning “will” (see Hasan and AbdelHafiz). These forms occur before the imperfective verb stem:

1. sa-yaqra’-u ad-darsa
   will-read –he- the-lesson
   “He will read the lesson”
2. sawfa yaqra’ u ad-darsa
   will-read-he the-lesson
   “He will read the lesson”
Some scholars of the Arabic language (see Wilkens\textsuperscript{12} and Holes\textsuperscript{13}) have noticed no difference in meaning between the sentences containing sawfa or sa- before the verb as in (1& 2). Thus, there is no difference between (sa-yaqra‘u “he will read”) and (sawfa yaqra‘u “he will read”). According to Al-Khawalda, “it seems that the selection of (sawfa yaqra‘u ‘He will read’) and (sa-yaqra‘u ‘He will read’) is arbitrary since it is difficult to find any semantic or syntactic reason for selecting one expression over the other to express futurity.”\textsuperscript{14} But other scholars (Hasan 60; Alkhuli\textsuperscript{15}; Khalil\textsuperscript{16} and AbdelHafiz) claim that Arabs use “the particle sawfa ‘will’ plus the imperfect indicative form of the verb” (KHALIL 99–100) in order to express remote future:

3- sawfa yazuurana ghadan.
Will he visit us tomorrow
“He will visit us tomorrow”

But the particle sa- “will” plus the imperfect indicative form of the verb is used to express near future time (Khalil 194):

4- Sa-yazuurana ghadan.
will-he visit us tomorrow
“He will visit us tomorrow”

Henceforth, the marker sa- ‘will’ seems to have developed from the word (sawfa), which is an independent marker of futurity. The fact that sa- is attached to the beginning of the imperfective verb stems indicates that it is derived from the word (sawfa), which is often placed before imperfective verb forms bearing the same meaning and function.

It seems obvious that some examples of (sawfa + the imperfective verb) form have undergone a phonological process and a morphosyntactic process: the phonological process, i.e. syllabic erosion, has reduced the word (sawfa) to sa- as explained in the following configuration:

5- Underlying Form $\rightarrow$ second syllable loss $\rightarrow$ coda deletion $\rightarrow$ surface form
sawfa $>$ saw $>$ sa $>$ sa

Such a phonological reduction of the particle is motivated by the frequent use of such a sequence of words (sawfa +verb). (sawfa) “will” has a high token frequency as, according to Abduh,\textsuperscript{17}
occurs 107 times in Abduh’s list of the most common 3025 words. Similar examples occur in English: the sequence (going to + Verb) is reduced to ‘gonna’ as a result of the repeated use of this sequence of words. We can also note that the grammaticalized word has been decategorized as a dependent element which has to be attached to a verb stem. According to Bybee, Perkins and Pagliuca, one important characteristic of grammaticalization is “a dramatic frequency increase” (549–83). This increase arises as a result of an increase in the number and types of contexts in which the grammatical morpheme is appropriate” (59–83). If this prediction is correct, the form (sa-“will”) is expected to be more frequent than the particle (sawfa” will”) from which it has developed. That this prediction holds can be seen in the study conducted by Al-Khawalda, who examined the token frequency of each of the future forms in Classical Arabic. The development of the future prefix sa- has not influenced the status of sawfa: both sawfa and sa- coexist (Al-Khawalda 20–1), but they are used in different contexts as has been previously pointed out. Accordingly, sa-, which is more grammaticalized than its cognate sawfa, must be the newer form and is probably going to outrank the source form. That this is in progress can be supported by referring to Al-Khawalda’s study of futurity in the speech of the Jordanian Prime Minister. Al-Khawalda (72) states that the form with the prefix sa- occurs 67 times per 73 words, making a total of 91.7%, whereas the form sawfa occurs four times, or 5.5% of the total.

The claim that the course of grammaticalization is unidirectional (Heine and Reh 74; Trask; Bybee, Perkins and Pagliuca) cannot be valid in such a situation. Bybee, Perkins and Pagliuca view unidirectionality as a situation whereby nouns and verbs lose their categorial status and become prepositions, auxiliaries and other grammatical forms. Free elements become more restricted and fuse with other elements. The reverse directions are rarely attested (Trask).

Standard Arabic provides a counterexample to the unidirectionality hypothesis (Abdel-Hafiz). It has just been noted that the future element sawfa has become sa-, which is attached to a verb stem. The particle sawfa has also been lexicalized as the verbs sawwafa/ yusawwif “to postpone.” SA is not the only language with counterexamples to the unidirectionality proposal (AbdelHafiz). English and Basque also provide some counterexamples to unidirectionality. English has counterexamples involving the lexicalization of grammatical items. For instance, the suffix -ism, as in socialism has recently become an independent word -ism meaning
“body of knowledge or theory” or, in some cases, “creed.” Similarly, the Basque bound morpheme –tasun “ness,” which is used in the formation of abstract nouns as in -eder “beautiful” and edertasun “beauty,” has been turned into an independent word tasun “quality” (Trask 147).

4. The Grammaticalization of Future Markers in Jordanian Arabic (JA)

Jordanian Arabic displays the future tense. The future tense (futurity) can be realized by three prefixes: b(a)-, Ha- and ta- before the imperfective indicative verb:

6-bukrah ba-shuufak fil-matar
   tomorrow shall –I-see –you in –the- airport
   “I shall see you tomorrow in the airport”

7-bukrah ha-shuufak fl- mataar
   tomorrow shall –I-see –you in -the-airport
   “I shall see you in the airport tomorrow”

8-Xabbirni ilyawm ta-shoufak bukrah
   you-tell-me today to see-you tomorrow
   “Just tell me today in order to see you tomorrow”

It is evident from the examples above that the future affixes b(a)-, ha- and ta- “will” are attached to the beginning of the imperfective verb shuuf “see” to indicate futurity.

4.1 Analysis

4.1.1 The form ba –VERB:

In Jordanian Arabic, futurity is expressed by the use of either the prefix b(a)- or the free particle (badd+ subject clitic pronoun) before the imperfective indicative verb to indicate futurity as shown in examples (9&10):

9- bukrak baddi-ashoufak- fil-mataar.
   tomorrow shall I-see -you in the airport
   “I shall see you tomorrow in the airport”

10-bukrah ba-ashoufak- fil-mataar.
   tomorrow shall I-see -you in the airport
   “I shall see you tomorrow in the airport”
It seems obvious that there is no basic difference in meaning between the two forms in terms of future remoteness. We would claim that the future marker őb(a)- seems to have developed from the lexical word őbad(di) to indicate futurity. The evidence we propose is that both forms that are attached to the beginning of the verb have the same inflectional position within the word as represented in the following configuration:

\[ \text{ba (ddi).... person (subject).....verb} \ldots \text{object / clitic OR (free morpheme)} \]

Thus, the particle (bddi) and the reduced prefix (ba-) are similar in terms of their syntactic distribution, i.e. they occur before of the verb. On the other hand, there is a basic difference between the two forms. The form őbad(di) takes the subject pronoun as a clitic (e.g. őbad-di “I shall,” őbad-du “he will,” őbad-ha “she will,” őbad-na “we will,” etc); and it is followed by the verb which also contains the same clitic pronoun (e.g őbad-di őshrab “I will drink,” őbad-ha tishrab “She will drink,” őbad-du yishrab “He will drink,” and őbad-na nishrab “We will drink”). While the second form ba- does not take such a subject pronoun clitic rather it is only attached to the verb which originally bears that clitic (b-ashrab “I will drink,” b-tishrab “She will drink,” b-nishrab “We will drink”).

4.1.2 The form őHa—verb

Jordanian Arabic also employs the prefix őHa-, which occurs before the imperfective verb to indicate the future tense. This prefix has the same distribution of the prefix ba- explained in section 4.1.1. We would also hypothesize that the future marker őHa- seems to have developed from the lexical word ra(a)Ha “went” and rayih “to go” in indicate futurity. The evidence is that both forms are attached to the beginning of the verb and have the same inflectional position within the word as represented in the following configuration:

\[ (ra) őHa/ őaH OR rayiH .... 1st person (subject)..... verb ... object / clitic OR (free morpheme) \]
It is necessary to note that the two particles ra (a) Ha and rayiH have the same root, but two different derivations. It seems clear that the prefix Ha- has developed from the particles ra(a) Ha or rayeH.

11. Ha–shoufak bukrah fi-l-mataar.
   shall-I-see –you tomorrow in the airport
   “I shall see you tomorrow in the airport”

12. ra(ye)H ashoufak fi-l-maTar
   shall-I-see –you tomorrow in the airport
   “I shall see you tomorrow in the airport”

4.1.3 The form ta+ Verb

Futurity can also be expressed in the particle Hatta “to+ future form verb” and its equivalent free particle ta- “to+ future form” before the imperfective indicative verb as in (13&14):

13. Xabbirni ilyawm Hatta ?shoufak bukrah
   you-tell me today to see-you tomorrow
   “Just tell me today in order to see you tomorrow.”

14. Xabbirni ilyawm ta-shoufak bukrah
   you-tell me today to see-you tomorrow
   “Just tell me today in order to see you tomorrow”

According to the data above, there seems to be no difference between Hatta and ta- in terms of structure and meaning. Both forms are followed by imperfective indicative verbs and both indicate futurity. We would assume that the grammaticalized form ta- “to+ future form” has developed from the lexical item Hatta “to+ future form.” This is supported by the phonological process which reduces the form ta- from the future particle Hatta and the decategorization process which renders the grammaticalized form meaningless separately.
Consequently, there are two processes that characterise the grammaticalization behaviour for the future markers in (JA): Bleaching and Phonological reduction explained below. First, as a result of frequency of use (Bybee, Perkins and Pagliuca), the forms (ra (a) Ha) “to go,” bad(di-) “want to” and Hatta “to+ future form” are de-semantified or bleached, such that their semantic content is radically reduced: an intention meaning and a future meaning developed. Thus, the particle Hatta, for example, which indicates futurity, has been bleached to just a prefix ta-(15):

15-Hastanna ta-shoufak bukrat
    will wait-I to see-you tomorrow
    “I will wait to see you tomorrow”

Furthermore, the verb (ra(a)Ha) “go” is de-semantified or bleached, part of its meaning gets lost: it now has nothing to do with movement or intention (e.g. Ha-ynaam bakkeer “he will sleep early”); this form is associated only with future meaning. According to Bybee, Perkins and Pagliuca, “the mechanism behind bleeding is habituation: a stimulus loses its impact if it occurs very frequently. But it is inference that is responsible for the rise of the future meaning in such constructions: the hearer infers that the intention is to be realized in the future. The repetition of this inference creates in the mind of the hearer a relationship between such constructions and the future meaning” (59–83). Second, phonological reduction process refers to syllabic erosion, which reduces the form of the lexical item, as shown in the following:

A-The form (Badd (i)):
First, the second syllable of the word bad(di) gets truncated, resulting in (baddi>bad-). Second, the coda of the syllable bad(di) is deleted, resulting in (b(a)-).

B-The form (ra(a)Ha)
This form also undergoes similar processes as shown in the following example. First, the initial syllable ra is completely eroded; consequently, the form becomes (ra(a)Ha >Ha). Thus, the grammaticalised form, which has lost its original category as a verb in a particular construction, has come to be decategorized as a prefix. Thus the mechanism of change that is operative here is frequency.
It is important to notice that the verb (raaHa “to go”) maintains its original meaning in some contexts of the language (i.e. it did not get exposed to bleaching or phonological reduction) in constructions where it is not followed by an imperfective verb form as in (16):

\[16\text{-} \text{al-walad raah ?ddaar} \]
\[\text{The-boy went to the home} \]
\[\text{“The boy went home”} \]

C. The form Hat (ta):

The lexical from Hat-ta is composed of two syllables Hat and ta, and we assume that the first syllable is completely eroded resulting in the grammaticalized form ta- as explained in section 4.1.2.

5. Conclusion

We have come up with the following findings. Standard Arabic and Jordanian Arabic have future markers. Both have a future prefix or particle that accompanies the verb stem. Standard Arabic has two future markers: (sawfa) which is employed if reference is made to remote future time and (sa-), which is used to denote near future time and this form does not exist in Jordanian Arabic. Moreover, the future forms of the Jordanian Arabic ba-, Ha- and ta- have developed out of full lexical items bad(di.), ra(a)Ha and Hatta respectively and these forms are developed from Jordanian Arabic, not from Classical Arabic.

As for the grammaticalization processes, the future forms in Jordanian Arabic and Standard Arabic have undergone two processes: desemanticization or bleaching and phonological reduction. Jordanian and Standard Arabic have in common the same mechanisms of change which are operative in the development of future elements: habituation and inference. Repetition has deprived a lexical item from parts of its meaning. Also, the lexical item is subject to phonological reduction. In the development of SA future forms, only habituation is involved. As the particle (sawfa) is repeated in constructions where it is followed by the imperfective verb form, it is, therefore, exposed to phonological reduction: syllabic loss (i.e. sawfa > sa).

To recapitulate, it has been noted that the lexical items that develop into future elements in Jordanian and Standard Arabic are subject to grammaticalization only in a particular construction, namely, the construction where the lexical item is preposed to a
verb. But the lexical items remain intact in other constructions: the lexical items coexist with the grammatical elements.

NOTES

2 Meillet, see A. Harris, “Remarks on Grammaticalization (1997)”.
6 Croft, 1990.
9 Standard Arabic (SA) is used nowadays in the religious and official contexts. In other words, it is the written form of the language, common to all educated Arabic speakers in the Arab world. It is used in the media, in the literature, and in the academic institutions (D. Ravid and Rola Farah, “Learning about Noun Plurals in Early Palestinian Arabic,” *First Language*, 19 (1999) 2: 56: 187–206).
14 M. Al-Khawalda, “The Expression of Futurity in the Arabic and English Languages,” in *Diversity in Language*, ed. Z. Ibrahim et al. (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2000), 70–76 [75].
15 M. Alkhulli, *Comparative Linguistics: English and Arabic* (Jordan: Dar AlFalah, 1997), 46,
A SIMONIDEAN TALE.
COMMEMORATION AND COMING TO TERMS
WITH THE PAST:
MICHEL TOURNIER’S LE ROI DES AULNES

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Faut-il inventer pour dire vrai? Oui, sans conteste: dans les limites d’une pratique qui s’interroge sur ses droits et ses devoirs, l’invention a part à la vérité du témoignage.¹

Michel Tournier (born in 1924 in Paris) is one of the most distinguished and renowned French authors of the twentieth century. His first novel, *Vendredi ou les limbes du Pacifique* (1967), won the Grand Prix du Roman de l’Académie Française and his second novel, *Le Roi des Aulnes* (1970), the Prix Goncourt. The author, who himself admits that he came late to literature, became thus, in a very short time, a celebrity within and without the borders of the French literary establishment. He was elected a member of the Académie Goncourt in 1972. Since then, he has been published widely and regularly and his works have been discussed in various contexts, including hermeneutical, intertextual as well as poststructuralist scholarly approaches.

His works, especially *Le Roi des Aulnes*, did not receive unanimous approval, however. Whereas French critics were mostly very enthusiastic about the astute composition of the novel and the formal consistency and strength, many German scholars, later followed by Americans, insisted that this novel made for very troubling reading. They objected to the apparent sympathy of the

¹ I would like to thank Chris Ball, Julian Pfitzner and Mark Schubert for proof-reading the final draft of this paper.
author with the Nazi-Regime during World War Two. Jean Améry (1973) accused Tournier of intentionally using the Nazi discourse and calls the novel an “Ästhetisierung der Barbarei.” A decade later, Saul Friedländer (1982) counted the novel among those of the postwar-era that stand at the beginning of a new discourse about Nazism:

Mais voici qu’à la fin des années soixante, dans le monde occidental tout entier, l’image du nazisme commence à évoluer. Non pas radicalement ni unanimement mais ici et là, à droite comme à gauche, de manière assez perceptible et assez révélatrice pour qu’il soit permis de parler d’un nouveau discours.³

According to Friedländer, the discourse about Nazism at that time shifted from an outsider perspective towards an insider perspective. Instead of a judgemental approach, mainly focused on the speechlessness of a whole generation of victims, the new discourse tried to aestheticize what happened by using the enemy’s (i.e. the Nazi) language. Friedländer, from a more scientific standpoint but otherwise quite like Améry, accuses Michel Tournier of unintentionally (or maybe also intentionally) collaborating with and thus promoting the Nazi discourse itself.

It is common knowledge among Tournierian scholars that most of the accusations that have been made concerning the integrity of the author and the novel have been refuted long since; whether it be by an accurate analysis of the French original and the proof of many incorrect and distorting translations⁴, by the overall positive reception of the author and the novel in Israel or, of course, by the fact that in the last 20 years or so scholars have had to deal a lot more commonly with recent history being processed in more or less aesthetic and imaginative ways, especially when eye-witnesses die and when history and fiction more and more become just two sides of the same coin.⁵ All these arguments notwithstanding, a certain unease remains in the reader of the novel today.

**Literature after Auschwitz**

The literature about Auschwitz is still closely linked to the questions of if and how it is possible to remember the indescribable European catastrophe of the twentieth century. As time passes, more and more eyewitnesses to the Shoah and the Holocaust die. As oral transmission becomes less available, it will become more important to think about adequate methods of remembering the
past. Scholars have to cope with an overwhelming amount of concentration camp literature as well as other documents handed down by the survivors of the Holocaust, most of which especially deal with questions of authenticity and fictionality and their respective characteristics. The Wilkomirski affair led to an intensification of the discussion in which literary criticism was faced with the question of how authenticity and reality are related to each other. Further questions are if, and to what extent, fictionalization within the Holocaust literature is not only allowed but has to be understood as an essential rhetorical instrument. Eventually, the affair also raised questions concerning the legitimacy of each single author in the face of these events. Who was, or is, allowed to write about the Shoah and the Holocaust? And, considering their own survival, do we even have to question the legitimacy of all those who did not die in the camps but came back to report things they never experienced until the bitter end? “Le survivant des camps est un témoin lacunaire,” explique Giorgio Agamben, car il parle d’une expérience qu’il n’a pas vécue jusqu’au bout puisqu’il n’est pas mort: ce n’est pas lui le vrai témoin, c’est celui qui est mort” (Bornand 53).

Every literary form in which information is presented contains fictional traits. A strict distinction between “true” testimonial and “fictitious” novel, as Elie Wiesel states it concerning the Auschwitz-experience, has to be challenged following more recent concepts of fictionality and history. It is the poet’s duty to reconstruct, reimagine and describe even those events that transgress fantasy and that haven’t been witnessed by the poet. And it is the poet who finally plays a major role in the process of interpretation and commemoration of the Shoah because he or she is the one who has to refute the Adornian dictum about the impossibility of writing [a poem] after Auschwitz.8

Antique Ars Memoria
In 1966, Frances Yates published The Art of Memory, a study dealing with mnemotechniques from Aristotle to Shakespeare.9 In the first chapter, she describes the foundation myth of mnemotechnique as it has been handed down to us in three antique sources.10 Mnemosyne is the mother of the muses in Greek mythology. Memory and art are therefore closely linked. The inventor of the mnemotechnique is said to be Simonides of Ceos, who lived from around 556 to around 468 B.C. The story about inventing mnemotechnique describes the decline of a former, natural memory, which has subsequently been replaced by an artificial
memory. Simonides, who wrote an appraisal poem for his patron Scopas, was paid only half the price for it because he dared to dedicate half of his praise to the mythical twins Castor and Pollux. Those two gods, according to Scopas, should pay him the other half of the fee. At a banquet in honour to Scopas, Simonides is called out by a messenger:

For he had scarcely crossed the threshold on his way out, when the banqueting hall fell in upon the heads of the guests and wrought such havoc among them that the relatives of the dead who came to seek the bodies for burial were unable to distinguish not merely the faces but even the limbs of the dead. Then it is said, Simonides, who remembered the order in which the guests had been sitting, succeeded in restoring to each man his own dead.¹¹

The above description begins with a border crossing of Simonides. He enters and transgresses a threshold that later becomes the limen between life and death. Goldmann, who understands the origin of mnemotechnique to be a cult of the death, refers to the cultic function of the poet who is the mediator between the living and the dead as well as between gods and men. The poet thus becomes a border crossing expert, and crossing the border itself becomes a magical act.¹² Furthermore, a building is described that collapses and transforms a former cosmos into chaos. This collapse from cosmos into chaos can metaphorically be understood as a collapse from life to death as well as from remembrance to oblivion. The destroyed ωμός becomes the house of the death, the Hades that hosts the dead people who are eternally gathered for their feast (see Goldmann 54). Last but not least, Simonides, by means of his art and imagination, and by simply remembering the seating arrangements, helps the family members find out whom of their beloved died. The poet crosses the border between the living and the dead. He is describing an event that he has not witnessed until its very end. In remembering and mourning the dead he assures a certain cultural memoria and he becomes the advocate of the dead as well as the bereaved. In addition, the poet Simonides here describes the destruction of an (architectonic) cosmos and he reconstructs the (new) order by the help of pictures and words.

Michel Tournier in his novel Le Roi des Aulnes has to be understood as a Simonidean figure in all these respects. He is crossing the border between the living and the dead. He describes an event in history that he has not witnessed until its very end. He
assures cultural memoria in remembering and mourning the dead. He describes (metaphorically as well as concretely) the destruction of an οὐκός, of an architectonic cosmos and he reconstructs a new order by the help of pictures and words. Even though the emphasis within the antique model lies not so much upon the creative role of the poet (as in Tournier) as upon his role as an authentic eyewitness and faithful reproducer of the objective past (as in Simonides), one has to consider that the new order is not compatible any more with the old one, nor is it wished to be. Taking this into account, one can presume that the tale of Simonides might be the first fictionalizing of history we know of, because the seating arrangements of the guests are not only dependent on the personal and highly subjective angle of the eyewitness himself, but the eyewitness is at the same time the only survivor, so that an examination of the words of the poet is not possible.

Memory Metaphors in *Le Roi des Aulnes*

In his novel *Le Roi des Aulnes*, Tournier establishes several memory metaphors: for example, the book, the palimpsest, the photography, the track or footprint, the building or architecture, the attic and the stomach, and the digging/excavating of items or persons. Part of this excavating metaphor is the idea of freezing or thawing as well as sleeping or waking. These metaphors are not chosen at random by the author but possess a clear function in the text. They refer to the vast complex of commemoration. With these metaphors, the author refers to older literature, different topographies and archaeologies, historical events, individual as well as collective mechanisms of remembrance and religious discourses and practices. He collects his metaphors from a rich fund of occidental culture. In the remainder of this section, the three most important memory metaphors in *Le Roi des Aulnes* will be analysed.

The meditative and rhetorical aspect of rumination as a metaphor of memory and oblivion plays a major and largely undervalued role in the Tournierian novel. Closely linked to the metaphor of rumination is the act of digestion and ingestion. The metaphor of eating and devouring is very consciously used by Tournier. In the scene where the hungry Tiffauges eats his beloved and highly cherished pigeons, the author links the Christian tradition of the last supper with a special model of memoria:
The first night Tiffauges had eaten one of the three roast pigeons. He was sure it was the silver, partly no doubt because of the weight, but there was also a certain flavor that seemed to have some affinity with what the bird had smelled like when it was alive. The two others enabled him not only to escape the hunger his companions suffered from but also to feed his soul through intimate communion with the only creatures he'd loved for the last six months.  

The reading of holy texts, mainly about the suffering and death of Jesus, can also be understood as a spiritual rumination and meditative act of remembrance, a commemoration of the death of Christ. Memory is closely linked to the metaphors of the stomach, ingestion and digestion. “The incorporation of the dying Christ finds its counterpart in the meditative way of rumination of the holy scripture. In Christ who is the divine Logos, the ‘verbum visibile’, Theophagy and Grammatophagy coincide.” In his work on rhetoric, Quintilian describes a memorizing technique that has close affinities with the monastic ideal of meditation (see Butzer 59). According to him, good health, especially good digestion, is a precondition for the memorizing act. The text should be digested like a meal. In Tournier’s novel, the reading of religious literature in the refectory of Saint Christopher refers to a special commemoration ritual (see Tournier 39–41). Tiffauges, with the aid of Nestor, is given the opportunity to recite from the sacred texts during meals in the refectory. During his recitation, he (mis)appropriates the tale of Saint Christopher and comes to understand himself as the sole interpreter of the legend in identifying Saint Christopher with Nestor, then with himself. The authentic text of the legend (Jacobus de Voragine) becomes a palimpsest. During the lecture of Tiffauges, it is (mis)appropriated by him recto tono, “eaten”, digested and changed during the process of spitting it out again. Thus, not only are Nestor and Tiffauges creating an oral tradition that stands against the written records and memoria, the doxa of the school, the author himself, in “eating”, “digesting”, “spitting out” and “defecating” other literature, also draws attention to this special method of intertextuality. Another example to highlight this special memory concept that the author promotes is the defecation scene inside the dormitory of Saint Christophe. During a nightly toilet session, Nestor uses a sermon from Father Superior, written in the Superior’s own hand, to get his backside wiped clean with the aid of Tiffauges (Tournier 55–7). This defecation ritual, aside from funnily abusing school authorities
(Nestor is literally “shitting” on their words!), at the same time refers to the memory ritual mentioned above. The official sermon is used as toilet paper and thus implicitly enters the cycle of meditation-rumination-digestion-defecation. The act of defecation itself, instead of reducing the written document into nothingness, preludes and thus facilitates memory, which reminds the reader strongly of the Carnivalesque, the Grotesque Body and the inversion of high and profane culture described in Bakhtin.

The rumination metaphor is connected with a specific pain imagery. The original traumatic aspect within the Simonidean tale will later in history be eliminated in favour of a rhetorical model that is devoid of trauma and pain. While Quintilian and Cicero do not talk about pain at all, Tournier picks up the aspect of a pain memory, as well as the idea of a specific body semiotics as a scripture that is burned into the body and leaves it transformed by pain. The pain metaphor and body writing appear in several places in the novel. Tiffauges suffers from the so-called “angélique”, his personal mark of Cain. This allows him to enter into contact with the divine. The pain imagery is closely connected with a personal commemoration ritual. In awarding his painful breathing problems a pseudo-religious impetus (he identifies his suffering with the suffering of Jacob, who fights with the Angel), he lets his body become a writing surface (like a parchment), onto which God himself burned his signs. In doing so, he changes his original illness or deficit into an excess and thus combines the Christian *Heilsgeschichte* with his own, ephemeral history:

“It was my guardian angel”, I began. “I wanted to do something I shouldn’t, he tried to stop me and we had a fight. I tried to hit him, he countered with a punch in the chest. An angel’s punch [...] I was able to get up again. But ever since I have had the mark, this dent in my chest on either side of which my pectoral muscles stand out like hard knotty lumps, like little dry and desperate breasts. [...] To myself I call this respiratory distress ‘angelic oppression’, or more briefly ‘the angelic’” (Tournier 68–9).

In *Le Roi des Aulnes*, the reader is regularly confronted with the pain metaphor in the form of bloody wounds. According to Nietzsche, wounds facilitate human memory. Only that which does not stop hurting will be remembered: “Wie macht man dem Menschen-Tiere ein Gedächtnis? [...] Man brennt etwas ein, damit es im Gedächtnis bleibt: nur was nicht aufhört, *wehtun*, bleibt im
Gedächtnis.”

Through its wounds and distortions, the body functions as a memory metaphor and at the same time a storage medium that can be inscribed like an empty page or a wax board. In the rumination metaphor there exists an explicit bond between pain, meditation and commemoration. The injury of Jeannot in the garage (Tournier 78–9) leads to a bigger and even more intensive “injury” of Tiffauges himself, whose feelings, in seeing the open wound, have religious connotations. Based on this body-pain-script the protagonist experiences a divine vision, intensified through meditation:

The nine choirs of angels surrounded me with a bright invisible glory. The air was full of incense and the sound of harps. A river of sweetness flowed majestically through my veins. […] I am still the greater casualty of the two and still haven’t finished ruminating over the dazzling discovery I was precipitated into by today’s accident (Tournier 79, my italics).

This painful unio mystica of the protagonist, described by Tiffauges and ironically sapped by the author, is at the same time a semiotic and a mnemonic one. The rumination here closely follows the painful body-experience, whereas there is no difference between the pain of the wounded body and the metaphorical pain that Tiffauges experiences. The other person’s pain is being “incorporated”, converted and transformed into Tiffauges’ own metaphysical pain. In another scene, a child gets injured while roller-skating, and Tiffauges tries to capture the child’s pain to make it become his own pain (Tournier 105–07). To get a better result in his photos, he slaps the injured boy in the face and then takes the photograph. Braunart cites a passage from Goethe’s Life of Benvenuto Cellini, where the father slaps the son in the face while he shows him a little fire salamander—not to punish him, but to make the memory of the salamander for the son a more vivid one (Braunart 357). Just as the father gives his son a slap in the face in order to keep his memory of the salamander a fresh one, Tiffauges slaps the small ice-skater in the face in order to get an imprint of his pain, which can be seen in his eyes, on the photographic paper so that the witnessed pain-semiotics could become a memory-semiotics.

Characteristically, within the intertextual reference system of the Tournierian novel are the graduations with which a new text is written over an older one. The old script seems to fade increasingly
as the story proceeds, because new reminiscences join the old ones, which lead an independent existence and refer to different hypotexts. The Canada-metaphor is one of the most important and most multifaceted metaphors in this novel and leads the sufficiently cautious reader indirectly but irresistibly to the memory of Auschwitz. It successively refers to the following items, situations, animals, human beings, or places in the novel (non-exhaustive enumeration):

- the staglike roar (French: “bramer”, English: “to bellow”) that Tiffauges makes when he dips his head into the flushing toilet in utter despair and which refers to the name of the protagonist “Bram” in Curwood’s novel (see Tournier 42ff.), as well as to the blind elk that Tiffauges feeds during his stay in the forest hut in East Prussia.
- the log cabin called “Canada” in the Prussian forest where Tiffauges secretly spends many nights of his captivity. This is a reference to Curwood’s novel, too (see Tournier 170).
- the blind elk, a doppelganger of Tiffauges, that keeps him company in the forest and that refers to Curwood’s novel (see Tournier 175ff.)
- the Jewish boy Ephraim (whose uncle wanted to emigrate to Canada) who tells Tiffauges about the meaning of “Canada” in Auschwitz (see Tournier 354).
- the barracks of Auschwitz, called “Canada”, in which the last properties of the killed Jews were collected (see Tournier 354).

The first four associations or links are of a positive nature. The last two links refer to Auschwitz and the Holocaust and lead to the collapse of the “Cité phorique” that Tiffauges (and the reader) created throughout the novel. This leaves no doubt as to where the story ends. The author’s reference to the barracks of Auschwitz in which the last properties of the killed Jews were collected, proves to be historically correct. There were special barracks which were known by the name “Canada”. Many documents of detainees in Auschwitz prove this. The term “Canada” stands for the barracks as well as for the commando some detainees belonged to. Their duty was to classify and prepare for transport the diverse items that formerly belonged to the Jews. In the official SS-terminology, these
places were known as “Effektenlager” or “Effektenkammern”; and the commandos were called “Aufräumungskommandos”. The Nazi authorities, as a prelude to their deportation tactics, pretended that the Jews should be resettled in new areas or countries (for example Canada). The Jews brought along their most precious belongings on the journey, which was, according to Strzelecki, not only a welcome side effect but part of a purposeful policy of the Nazis (see Strzelecki 189). In Le Roi des Aulnes, the Canada-context runs as follows:

Canada had been a province of his own personal dream, the refuge of his Nestorian childhood and of the first months of his Prussian captivity. He asked for details. “Canada?” said Ephraim, surprised at such ignorance. “It was the treasure house of Auschwitz. You see, the prisoners used to carry around with them whatever valuables the had left, precious stones, gold coins, jewels, watches. When they’d been gassed, their clothes, and whatever had been found in the pockets and the linings, were put in a special hut that was called Canada.” (Tournier 354)

With his method of an intertextual mnemonic concept, the author intends to release in the reader a recognition of the images of Auschwitz. The author’s own inventions remain little and fulfill a special function in the novel. The evocation of the hair, the twin research of Dr. Mengele, and the barracks, where the last belongings of the dead were gathered, are all anchored in the collective memory of most readers of the novel. The special mnemotechnique of the author—similar to the antique Ars Memoria—is that the well known pictures of Auschwitz and the Holocaust are being connected to images of a completely different quality and register, “Le Canada.” The notion of “Canada” initially evokes (in Ephraim as well as in Tiffauges and the reader himself) rather positive associations and can therefore easily be remembered. The antique Ars Memoria of the rhetor (Cicero) offers a number of rules for the positioning of images in virtual space. Virtual spaces (architectures, rooms, open places, attics, walls, castles ...), where the images of things that shall be remembered will be stored or even locked away by the rhetor, have to be imagined. In (virtually) walking through these places (during a speech, for example), the rhetor will find the pictures that he left during his first imaginative visit to the place. In doing so, he is able to remember his speech without written notes. He will remember
what he wants to say in walking through the imaginative rooms. Quite like *Ars Memoria*, Tournier attaches his positively connoted image of “Canada” to places, where it can be remembered easily. The (positive) Canada image, by the help of a “malign inversion” (Tournier 354) then becomes the reference image for the horror of Auschwitz. According to the ancient *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, the movable picture, the *imago agens* (see Antoine 55) should be presented in a very uncommon manner. It has to be very impressive. The positive Canada association, resulting from the lecture in childhood by the protagonist, and the hut and the elk in the Rominter Heide, finds its devilish counterpart in the image of the barracks in Auschwitz. This indeed is a very provocative and impressive image and therefore one to be easily remembered, making it a strong reminder of the extermination of the Jews. Tournier’s novel thus becomes in many different ways and meanings a mnemotope for Auschwitz and the Holocaust. Tiffauges as well as the reader are led by the author to connect the seemingly positive connotations of Canada with the negative associations of the extermination of the Jews. The act of remembrance itself comes along with rather happy and even trivial associations that are not concretely linked to the situation to be remembered:

Tiffauges couldn’t accept without a murmur this horrible metamorphosis of all that had been for him most intimate and happy. […] Thus, through Ephraim’s long confessions, Tiffauges, steeped in horror, saw an *infernal city* (*Cité infernale*, R.B.) remorselessly building up which corresponded stone by stone to the *phoric city* (*Cité phorique*, R.B.) he himself had dreamed of at Kaltenborn. Canada, the weaving of the hair, the roll calls, the Dobermans, the researches into the phenomena of twins and atmospheric densities, and above all, above all, the mock shower rooms—all his inventions, all his discoveries were reflected in the horrible mirror, inverted and raised to hellish incandescence. (Tournier 354 and 357, my italics)

Tiffauges’ *Cité phorique* corresponds with the houses and palaces of the artificial memory in the antique *Ars Memoria*, where the movable images are attached. Canada itself becomes a formula for remembrance that is charged with a new meaning. To sum up, Tournier accomplishes his own *Ars Memoria*, in accordance with the ancient *Ars* in four steps: The novel starts with the original documentary adaption of a primary source (hypotext) that he wants
the reader to remember (Jehuda Bacon-document; 1); he then uses different movable pictures (*imago agens*) such as the elk, the log hut or the lecture of Curwood-texts (2) and goes further, in creating a closed intertextual reference system of “sign posts” (Culler) that all lead to the construction of a single visualization: “Canada” (3). He finally positions this *imago agens* in a place (the novel as a “mnemotope” or the “Cité phorique” of Tiffauges as an imaginary, architectonic building that is being construed throughout the novel (4).

In 2002, Anthony Purdy published an important article about the bog body as a mnemotope, which included an analysis of the bog bodies in *Le Roi des Aulnes*. Purdy most probably is still the only scholar who has previously worked on the aspect of mnemonic archaeology in Tournier.28

For his analysis of an archaeology of the bog body in Heaney and Tournier, Purdy introduces the concept of “mnemotope”, which closely follows the concept of “chronotope” in Bakhtin (Purdy 94).29 The questions Purdy raises concerning the literary figure of the bog body do not aim to shed light on why and how the bodies came to the place they were finally found by later generations. The questions aim to find out in which specific way the bog body can become a mediator between the past and the present:

Bog bodies have an extraordinary power to abolish temporal distance, to make the past present. They are not skeletal remains; they have flesh on their bones and that flesh bears the marks of their living and their dying. They have hair and beard stubble and faces with expressions we think we recognize. They have stomachs that still contain the grains and seeds and plants they ate as their last meal. In a word, with their peculiar capacity to compress time, bog bodies are exemplary mnemotopes and speak of a life anchored in an everyday that was then but is also now. To an extraordinary degree, bog bodies allow us to see time. (Purdy 94)

Not only do the tools of the archaeologist provide knowledge about the past. Language and writing of the author, too, can become the means of a special kind of archaeology. The pencil of the writer is his digging tool. It helps digging up the bodies into the present time.30 According to Purdy, the bog bodies possess a central meaning in Tournier’s novel even though they only appear once and in a rather short episode.
In the first of three important textual remarks, Purdy establishes a connection between the bog body archaeology on the one side and the accusation of aesthetizisation of the terror on the other side. The bog bodies, according to Purdy, are not signs but rather signposts: “As such they are useful guides to the way this disturbing text is ordered and a pointer to how it might best be read” (101). The novel, he concludes like many French critics in the early days, should be read less on a content level and more on a structural level. In a second textual remark, Purdy refers to the literary transformation the bog bodies undergo:

In fact, the bog bodies qua bog bodies disappear from the text after their initial discovery and do not reappear until their symbolic reincarnation at the end of the novel. In the meantime, and this is my second observation, they undergo a literary transformation into the Erl-King and the child he entices away from his father [...]. (102)

The third and most important statement by Purdy concerns the bog body as a metaphor for Auschwitz: “My third observation concerns Tournier’s bog bodies as signposts, a metaphor that foregrounds the ‘spatial turn’ taken by a novel in which all roads lead to Auschwitz” (103). In this context, the most important question concerning the novel has not yet been tackled. According to Purdy, postmodern scholars usually depart from the wrong premise. Far from offering a re-mythification of history, Tournier, according to Purdy, promotes a de-mythification which is all the more powerful, because it uses the enemy’s mythical and aesthetic perception to finally lead it ad absurdum:

[The novel offers, among other things, a very powerful critique of mythical interpretations of history […], a tactic, that Saul Friedländer misreads and chastises as uncritical complicity with the apocalyptic kitsch of Nazi aesthetics (22–3, 42). Similarly, in order to counter the strategies of seduction implicit in the Nazi aestheticization of politics, the novel has to run the political risk of being aesthetically seductive. (104)

The most important question concerning the text should therefore be: “[I]n what sense can the Erl-King be regarded as an “archaeological” novel and can fictional archaeology tell us anything of interest about German history during the Nazi period?” (105).
The point of the exercise lies not in the search for a beginning, the excavation of a more authentic self, or the restoration of a lost or tainted purity, but in the critical representation of a discourse that attempts all those things. The novel is “archaeological” in its determination to present the discourse of an allegorical archaeology as discourse, and its “archaeology” of Nazi Germany lays bare not the distant origins and hidden meaning of Nazi discourse but the Nazi discourse of distant origins and hidden meanings. (105, my italics)

The criticism of mythification in Tournier thus works on a second level, according to Purdy. In using the enemy’s tool, it more easily attacks the credibility of that discourse. The recourse to meaningfulness and sign abundance within the laid trails and references in the text is only seeming to work. The recourse is based on a widely spread reference system of signposts which themselves are always auto-referential. Instead of being real signs, they are comparable to Cullerian ‘markers’31. They are signposts to a nonexistent reality, auto-referential in their never fulfilled ambition of coincidence of the signifiant and the signifié.

A fourth observation, which goes beyond this last assumption of Purdy, or better, which takes him at his word, shall be offered in this paper. One fundamental function of Tournier’s novel as shown above, is the establishment of a new mnemonic discourse based on the antique Ars Memoria. We are talking about a literary commemoration of Auschwitz. Therefore bog bodies should not be understood as Purdy’s auto-referential signpost to a non-existing reality, but as a mnemonic metaphor that leads to Auschwitz like all the other memory metaphors in the novel (see fig. 2). The bog bodies, being misinterpreted and misappropriated by the Nazis as messengers of a glorious Germanic, pseudo-religious past, become in Tournier a mnemonic image or icon for Auschwitz. This icon in the Tournierian novel is democratic, not dictatorial. It offers an empty space (see fig. 2) to the reader that can only emerge on the basis of destroying the seductive doctrine of the “tout est signe” of Tiffauges (and the Nazis). This and only this makes the novel so fascinating and at the same time so vulnerable to criticism, because it doesn’t withdraw the interpretative sovereignty from the reader but leaves it with him. Unlike earlier literature about Auschwitz which educates the reader about right and wrong and what a memory discourse after Auschwitz is allowed to do or not do, Le Roi des Aulnes does not contain a criticism of the Nazi discourse. On the contrary, we are confronted with a criticism of the criticism. The
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reader does not slip from one authoritative system into the next. Instead, he is free to draw his own conclusions. This might in the end mislead Tournier’s reader, as Purdy already put it. But it seems to be the only way to avoid the dialectic of enlightenment that became traumatic with and after Auschwitz. The bog bodies carry this traumatic aspect:

Yet, these child-like apparitions [bog-boys or ghosts] indicate that displaced trauma returns to interrupt the present flooding it with images from another temporality: arrested, mythic and seemingly eternal. Such children do not grow up; they appear and disappear, always as they were at the time they were lost.32

The metaphorical digging of the author in the past and in deep layers of cultural memoria does not lead to a musealization33 of memory in archives. At best, it will allow people to come to terms with the past in a way that is based on a democratic approach and the liberty of each and every reader. It is not an authoritative command about the “if” and “how” of a memory discourse after Auschwitz. Tournier refutes both the thesis and the antithesis (the “dialectics of enlightenment”—the glorification as well as the condemnation of the recent political past in Europe—as inadequate strategies for coming to terms with the past.

Ars Oblivionalis or Ars Memoria?

Considering that there are so many memory metaphors, so many references to Auschwitz in the novel, one has to finally ask the question: Is there an elimination of meaning because of the over-abundance or over-saturation of signs (similar to the apocalypse that is being described by the Earl of Kaltenborn, see Tournier 302), which might lead to oblivion instead of memory? The Econian model34 of a non-defective but rather excessive ars oblivionalis could be the right model to describe this phenomenon. Let us consider for a moment oblivion as a counterpoint to memory and remembrance throughout the novel. Next to the metaphors of remembrance, there are indeed many metaphors of oblivion that can be found throughout the novel, for example, the element of water or the destruction of a building (or system), described in the crumbling down of Tiffauges’ “Cité phorique” when he first talks to Ephraim. But there is one simple reason why Tournier’s specific mnemonic technique cannot adequately be described with the water or wave metaphor that forever destroys the artwork in the sand.35 Tournier’s form of an ars memoria is a
semiotics, a lecture and interpretation of signs, as one can establish without any doubt in *Le Roi des Aulnes*. On the basis of such an *ars memoria*, an *ars oblivionalis* cannot be established: “If an art of memory is a semiotics, then we can understand why it is not possible to construct an *ars oblivionalis* on the model of an art of memory. If one did, the *ars oblivionalis* would also be a semiotics, and it is proper to a semiotics to make present something absent” (Eco 258). The Tournierian metaphor of oblivion rather allows the reader “not to forget something but to remember that one wanted to forget it” (Eco 254).

According to Eco there cannot be “defective” oblivion but possibly an “excessive” one (see Eco 259). Translated into our context, this means that, because of the excessive semiotics within the novel, the act of memory is weakened in favor of an act of oblivion. Eco describes how one can wrongly memorize something if there are too many only seemingly correct answers to a certain question (see fig. 1). It should not be denied altogether that such wrong remembering on behalf of the individual reader of Tournier is possible and could weaken the commemoration discourse that has been detected throughout the novel. But it is obvious here—and the analyzed parts of the novel prove this—that the sometimes excessive linking of different events with a special meaning does not at all promote oblivion but further activates and stimulates the process of commemoration. One piece of evidence for this is that there are no false tracks laid by the author. Only a certain number of tracks have been linked to each other. This might happen in a rather arbitrary way, as regards content, but is never devoid of meaning or a certain function. The linking might be a construed one in the case of the “Bram with the elk with Curwood with Canada with Auschwitz” (see fig. 1). Yet, this excessive information, this form of a path-connection does not lead to a dead end because there are no potentially wrong answers within the possible choice of answers. Besides, the hierarchy of meaning is not one that works from top to bottom (as in Eco) but one that works from bottom to top. This can be shown in the following two illustrations. According to the Econian model, there is originally one single referent and many different signs out of which only one sign is the correct one.
Fig. 1: “excessive” oblivion or confusion according to Eco (my figure) through semiotic overabundance

According to the Tournierian concept, there are originally many different signifiers which are not correlated to each other, neither openly nor hidden. These signifiers are then connected to each other and all come to refer to the same signified concept. In doing so, the connections can be among each other on the same level or a first degree-connection can generate a connection of second degree, as shown in the following illustration (the connections are chosen as examples and are therefore not exhaustive):

Fig. 2: “progressive” commemoration according to Tournier (my figure) through semiotic overabundance

The author here clearly acts as a successor of the “inventor” of mnemotechnique, Simonides of Ceos. He becomes the guarantor of a process of remembrance that shifts from the oral (Ephraim’s tale) into the literary/written (novel) memory. This process of remembering uses the collective memory of the readership and links it with new connotations such as the image of “Canada”.
Conclusion

We have established how, in Tournier’s novel, the reader is exposed to the methods of the antique mnemonic technique. The novel provides architectural places where mind maps are being attached by the protagonist, or the reader, which will be remembered while “walking” through the place. “Le Canada” is such a picture, being conscious of its own imagery and simulacrum character. In using these reminiscences, Tournier not only applies the methods of the ancient mnemonic technique in a reproductive manner but also in a creative-productive one. Formerly stored material is not only being recalled, but old, that is reproducible, knowledge is being generated as new knowledge, by linking it to new images and information. The specific mnemonic space within the novel of Tournier becomes an open, productive space for the reader, where memory should not be understood as a pure storage medium, but its creative part is being focused upon. Tournier makes wide use of intertextuality, not only to start a game with signs devoid of meaning, in which the mosaic of quotations and reminiscences is arbitrary and unlimited, but, with the help of a special mnemonic technique, provides a new understanding of the Shoah and the Holocaust. Behind the many and apparently arbitrary signposts, connotations and symbolical motif links, the reader finds a reference point to which all other signposts lead and which is not empty and devoid of meaning. Instead of an “excessive oblivion” (Umberto Eco), this method promotes a “progressive remembrance” (my term). Auschwitz is therefore not denied or trivialized in the novel but is created in the very centre of the novel as well as the reader’s memory. In doing so, the author contributes to cultural memoria and makes sure that this cultural memoria, which is commonly based on archives and rituals, is not in danger of becoming museal or of being forgotten because of its close contact to the very old, the stored and the relocated. As a successor of Simonides of Ceos, the author describes an atrocity that he, as a survivor and non involved person, has not witnessed. It can be said that the intertextual commemoration work of the author leads to a new understanding of the Holocaust. The author stands for the demusealization of the archives and the continued and acclaimed mnemonic discourse, without—and this is essential—denying or even camouflaging the simulacrum character of the ever incommensurable metaphor “Auschwitz.”
NOTES

6 Binjamin Wilkomirski, Bruchstücke. Aus einer Kindheit 1939–1948 (Frankfurt/M.: Jüdischer Verlag, 1995) is the author of a forged camp biography. The author himself, his real name is Grosjean, has never been in a concentration camp. Despite that, his autobiography caused a sensation as one of the “most authentical” (sic!) testimonials of the Holocaust.
13 See Aleida Assmann, Erinnerungsräume. Formen und Wandlungen des kulturellen Gedächtnisses (München: Beck, 1999), 149ff. for a discussion of the most important memory metaphors.
14 For a detailed analysis of memory metaphors in Tournier, see Regina Eickelkamp (=Regina Bergholz), Rein Grenze-Erinnerung. Spuren des Verschwindens und die „Erfindung der Wirklichkeit“ in ausgewählten Texten Michel Tourniers (Heidelberg: Winter, 2008), 185ff.
16 Günter Butzer, “Rhetorik der Meditation. Martin Mollers ‘Sollösquie de Passione Jesu Christi’ und die Tradition der eloquenta sacra”, in

17 See Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and His world (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993).


21 For the terminology of ‘hypertext’ and ‘hypotext’ see Gerard Genette, Palimpsestes. La littérature au second degré (Paris: Seuil, 1982).

22 See, for example, Maurice Cling, Vous qui entrez ici... Un enfant à Auschwitz (Paris: Graphein FNDIRP, 1999), 83–100 (Au “Canada”); or Henry Bily, Destin à part. Seul déporté rescapé de la rafle de Clans du 25 octobre 1943 (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1995), 96: “[…] je profite avec plaisir des avantages du Kanada! Je change, avec les autres du kommando, de linge et de chaussures presque quotidiennement et la nourriture est très variée.”


24 On the working conditions in the ‘Effektenlager,’ see one of the best known testimonies of a survivor: Kitty Hart, Return to Auschwitz. The remarkable story of a girl who survived the Holocaust (London: Grafton Books, 1986), 147ff. See also the Nuremberg trials documents NO–1257, NO–724, NO–606 (NO–5395). See also Centre de documentation juive contemporaine, Mémorial de la Shoah, Paris, Microfiche-format: CXXX–36 (NO 606); CXXXI–42 (NO 724) and CXXXII–31 (NO 1257).


26 Rhetorica ad Herennium III, 34.

27 See next page for the term mnemotope.

whatsoever as *bog bodies*. Significantly, Tournier’s reading of Glob has passed unnoticed and plays no part at all in the accusations of aestheticization, mythologization, and trivialization that have been made against the novel.”


30 See Heaney, “Death”, 13–14, quoted from Purdy 95: “But I have no spade to follow men like them between my finger and my thumb the squat pen rests I’ll dig with it.”


35 For the purifying and destroying character of the wave and the artist (Patricio Lagos), who always exposes himself to this form of oblivion, see Michel Tournier, *Le Medianoche amoureux* (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), 27ff.

36 The blank space in the illustration offers a possible placeholder for the individual reader.


Fifteen years before the first publication of Günter Grass’s anti-Nazi classic Die Blechtrommel, with its memorable opening: “Granted: I am an inmate of a mental hospital; my keeper is watching me…,” Hans Fallada wrote:

I am writing these lines under the threat of the hangman’s rope in the criminal asylum in Strelitz, where by the kindness of the senior public prosecutor accommodation has been found for me as “a lunatic dangerous to the public safety,” in September 1944. About every ten minutes a guard comes into my cell, looks curiously at my scribbings and asks me, what am I writing? I say: “A story for children” and continue writing. I suppress every thought about what will become of me if someone reads these lines. I have to write them.

I can feel the end of the war approaching, and before then I want to have written down what I experienced. (20–1)

But whereas Grass wrote fiction, Fallada was writing fact. Following a violent argument with his estranged wife, Fallada really was committed on 4 September 1944 to the criminal asylum in Strelitz where, having been granted access to pen and paper, he really did write a manuscript which recorded his experiences in the institution, and recalled his earlier life in Nazi Germany.

Fallada’s manuscript survived because he contrived to smuggle it out of the asylum during an escorted visit to his home on 8 October, and Fallada himself survived because he was released for good on 13 December. The manuscript indeed included “stor[ies] for children,” as well as the novel Der Trinker, which was released in 1950. However, In meinem fremden Land is the first complete publication of the autobiographical materials in the manuscript, although Fallada drew on them for the series of articles entitled “Osterfest 1933 mit der SA” which appeared in the Tägliche
Rundschau in November and December 1945, and although some extracts from the materials have been quoted in various biographical and critical studies of the author.

The editors of In meinem fremden Land identify two conflicting currents in the text, suggesting that Fallada’s account of his experiences is intended for “the defence of his own actions, of his ‘inner emigration’” (271), but that “[t]he prison diary documents above all the failure and the growing despair of an unpolitical man” (279). It is difficult to disagree with either of these assessments. Thus in the passage quoted above (which is from the second daily entry in the diary), Fallada does not simply express his willingness to tell his story in the extremely hazardous environment of “the criminal asylum in Strelitz,” but also numbers himself among the patriots who chose to suffer with their own people, by contrast with the exiles who preferred an easier life elsewhere: “But even under these conditions I say: ‘I did the right thing by staying in Germany. I am a German, and I would rather perish with this unfortunate-fortunate people than enjoy illusory happiness among foreigners!’” (21). Fallada reiterates this self-justifying and highly questionable dichotomy (which was most famously propagated by Frank Thieß and his supporters in the “Emigrantenstreit” of 1945–46) later in his diary, for example when he claims that those who stayed in Nazi Germany “said something useful here and something useful there, we supported each other, we endured, even if often we were afraid” (143), while the “fools out there in foreign countries, they’re sitting very comfortably and securely” (142). But Fallada’s defence of his “inner emigration” is undermined by his numerous stories of failure and despair. The best known and most telling of these concerns Der eiserne Gustav, the novel which was commissioned by the Reich Propaganda Ministry as the basis for a film with Emil Jannings, and which Fallada revised significantly when Jannings reported that Joseph Goebbels was dissatisfied with the manuscript. In describing how he complied with Goebbels’s instructions, Fallada no longer represents himself as resolutely prepared to “perish with this unfortunate-fortunate people,” but as simply scared for himself and his family: “I have no love for the grand gesture before tyrants’ thrones, allowing myself to be slaughtered, senselessly, helping no-one, harming my children […] after three minutes’ thought I accepted the additional commission” (170). Towards the end of the diary, Fallada is equally blunt about the quality of his literary production in Nazi Germany, declaring that after Wolf unter Wölfen (which was published in 1937) “I lapsed into shallow entertainment” (229).
While Fallada repeatedly writes about himself as a public figure—a bestselling author who sometimes encountered other people prominent in the arts or politics—he of course spent most of the years between 1933 and 1944 in Carwitz in Mecklenburg, and one section towards the end of In meinem fremden Land is devoted to his experience of village life in Hitler’s Germany. This section (which has not previously been published in any form) is particularly interesting in documenting the influence exercised by low-level Nazi functionaries, here primarily the teachers at the local school, who held numerous offices in Party and civic organisations, and who did not hesitate to show the village children photographs of alleged Polish atrocities, or to ask them “exactly where at home father has hung the picture of Hitler, and whether he says ‘Heil Hitler’ every morning and evening as well?” (213).

In another remarkable and hitherto unpublished section in the last pages of In meinem fremden Land, Fallada describes various fantasies of escape from Nazi Germany. The most extensive of these envisages a vast, well equipped and generously provisioned bunker into which the author and his family withdraw to await the end of the Second World War. As Fallada’s biographers have noted, such “Robinsonaden” were a recurring feature of his mental life; one was projected for (but then omitted from) Kleiner Mann—was nun, and another was published in Der Alpdruck. The particular significance of the elaborate “Robinsonade” in the prison diary is as a symbol of Fallada’s decision to remain in Germany after 1933, because he imagines that when he and his family descend to the bunker underneath their house, the villagers will ask each other: “‘Where can the Falladas have got to?’ […] And they will answer: ‘They must have fled abroad!’” (255). But the symbolism of this radically “inner” emigration is clearly (if perhaps unconsciously) negative, for Fallada also imagines his children staying underground so long as to lose all consciousness of the natural world, so that when the family finally re-emerges after the end of the war, a neighbour accuses the author and his wife: “How could you do that do your children?” (261).

Hans Fallada’s 1944 prison manuscript is an extraordinary document of modern German literary history, and presents considerable challenges which have been skilfully overcome by the editors of In meinem fremden Land, Jenny Williams (the eminent scholar and biographer of Fallada) and Sabine Lange (the long-serving archivist at the Fallada Archive in Mecklenburg). As a facsimile page from the manuscript in this edition (289) indicates, Fallada’s “scribblings”—the microscopic handwriting which he
employed as a defence against scrutiny by his guards—would defeat all but the most indefatigable editors. Because Fallada was writing both under psychological pressure and entirely from memory, his manuscript contains numerous factual errors, which Williams and Lange rectify in their extensive footnotes. The editors also carefully trace the revisions which Fallada made to the manuscript at the end of the war, and explore their implications for the author’s state of mind.

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James N. Bade’s book on Fontane’s landscapes offers just as many clues for close readings of three major novels of Theodor Fontane, *Schach von Wuthenow, Irrungen, Wirrungen* and *Effi Briest,* as the author perhaps intended them to be unravelled by an educated readership. In light of the extensive scholarly analysis of the works of Germany’s greatest realist novelist, today’s academic readers are certainly better prepared for the task than Fontane’s contemporaries. We not only have access to Fontane’s epistolary correspondence, his sketches for locations, an insight into his biography and how the places of his life and his wanderings are reflected in the locations of his novels with topographical exactitude. We also gained an understanding of the main themes of historical and social criticism in Fontane’s novels. Bade picks up on this comprehensive understanding of the poet’s intentions and the mass of literary analysis of subtle details in Fontane’s novels by focussing on a central category: Fontane’s “landscapes.” The choice of this category as an artistic concept is well justified. Bade analyses it in his introduction within a larger context of the landscape in literature and cultural geography and highlights Fontane’s artistry in using the “multiple layers of meaning” of landscape in order to suit his narrative purposes. Fontane, Bade says, finds beauty in the most unexpected places. More so, the modernity of the poet lies in the co-existence of the “beautiful,” be it relics of the rural in modern city life, be it the search of individual happiness in certain places, and the “ugly” in the modern Metropolis. With his multi-layered symbolism of place, Fontane is beyond the realistic writing traditions of the nineteenth century. Most and foremost, Bade
highlights Fontane’s semiotic or symbolic use of landscape in his novels, which spans a number of locations, not just Berlin. The main characteristics of Fontane’s landscape and place descriptions have to with leitmotiv in the narrative and “networks of symbolisms and associations.” Bade refers here to existing research.

The multi-layeredness of Fontane’s landscape descriptions derives, for example, from the motifs and thoughts of the protagonists; it prefigures future events and is often linked to a critical point of the novels. Perhaps the sociological function of landscape description has been neglected in Bade’s scholarly references. The social significance of address and place reflecting the social status of the protagonists in what Bade calls “landscapes of obligation” is clarified, however, in the numerous examples of analysis in the three main chapters.

With regard to the intended outcomes of the book, the “note on edition used” should be quoted: “The book is principally intended for English-speaking students of German literature as an introduction to Fontane’s best known novels by way of his landscapes.” This, in my opinion, is an understatement with regard to the scholarly significance of Bade’s study, which goes far beyond the collection of existing commentaries on Fontane’s landscape descriptions. The author not only addresses students of German studies, but the international scholarly (Fontane) community. Certainly, the book is very readable in terms of explanations of a multitude of passages in the three novels. In addition, the reader is guided through Fontane’s landscapes by illustrations provided through photographs from today’s trips to the authentic locations, most of them the author’s own pictures. One might question whether the pragmatic decision of choosing the three novels is justified. In terms of an exemplary analysis of Fontane’s landscape description techniques, it certainly is. The three novels selected present not only highlights of Fontane’s symbolic techniques, they are also different—and similar!—in making use of them for composing an historical or contemporary societal portrait. Chapter two analyses the historical novel *Schach von Wuthenow*, where Fontane moved the plot back to 1807 thereby linking Prussian officer Schach’s symbolical fate—the drama of his suicide caused by false pride when faced to marry a pockmarked woman after he made her pregnant - with the downfall of Prussia. Consequently Bade demonstrates the dominant function of landscape description in this novel as one of setting the mood. The recurrence of the setting sun emphasises the feeling of doom and approaching disaster. But the multi-layeredness of landscapes is not restricted to
“Stimmungsbilder” and effectively used sunsets. Bade thoroughly examines the incorporation of historical details such as the history of the village church of Tempelhof and its association with the Templar Order, and the references to the Prussian elite Regiment Gendarmes—details which are all equally important for the “networks of associations”! Remarkably, the author’s close reading leads to new insights into the novel. We are shown that the landscapes of the parks and palaces of Paretz and Charlottenburg (the scenes which depict the Prussian royals as examples of honesty and matrimonial happiness) are bathed in sunshine and present an exception to the “doom” in the scenes in Berlin. This contrast and also the “most abiding” image of the novel, the swans’ military parade and their farewell to the Prussian King, are mise-en-scène in Fontane in order to hint at his views of history, his “desire for the liberal renaissance of Prussia” (36). In brief, Bade’s landscape analysis adds important layers to the much-discussed topic of Victoire’s child as a hope for the future.

As for the two other novels analysed in chapters three and four, the task of the author to unravel the multitude of references associated with the depiction of landscapes and locations is somewhat more difficult. Paradoxically, this is due to the abundance of detailed analyses of the most famous passages in these novels in Fontane research, for example the attention which has been paid to the introductory chapters. Where is the thread that guides through the networks of associations of Fontane’s most famous society novels? Here, Bade has opted, on the one hand, for fairly exhaustive references to scholarly interpretations, and on the other, for a close reading that follows the scenes in a chronological order, noting and interpreting the main leitmotifs and symbolic associations in his explanations. I cannot refer in detail to the commentaries made by both Bade and other scholars. Here are just a few words on the thread Bade provides in his close reading. As for Irrungen, Wirrungen, the above mentioned social-personal connotations of the Berlin locations are clearly visible in the constellations of place descriptions in the vicinity of the Zoo, the Dörrsche nursery, Botho von Rienacker’s new elegant apartment in the New West with its window view of the Wilmersdorf church steeple—landscapes which Bade calls “landscape of remembrance” with regard to the latter part of the novel. Botho’s milieu in central Berlin Unter den Linden and his old apartment in Bellevue-Tiergarten become increasingly identified with unpalatable social responsibilities. In my opinion, the new interpretations Bade provides lie not so much in the inspection of the famous passages
of the novel such as the trip to Hankels’ Ablage and Botho’s ride to the cemetery at Rixdorf, but in comments on the latter part of the novel, parts which hint at the strengthened commitment of Botho and Käthe, for example, when Käthe wants to peer into the Schlosspark mausoleum for Queen Luise.

A comprehensive interpretation of landscapes in *Effi Briest* is just as much a challenge as it is for *Irrungen, Wirrungen*. So much has already been said on Hohen-Cremmen, Kessin, Berlin, and Fontane’s invented and authentic landscapes. No detail in the anticipatory techniques in the Hohen-Cremmen und Kessin passages has been overlooked in Bade’s synopsis. Again I would like to emphasise the author’s own findings and elaborations. They occur in the interpretations of the Rügen episode, Effie’s visit to the sacrificial stones at the Herthasee with their references to the “Schaudergeschichte” on human sacrifice so much connected to her own fate. There has been some scholarly attention paid to the material used by Fontane. It is up to Bade to evaluate this material in order to come to the conclusion that we have here Fontane “at his best [...] his characters’ emotional states are merged imperceptivity into both the landscapes and the leitmotival network of the novel” (143). The main effect of choosing and composing landscapes in *Effi Briest* lies, however, in constructing a symbolic contrast: the oppressive landscapes of Kessin and even Hohen-Cremmen are juxtaposed to the “open-minded and enlightened” landscapes of Berlin. This predominantly positive portrait of Berlin is, of course, what distinguishes *Effi Briest* from the two other novels, where central Berlin stands for a “world of social obligation” and for a society which is in “drastic need of change” (Bade). Comparing all three novels, Bade’s final conclusions and distinctions are most helpful. Fontane’s mastery lies in embedding his characters in what Bade calls “landscapes of freedom” and “landscapes of obligation”. An interesting question comes up in the application of this contrast to the city-province opposition in *Effi Briest*. Certainly, it is important to notice that the contrast with the oppressiveness of small town life in Kessin allows for the associations of central Berlin cityscapes in *Effi Briest* as ones of liberation and tolerance, which are unusual for Fontane. On closer observation, however, it cannot be overlooked that Effi is followed by her “spectre” to Berlin—to be seen in the location of the social outcast’s apartment in Kreuzberg. The melancholic leitmotiv of a window view on a cemetery and Fontane’s play with street names referring to Prussian history are explained by Bade at this juncture. Therefore, the Berlin chapters in *Effi Briest* also remind of unsolved
societal problems in the capital which should not come as a surprise with regard to the story of Effi’s downfall. However, as Bade seems to suggest, Fontane’s focus in this novel is more on the disturbing social and psychological experiences and the symbol-laden surroundings in the Kessin world.

Certainly the paradigm of “landscapes of freedom and obligation” can be applied to other novels of the author, from Stine to Die Poggenpuls and the masterpiece Der Stechlin, just to name a few. I have no doubt that Bade’s intimate knowledge of Fontane’s works and his fine scholarship in Fontane literature hints at this possible extension toward further explorations of leitmotivs and symbols in the landscapes of other novels. Bade’s enthusiasm for unravelling the various layers of meaning in Fontane’s landscape descriptions is contagious. Fontane scholars will not need to be persuaded to see the value of following the leads which are hidden in a multitude of details in Fontane’s semiotic techniques. One might also hope that the readability of the book for students of German literature will help spread interest in our great nineteenth century novelist at universities in English-speaking countries.

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   Articles normally should be 4000–9000 words; review articles, 4000 words; research notes and queries, 1500 words; reviews, 500–700 words per book reviewed; letters or brief notes, 300 words.

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(Fish, *Self-Consuming* 74) (Sawyer 15)

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CHRISTINE SMITH
University of New South Wales

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Accents will normally be omitted from capital letters in French, but the Umlaut will be used on capitals in German.

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9. **Punctuation**
Commas and periods that directly follow quotations go inside the closing inverted commas. In this case, an endnote number,
if required, should immediately follow the closing inverted commas. For example:

Austen opens her novel ironically: “It is a truth universally acknowledged, that a single man in possession of a good fortune, must be in want of a wife.”¹

A parenthetic reference intervenes between the closing inverted commas and the required punctuation. If a quotation ends with a full-stop or period, the punctuation appears after the reference. In this case, if an endnote number were needed, it would follow the final punctuation. For example:

Austen closes the chapter on a similarly sardonic note: “The business of her life was to get her daughters married; its solace was visiting and news” (53).²

All other punctuation marks—such as semicolons, colons, question marks and exclamation points—go outside closing inverted commas, except when they are part of the quoted material. If a parenthetic reference is needed, it is followed by a full-stop (and then an endnote number if necessary). For example:

Dorothea Brooke responds to her sister, “What a wonderful little almanac you are, Celia!” (Eliot 7).³
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The following language conventions should be followed in titles and subtitles. English usage favours capitals throughout the title of a book (except for prepositions and articles). German, Spanish and Italian use capitals for the first word and other words normally capitalised. French capitalises the first word and all proper nouns.

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